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Introduction
“I tried to practice ethical medicine, but it didn’t pay.”
Sandeep Jauhar, “Doctored: The Disillusionment of an American Physician”, 2014
This anecdotal evidence from the memoirs of a practicing US-cardiologist highlights one
of the key challenges faced by health care systems around the world: How to incentivize
health care service provision to ensure the control of costs and high quality of care at the
same time? Rapidly increasing expenditures and mounting inefficiencies in the health care
provision (e.g., Baicker and Goldman, 2011; Chandra and Skinner, 2012) reflect the urgent
need for action and exert pressure on health care policy-makers to design and implement
effective interventions. As these interventions typically address providers, it is of utmost
importance to understand the mechanism underlying the responses to policy interventions,
such as variations in incentives. Empirical evidence indicates that some interventions to
change incentives, which have been promising in theory, either have only moderate effects or
lead to unintended consequences when implemented in practice, such as the introduction of
performance-based bonus payments (e.g., Scott et al., 2011; Eijkenaar et al., 2013; Mendelson
et al., 2017). As one potential cause, the interventions often lack a profound understanding
on how they affect individuals’ behavior and what can explain behavioral heterogeneity.
Controlled experiments seem particularly useful in uncovering the behavioral mechanism
and can thus complement empirical work in studying the effect of policy interventions (e.g.,
Falk and Heckman, 2009). The controlled decision environment allows the researcher to
exogenously vary regulatory elements such as incentives and thus to causally test whether
1
and how policy interventions affect individual behavior without confounding factors which
are prevalent in the field (e.g., Galizzi and Wiesen, 2017, 2018).
This dissertation consists of four self-contained chapters which explore behavioral re-
sponses to policy interventions and preferences of future physicians. The method commonly
applied in all four chapters is behavioral experiments in health. Behavioral experiments can
represent an indispensable and rather inexpensive “test bed” for gaining insights about be-
havioral responses to policy interventions and the underlying behavioral mechanism (Galizzi
and Wiesen, 2017, 2018). These insights draw a number of lessons to be learned which are
valuable to inform health policy debates on the design of interventions before they are rolled
out in the field. The first chapter studies how different monitoring policies may influence
dishonest behavior in neonatal care. The following two chapters investigate physicians’
responses to financial incentives. In particular, they focus on performance-based bonus
payments and the interaction of behavioral responses with patients’ health characteristics
(Chapter 2) and physicians’ personality traits (Chapter 3). While it is well established in
health economic theory that patient-regarding altruism (Arrow, 1963) in physicians plays
a crucial role in their responses to financial incentives (e.g., Ellis and McGuire, 1986), up
to now, there is still little empirical evidence on how patient-regarding altruism in future
physicians is formed by medical education. The final paper (Chapter 4) addresses this
issue and studies patient-regarding altruistic preferences in medical students. Following
the taxonomy of Galizzi and Wiesen (2017), the experiments in all chapters are behavioral
in the sense that the outcomes of subjects’ decisions consist either of directly observable
behavioral responses (Chapters 1-3) or of directly revealed preferences (Chapter 4). In the
following, I will briefly outline the chapters of my dissertation.
The first chapter deals with the issue of correcting misaligned financial incentives in the
reimbursement of hospital services. Introduced with the intention to reduce and control
costs, the change to reimburse hospital services on the basis of diagnosis-related groups
unintentionally led to one of the most prevalent types of fraud in health care: upcoding of
2
patients into a higher reimbursed diagnosis-related group (e.g., Carter et al., 1990; Silverman
and Skinner, 2004; Dafny, 2005; Januleviciute et al., 2016; Barros and Braun, 2017; Bastani
et al., 2019). To cope with upcoding, monitoring policies, such as audits and fines, are
subject to health policy debates. So far, it is not well understood how policies need to be
designed to cope with upcoding. With a controlled laboratory experiment I analyze how
audits and fines affects upcoding, a behavior which is typically hidden in the field (e.g.,
Galizzi and Wiesen, 2017, 2018). Chapter 1 “The effects of audits and fines on upcoding
in neonatology”1 provides causal evidence on the effect of random audits with different
probabilities and financial consequences on upcoding practices in neonatal care. Using
a controlled laboratory experiment, I mimic the decision situation of the obstetrics staff
members to report birth weights of neonatal infants. Subjects’ payments in the experiment
depend on their reported birth weights and follow the German non-linear diagnosis-related
group remuneration for neonatal care. Behavioral results show that audits with low detection
probabilities only reduce fraudulent birth-weight reporting, when they are coupled with fines
for fraudulent reporting. For audit policies with fines, increasing the probability of an audit
only effectively enhances honest reporting, when switching from detectable to less gainful
undetectable upcoding is not feasible.
Chapter 2 and 3 address how individuals respond to performance pay and thus con-
tribute to the growing body of literature on the heterogeneity in physicians’ responses
to financial performance incentives (e.g., Scott et al., 2011; Mathes et al., 2019, and Jia
et al., 2021). Chapter 2 “Physicians’ incentives, patients’ characteristics, and quality
of care: A systematic experimental comparison of fee-for-service, capitation, and pay for
1This paper is co-authored by Hendrik Jürges and Daniel Wiesen. I was responsible for collecting the
data, conducted the statistical analyses, and wrote the initial draft. Hendrik Jürges gave input on the
econometric specifications and commented on the draft. Daniel Wiesen gave methodological advice and
revised the draft. This paper is published and should be cited as follows: Groß, M., Jürges, H. and Wiesen,
D. (2021), The effects of audits and fines on upcoding in neonatology. Health Economics. 30:1978-1986.
doi:10.1002/hec.4272. The layout has been adjusted for the purpose of this dissertation.
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performance”2 systematically studies how performance pay, complementing either fee-for-
service or capitation, affects physicians’ medical service provision and the quality of care.
This chapter presents causal evidence from a series of controlled experiments with physicians,
medical students, and non-medical students about the effects of performance pay on the
quantity and quality of care with heterogeneous patient types. At a within-subject level,
performance pay is introduced to complement either fee-for-service or capitation, allowing
for between-subject comparisons of the two blended pay for performance systems. A discrete
bonus is granted if a quality threshold is reached, which varies with the patients’ severity
of illness. Behavioral data show that performance pay significantly reduces non-optimal
service provision under fee-for-service and capitation and enhances the quality of care. The
effect sizes depend on the patients’ severity of illness. The effect of performance pay and
fee-for-service on the quality of care decreases in the patients’ severity of illness, while it
increases in severities for performance pay and capitation.
Chapter 3 “Physician performance pay and personality traits” studies another po-
tential source of the heterogeneity in behavioral responses to financial incentives, namely
physicians’ personality. It explores how responses to performance incentives for physicians
aimed at improving the quality of care relate to an individual’s personality traits. This
analysis uses the experimental data introduced in Chapter 2. Beyond the experimental
evidence that performance pay significantly improves the quality of care under fee-for-service
and capitation payment systems, I find differences in the provided quality of care for some
personality traits. More conscientious and more agreeable individuals respond significantly
less strongly to incentives under performance pay blended with capitation. Other personality
traits, such as extraversion, openness, and neuroticism, are not significantly related to
individuals’ behavior. Under fee-for-service payments, however, personality traits are not
2This chapter is based on a joint paper with Jeannette Brosig-Koch, Heike Hennig-Schmidt, Nadja
Kairies-Schwarz and Daniel Wiesen entitled “Physicians’ incentives, patients’ characteristics, and quality of
care: A systematic experimental comparison of fee-for-service, capitation, and pay for performance”. The
co-authors developed the experimental design and conducted the experiments. I analyzed the data and wrote
the draft which is a completely revised and extended version of a working paper by the co-authors, circulated
under the title “Physician performance pay: Evidence from a laboratory experiment” (Ruhr Economic Paper
No. 658). Heike Hennig-Schmidt and Daniel Wiesen gave methodological advice and revised the draft.
Jeannette Brosig-Koch and Nadja Kairies-Schwarz gave input on the modified direction of the paper and
commented on the revised draft.
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behaviorally relevant. These findings can be informative for incentivizing physicians better
and sorting them into incentive schemes.
Understanding how physicians respond to incentives is important for policy-makers and
researchers alike. One particularly important aspect therein is the role of physician altruism
(e.g., Arrow, 1963). Physicians’ altruistic preferences are not only key in describing responses
to financial incentives (e.g., Ellis and McGuire, 1986; Alexander, 2020) but represent a
key determinant for physicians’ behavior in general (e.g., Arrow, 1963; Allard et al., 2011;
Kolstad, 2013). Deeply rooted in the profession, physician altruism is still maintained by
the modern-day physician’s pledge stating: “The health and well-being of my patient will
be my first consideration” (World Medical Association, 2018). Despite its essential role,
surprisingly little is known empirically about how physician altruism is formed by medical
education. The final chapter presents a novel experimental choice task to elicit physicians’
altruistic preferences towards the patients’ health. Chapter 4 “Physician altruism: The
role of medical education”3 studies how patient-regarding altruism is affected by medical
education and presents structural estimates on experimental data from a large sample of
German medical students (N=733) varying in their study progresses. The estimates reveal
substantial heterogeneity in altruistic preferences across study cohorts. Patient-regarding
altruism is highest for freshmen, significantly declines for students in the pre-clinical and
clinical study phase, and tends to increase for practical-year students who are assisting in
clinical practice. Across individuals, patient-regarding altruism is higher for females and
increases in general altruism. Altruistic subjects have lower income expectations and are
more likely to choose surgery and pediatrics as their preferred specialty.
3This paper is joint work with Arthur E. Attema, Matteo M. Galizzi, Heike Hennig-Schmidt, Yassin Karay,
Olivier L’Haridon, and Daniel Wiesen. Daniel Wiesen and Heike Hennig-Schmidt developed the experimental
decision task. I was responsible for conducting the experiments, assisted by Heike Hennig-Schmidt, Yassin
Karay (and the deanery of the medical faculty), and Daniel Wiesen. I conducted the statistical analyses
and prepared the initial draft of the paper. Olivier L’Haridon performed the econometric estimations. Heike
Hennig Schmidt, Olivier L’Haridon, Daniel Wiesen, and I jointly wrote the final version of the paper. Arthur
E. Attema, Matteo M. Galizzi, and Yassin Karay reviewed and commented the manuscript.
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Chapter 1
The effects of audits and fines on upcoding in neonatology
1.1 Introduction
Upcoding of patients to attract higher diagnosis-related group (DRG) payments is a common
problem in several healthcare systems, leading to inefficiencies and financial losses (e.g.,
Carter et al., 1990; Silverman and Skinner, 2004; Dafny, 2005; Januleviciute et al., 2016;
Barros and Braun, 2017; Bastani et al., 2019). Incentives to upcode are particularly prevailing
in neonatal intensive care (e.g., Shigeoka and Fushimi, 2014; Jürges and Köberlein, 2015; Reif
et al., 2018; Hochuli, 2020). The reimbursement for neonatal care is typically determined
through birth weights reported by obstetrics staff. DRG payments non-linearly increase with
decreasing birth weights at birth-weight thresholds. In Germany, for example, reporting
weights just below a threshold may yield additional payments of more than EUR 17,000 (a
relative increase of 40%) (Jürges and Köberlein, 2015).4
To cope with upcoding, policy-makers often intend to increase the frequencies of audits.5
4According to the German DRG schedule, reported weights that fall into the category of 750g to 874g
instead of 875g to 999g, increases the average reimbursement by EUR 17,555, from EUR 45,985 to EUR
63,540; see Jürges and Köberlein (2015) for further details.
5Increasing audit frequencies for a given fine level would make dishonest behavior less attractive (e.g.,
Becker 1968). In a Beckerian sense, a utility-maximizing decision-maker weighs the expected utilities from
dishonest and honest behavior. This logic motivated health-policy reforms that were recently implemented
after much debate. For example, in Germany a recent reform of the Medical Service of the Sickness Funds
(MDK) came into effect in early 2020. It intends to sanction fraudulent reporting of hospital bills. In detail,
depending on the overall share of unobjected (or correctly billed) hospital invoices, hospitals must pay a
fine to the health insurance funds in addition to the repayment of the difference between the true and the
wrongly billed amount. In 2020, the fine amounts to 10% of the difference, but is never less than EUR 300.
From 2021, the size of the fine will differ depending on the overall share of contested bills in 2020 (Gesetz für
bessere und abhängige Prüfungen (MDK-Reformgesetz) 2019, Art. 1, §275c). In the past, German hospitals
did not face any consequences beyond the repayment of the falsely billed amounts. Moreover, hospitals have
received, and will continue to receive, EUR 300 for every audited invoice which has been correctly billed as a
lump-sum expense allowance from the health insurance fund.
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However, empirical evidence on the effectiveness of such a means is mostly lacking. Only
Hennig-Schmidt et al.’s (2019) experiment with neonatal framing shows that a random
audit coupled with a fine effectively reduces dishonesty. Similarly, Angerer et al. (2021)
find that non-optimal treatment decreases with more frequent audits in a credence goods
experiment.6 Nevertheless, it is not well understood whether a random audit alone, which
upon detection confronts individuals with their dishonesty alluding to self-image concerns
(e.g., Bénabou and Tirole, 2006), is sufficient or whether financial consequences are needed
to induce honesty.
Using a behavioral experiment, we investigate how (i) coupling random audits with
fines and (ii) increasing the audit probability affects upcoding. A controlled laboratory
experiment renders control over the decision situation and allows us to observe upcoding
which is typically hidden in the field.7 We thus complement field evidence on upcoding in
neonatal care by analyzing individual behavior in situations in which upcoding is either
detectable or undetectable through audits.
1.2 Experimental design and procedure
In a neonatal framing (Hennig-Schmidt et al., 2019), subjects role-play obstetrics staff
members charged with the task of entering birth weights ŵj of six preterm infants j in birth
reports. The birth weights wj are drawn in random order and shown on subjects’ screens:
1,200g, 1,250g, 1,300g, 1,350g, 1,400g, and 1,500g. After having seen an infant’s weight,
subjects are asked to report the birth weight ŵj = [1,150; . . .; 1,550] in 50-gram increments.
Subjects receive a fixed lump-sum payment F and variable DRG-based payments r(ŵij)
depending on subject i’s reported weight per infant. Based on empirical evidence (e.g.,
Reif et al., 2018), subjects are informed that infants receive optimal care according to their
true (not the reported) birth weights, which excludes non-financial motivations to upcode.
Consequently, treatment costs c(wj) also depend on true weights. Subject i’s overall profit is:
6For a definition of credence goods, see, for example, Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006) and for excellent
surveys of the literature, see, for example, Kerschbamer and Sutter (2017) and Balafoutas and Kerschbamer
(2020).
7For a definition of behavioral experiment in health and more on the discussion of the use of experiments
in health economics, see Galizzi and Wiesen (2017, 2018).
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πi(w, ŵ) = F +∑6j=1 r(ŵj)− c(wj). For an illustration of a decision situation, see Appendix
B.1.4.
The range of weights in the experiment comprises thresholds at 1,250g and 1,500g,
following the German DRG-scheme. Payments within a DRG are set such that average
treatment costs of an infant are mostly covered. For profits of all combinations of reported
and true weights, see Table A.1.1 in Appendix A.1.2. We refer to upcoding whenever a
birth weight is fraudulently reported to be below a threshold implying a higher DRG-based
payment.
Between-subjects, we test the effects of different audit probabilities and of a fine on
Table 1.1: Overview on experimental treatments
Detection Financial consequences
probability No fine Fine
0% (no audit) NANF (No-audit-no-fine/ Baseline):
No random audit, upcoding cannot be
detected, no fine (n= 56).
—
10% 10ANF (10%-audit-no-fine): Random
audit of subjects’ reported birth weights
with 10% probability. If upcoding is de-
tected, subjects are informed about the
detection of their fraudulent behavior,
but they are not fined (n= 38).
10AF (10%-audit-and-fine): Random
audit is equivalent to 10ANF. If up-
coding is detected, subjects are in-
formed about the detection of their
fraudulent behavior, and they are fined.
That means they only receive the fixed
amount F (n= 65).
75% — 75AF (75%-audit-and-fine): Random
audit of subjects’ reported birth weights
with 75% probability. If upcoding is de-
tected, subjects are informed about the
detection of their fraudulent behavior,
and they are fined. That means they
only receive the fixed amount F (n=
38).
Notes. The number of participants per treatment is reported in parentheses.
individuals’ reporting behavior; see Table 1.1. In our baseline (treatment NANF), subjects
report birth weights without audits and fines. To investigate audit-effects without fines, a
10%-random audit is introduced in 10ANF. A fine for fraudulent reporting is added in 10AF.
If upcoding is detected, all DRG-based payments are withheld and subjects only receive the
lump-sum F . In 75AF, the probability of an audit (hence detection and fine) is increased
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to 75%.8 We compare reporting behavior between NANF and 10ANF and between 10AF
and 75AF to analyze the effects of audits. To analyze the effect of fines (at low detection
probability), we compare treatments 10ANF and 10AF.9
The audit mechanism in 10ANF, 10AF, and 75AF relies on comparisons of reported birth
weights with infants’ weights recorded on their second day of life. Assuming that hospital
records show the correct weight on the second day after birth, and taking into account that
newborns lose about 5% of their initial weight within the first 24 hours (e.g., Flaherman et al.,
2015), the second-day weight cannot be higher than the first-day weight. The opposite would
indicate fraudulent reporting. The second-day weight plus 5% thus represents a lower bound
for the true birth weight which enables subjects to upcode without the risk of being detected.
The analogy for our experiment is that upcoding by 50g is undetectable and upcoding by
more than 100g is detectable. For true birth weights just above the thresholds (1,250g and
1,500g), upcoding to the next DRG-threshold goes undetected. Upcoding 1,500g-infants
by two DRG-thresholds is then detectable.10 In contrast, subjects always face a risk of
detection for true birth weights of 1,300g, 1,350g, and 1,400g, for which upcoding is to
report 1,200g. We are thus able to investigate effects of audits and fines on honest reporting
when either (i) only detectable upcoding is possible, (ii) undetectable upcoding is possible,
or (iii) detectable and undetectable upcoding are possible. In case a subject is audited and
upcoding is detected (for at least one infant), subjects are informed about the detection of
fraudulent behavior.
The computerized experiment programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) was conducted
via the Cologne Laboratory for Experimental Research in May and June 2019. For the
experimental protocol, see Appendix A.1.5. For treatments NANF and 10AF, we also include
data from the experiments by Hennig-Schmidt et al. (2019) which were conducted at the
8While the fine seems substantial under 10AF, a risk-neutral profit-maximizer would still upcode weights
in all decisions. An audit probability of 75% represents the cut-off value which (assuming common knowledge
about randomly drawn birth weights) implies that a profit-maximizer would only engage in undetectable
upcoding which cannot be detected by audits.
9For a detailed description of the decomposition of the effects of audits and fines, see Appendix A.1.3.
10In detail, when wj = 1, 250g, reporting a birth weight of ŵj = 1, 200g cannot be detected by an audit,
as the reported birth weight is higher than the lower bound of the true weight of 1, 187.5g on day two. The
other possibility of undetectable upcoding is represented by wj = 1, 500g (lower bound of the true weight
at the second weighing: 1,425g). Here, reporting ŵj = 1, 450g cannot be detected by an audit, whereas
reporting wj = 1, 200g can. For a graphical explanation of (detectable and undetectable) upcoding, see
Figure A.1.1 in the Appendix A.1.4.
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BonnEconLab in 2014 and 2015. Characteristics and behavior of subjects from Bonn and
Cologne did not differ significantly; see Appendix A.2.1. Overall, 197 students participated
in our experiments, 99 in Cologne and 98 in Bonn; 61% were medical students, the average
age was 23 years, and 45% were female.
1.3 Results
In all treatments, we observed substantial upcoding of neonatal cases between 37% and 82%.
We further differentiate between three types of reporting behavior: detectable upcoding,
undetectable upcoding, and honest reporting.11 Figure 1.1 shows the average proportions
for the reporting types differentiated by treatments. The observed pattern is that, the
introduction of a 10%-random audit without fine (10ANF), the introduction of a fine to
the 10%-audit (10AF), and the increase in the audit probability from 10% to 75% (75AF),
reduced detectable upcoding while undetectable upcoding increased. Honest reporting
increased at a small rate for 10ANF and more substantially for audit policies with fines
(10AF, 75AF).
We next separately analyze individuals’ honest reporting as opposed to situations in
which either only detectable or undetectable upcoding is feasible. We apply logit regression
models to analyze individuals’ behavior controlling for subjects’ characteristics: age, gender,
medical major, personality traits (Big-Five Inventory; Rammstedt and John, 2007), and
integrity (Schlenker, 2008).12 Table 1.2 reports predictive margins for honest birth-weight
reporting differentiated by treatments. Treatment differences expressed as marginal effects
at the means reflect the effects of audits and fines on the likelihood of honest reporting in
percentage points (pp).
First, we analyze honest reporting only for true birth weights, at which upcoding is always
detectable (1,300g, 1,350g, and 1,400g); see Panel A of Table 1.2. Introducing a 10%-audit
11The vast majority of decisions falls in one of the three categories. Only 8% of reported birth weights
reports per treatment deviate from these classifications of behavior and are categorized as unclassified. The
proportions of unclassified birth weight reports did not vary systematically with the treatment; see Table A.2.3
in Appendix A.2.3. For the frequencies of individuals’ choices, see Tables A.2.8 to A.2.11 in Appendix A.2.4.
12For descriptive statistics on individual characteristics by treatments, see Table A.2.2 in Appendix A.2.2.
Descriptive statistics on proportions in upcoding behavior and reported marginal effects based on regressions
without individual controls yield very similar results on the effects of an audit and fine; see Tables A.2.4,
A.2.5, A.2.6, and A.2.7 in the Appendix A.2.3.
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A. Detectable upcoding B. Undetectable upcoding C. Honest reporting
NANF 10ANF 10AF 75AF
Notes. The bar charts represent the average shares of upcoding and honest reporting differentiated by
treatments, with 95% confidence intervals. Upcoding is defined as payment-increasing misreports of birth
weights. Undetectable upcoding is achieved by misreporting birth weights by only 50g, which cannot be
detected by an audit (Panel A). Detectable upcoding implies misreporting birth weights by 100g or more,
which can always be detected by audit (Panel B). Honest reporting refers to reporting the true birth weight
(Panel C). We included all birth weights except 1,200g where (payment-increasing) upcoding is not possible
(k=985 decisions).
without a fine slightly increased honest reporting by about 7 pp (p=0.248). Adding a fine to
the 10%-random audit significantly increased honest reporting by about 33 pp (p<0.001).
An increase in audit probability from 10% to 75% (with fines) increased honest reporting by
roughly 21 pp (p=0.015).
Second, we consider the effects of audits and fines on honest reporting at 1,250g, the true
birth weight at which upcoding is undetectable; see Panel B of Table 1.2.13 Introducing a
10%-audit led to a decrease in honest reporting by about 6 pp (p=0.194). Adding a fine to an
audit with a low detection probability, increased honest reporting by about 4 pp (p=0.307).
Raising the audit probability further increased honest reporting by about 16 pp (p=0.070).
Finally, we analyze individuals’ honest reporting for the true birth weight of 1,500g. At
this weight, subjects have the opportunity to choose between detectable and undetectable
13Note that at 1,250g, reporting 1,150g would be detectable but it yields no financial gain compared to
reporting 1,200g (and remaining undetectable). Participants who choose 1,150g make an inferior decision
and we thus classify it “other” reporting behavior.
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upcoding where the former yields a higher gain; see Panel C of Table 1.2. Introducing
a 10%-audit did not significantly affect honest reporting (p=0.954). Adding a fine to it,
however, significantly increased honest reporting by about 13 pp (p=0.023). Raising the
detection probability of a random audit to 75% did also not significantly affect honesty (1
pp, p=0.887).
While rational choice options at the previously considered true birth weights are binary,
subjects have three choice options at 1,500g: honest reporting, detectable upcoding (by two
DRG-thresholds) and undetectable upcoding (by one threshold). Table 1.3 reports predictive
margins based on multinominal logit regressions for detectable and undetectable upcoding
differentiated by treatments. Treatment effects are expressed as marginal effects at the
means in percentage points (pp). We find that introducing a 10%-random audit decreased
detectable upcoding by about 18 pp (p=0.089). At the same time, however, undetectable
upcoding increased by about 19 pp (p=0.063). Obviously, honest reporting was hardly
affected. Adding a fine to the 10%-audit significantly decreased detectable upcoding by about
33 pp (p=0.002), and in parallel increased undetectable upcoding by about 20 pp (p=0.065).
With a fine, an increase in audit probabilities from 10% to 75% reduced detectable upcoding
by about 17 pp (p=0.022) and increased undetectable upcoding by about 16 pp (p=0.113).
The results reveal an unintended consequence of audits in that they shifted detectable to
undetectable upcoding rather than triggering more honest reporting.
In sum, our analyses indicate that, first, random audits with low detection probabilities
only reduced upcoding and fostered honest reporting if audits comprise fines. This emphasizes
the importance of a financial consequence to cope with dishonest behavior and complements
findings from Hennig-Schmidt et al. (2019). Second, raising the probability of an audit
increased honest reporting in the decision situations when either only detectable or only
undetectable upcoding was possible. As a separate analysis of the true birth weights of 1,500g
indicated reductions in detectable upcoding were accompanied by increases in undetectable
upcoding.
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Table 1.2: Predictive margins from logit regressions on differences in honest reporting
between experimental treatments
A. Honest reporting when only detectable upcoding is possible
(at 1,300g, 1,350g, and 1,400g; k=591 decisions)
Detection prob. No fine Fine M, in pp (p-value)
0% (no audit) 12.4% (NANF) —
10% 19.8% (10ANF) 52.4% (10AF) 32.6 (< 0.001)
75% — 73.8% (75AF)
M, in pp (p-value) 7.4 (0.248) 21.4 (0.015)
B. Honest reporting when undetectable upcoding is possible
(at 1,250g; k=197 decisions)
Detection prob. No fine Fine M, in pp (p-value)
0% (no audit) 7.4% (NANF) —
10% 1.8% (10ANF) 5.7% (10AF) 3.9 (0.307)
75% — 21.7% (75AF)
M, in pp (p-value) −5.6 (0.194) 16.0 (0.070)
C. Honest reporting when undetectable and detectable upcoding
are feasible (at 1,500g; k=196 decisions)
Detection prob. No fine Fine M, in pp (p-value)
0% (no audit) 4.3% (NANF) —
10% 3.5% (10ANF) 16.3% (10AF) 12.8 (0.023)
75% — 17.4% (75AF)
M, in pp (p-value) −0.8 (0.837) 1.2 (0.887)
Notes. This table reports predictive margins at the means of the covariates based
on logit models on honest reporting for Panels A and B and based on a multinomial
logit model on reporting behavior at 1,500g for Panel C. Upcoding is defined as
payment-increasing misreports of birth weights. Panel A estimates honest reporting
for infants for whom upcoding is always detectable in case of an audit (1,300g, 1,350g,
and 1,400g; k=591 decisions). Panel B estimates honest reporting for infants of 1,250g
for whom undetectable upcoding is possible (k=197 decisions). Undetectable upcoding
means that upcoding is achieved by misreports of birth weights by only 50g, which
cannot be detected by an audit. Panel C estimates honest reporting for infants of 1,500g
for whom undetectable upcoding is possible but less gainful than detectable upcoding
(k=196 decisions). All predictive margins are adjusted for individual characteristics,
i.e., gender, age, medical major, personality traits (Big-Five Inventory), and integrity
(Schlenker, 2008). Treatment effects (M) are differences in marginal effects at the means
(percentage points, pp). Full regression results are reported in the Appendix, Table A.2.6
and Table A.2.7.
13
Table 1.3: Predictive margins from a multinomial logit regression on differences in detectable
and undetectable upcoding at 1,500g
A. Detectable upcoding
(at 1,500g; k=196 decisions)
Detection prob. No fine Fine M, in pp (p-value)
0% (no audit) 76.2% (NANF) —
10% 57.8% (10ANF) 24.9% (10AF) −32.9 (0.002)
75% — 7.8% (75AF)
M, in pp (p-value) −18.4 (0.089) −17.1 (0.022)
B. Undetectable upcoding
(at 1,500g; k=196 decisions)
Detection prob. No fine Fine M, in pp (p-value)
0% (no audit) 19.5% (NANF) —
10% 38.7% (10ANF) 58.8% (10AF) 20.2 (0.065)
75% — 74.8% (75AF)
M, in pp (p-value) 19.2 (0.063) 16.0 (0.113)
Notes. This table reports predictive margins at the means of the covariates based
on a multinomial logit model on upcoding at 1,500g (k=196 decisions). Upcoding is
defined as payment-increasing misreports of birth weights. All predictive margins are
adjusted for individual characteristics, i.e., gender, age, medical major, personality
traits (Big-Five Inventory), and integrity (Schlenker, 2008). "Detectable upcoding" takes
place when an individual reports a weight of 1,250g or lower, "Undetectable upcoding"
takes place when an individual reports a (fraudulent birth) weight of 1,450g. Estimates
for "Honest reporting" are reported in Table 1.2. We excluded one subject with a
birth-weight entry of 1,550g. Treatment effects (M) are differences in marginal effects at
the means (percentage points, pp). Full regression results are reported in the Appendix,
Table A.2.7.
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1.4 Discussion and conclusion
Our behavioral experiment provides important insights for healthcare policy-makers on
the effects of different audit policies on upcoding in neonatology. First, random audits at
low detection probability without financial consequences are not sufficient to foster honest
reporting. Only when random audits include fining of fraudulent reporting, honesty increased
significantly. A fine seems thus to be an essential instrument carrying a signal that fraudulent
reporting of birth weights represents misbehavior and is sanctioned. Second, increasing the
frequency of random audits only induces more honesty when individuals are not able to shift
from detectable to undetectable upcoding. Hence, differentiating between detectable and
undetectable upcoding reveals the unintended consequence of audit policies to foster more
undetectable upcoding rather than honest reporting.
When interpreting behavioral consequences for the remuneration within the confines
of the experiment, upcoding led to high financial losses for payers. Without an audit, the
average payment per infant almost doubled compared to a theoretical payment under fully
honest reporting. Introducing a 10%-random audit (without a fine) reduced the financial
loss for the insurer by 10%.14 Only when subjects bore the risk of being fined for fraudulent
reporting, however, there was a noticeable drop. When a 10% or 75%-audit came with a
fine, the financial loss declined by 36% or 66% compared to no audit; see Panel A of Table
1.4. The effects are more pronounced focusing on infants for whom only detectable upcoding
is possible. Introducing a 10%-audit reduced the financial loss by 15%, a 10%-audit and fine
by 49%, and a 75%-audit and fine by 87%; see Panel B of Table 1.4.
We now separately consider remuneration effects per infant at 1,250g and 1,500g for
whom undetectable upcoding was possible. While treatment comparisons reveal that the
insurer’s financial loss due to DRG upcoding increased by 4% (10ANF) and by 3% (10AF)
for infants at 1,250g, it can be reduced by 17% only when audits occurred with high detection
probability and a fine (75AF); see Panel C of Table 1.4. However, the insurer’s loss can
14Note that the reduction in financial loss only refers to the reduced payments the insurer has to pay
per infant based on observed reporting behaviors. Potential fines which hospitals have to pay if they are
found out for misreporting birth weights are not considered in the calculation and would even lead to higher
reductions in financial losses.
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Table 1.4: Overview of mean DRG remunerations per infant by experimental treatment
Mean remuneration per infant (in Taler) Loss due to Reduction in loss
Treatment If fully honest Observed behavior upcoding (in Taler) compared to NANF (in %)
A. At all birth weights; k=985 decisions
NANF 184 343 159 –
10ANF 184 327 143 -10.1
10AF 184 286 102 -35.8
75AF 184 238 54 -66.0
B. At 1,300g, 1,350g, and 1,400g; when only detectable upcoding is possible; k=591 decisions
NANF 200 344 144 –
10ANF 200 323 123 -14.6
10AF 200 273 73 -49.3
75AF 200 219 19 -86.8
C. At 1,250g; when undetectable upcoding is possible; k=197 decisions
NANF 200 364 164 –
10ANF 200 371 171 +4.3
10AF 200 369 169 +3.0
75AF 200 337 137 -16.5
D. At 1,500g; when undetecable is possible but less gainful than detectable upcoding; k=197 decisions
NANF 120 320 200 –
10ANF 120 295 175 -12.5
10AF 120 243 123 -38.5
75AF 120 197 77 -61.5
Notes. This table reports the average DRG remuneration the insurer has to pay per infant. Upcoding is defined as payment-
increasing misreports of birth weights. In Panel A, we only consider the infants for whom upcoding is possible (birth weight
of 1,200g is excluded for our calculations). In Panel B, we only consider the infants for whom upcoding only detectable
upcoding is possible (1,300g, 1,350g, and 1,400g). In Panel C, we only consider the infant with birth weight of 1,200g for
whom undetectable upcoding is possible. In Panel D, we only consider the infant with birth weight of 1,500g for whom
undetectable upcoding is possible but less gainful detectable upcoding. Under full honest reporting, we report the average
hypothetical remuneration for the true birth weight of the respective infants. Observed behavior refers to our behavioral
data differentiated by treatments. We have calculated the mean remuneration of every subject per infant based on the
reported birth weights. We report the financial loss for the insurer due to DRG upcoding as the difference between fully
honest reporting and our behavioral data. In the last column, we calculate the relative differences of financial loss between
the respective audit and our baseline treatment. All monetary amounts are given in Taler, our experimental currency, the
exchange rate being 1 Taler = 0.01 EUR.
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be reduced by 13% (10ANF), by 39% (10ANF), and by 62% (75AF) for infants with true
birth weights of 1,500g; see Panel D of Table 1.4. This decline can be explained by upcoding
infants with true birth weights of 1,500g by one instead of two DRG thresholds. Thus,
switching from detectable to less gainful undetectable upcoding reduced the payments to
some extent.
The results should be interpreted within the confines of our experimental setup. The
implementation of audit policies comes at costs, such as set-up costs for monitoring programs,
personnel costs, and costs for potential false positive findings which need to be weighed against
the savings in expenditures due to less upcoding. Further, beyond the financial savings
which can be realized through changing individuals’ reporting behavior when introducing
audits, fines for detected fraudulent behavior under audits help to reduce the losses insurers
face due to upcoding. When considering a real-world health setting, it remains unclear
whether the detection of dishonest behavior would imply psychological costs, for example
derived by concerns for social reputation or self-respect (e.g., Bénabou and Tirole, 2006) and
observed lying aversion (e.g., Dufwenberg and Dufwenberg, 2018; Gneezy et al., 2018), which
could vary between the lab and the field and might thus lead to different kinds of upcoding
behavior. While evaluating costs and benefits is at the discretion of health policy-makers,
our findings at least provide some directional guidance for the ongoing debates on the design
and implementation of audit policies. Our experimental study suggests interesting paths for
future research; for example, in the form of an analysis of reporting behavior under a high
detection probability without financial consequences in case of detection, and situations in
which upcoding does not yield financial gains. In these ways, the preferences of individuals
for dishonesty could be investigated further.
In sum, our results suggest that audits with fines can, on the aggregate, reduce upcoding
while not necessarily inducing more honesty. Audits might still decrease dishonesty by
pushing dishonest individuals into reporting fraudulently to an extent that is not detectable.
This calls for a design of audit policies that makes the detection of dishonest behavior more
likely, for example, through audit mechanisms that reduce measurement errors.
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Chapter 2
Physicians’ incentives, patients’ characteristics, and quality of
care: A systematic experimental comparison of fee-for-service,
capitation, and pay for performance
2.1 Introduction
Paying physicians for performance has become prominent among health policy-makers, for
example in the USA (e.g., Rosenthal et al., 2006; Stokes et al., 2018; Song et al., 2019) and
in the UK (e.g., Roland, 2004; Doran et al., 2006; Roland and Campbell, 2014). Performance
pay (P4P) is usually granted if a quality threshold is reached. Traditional physician payment
systems are lump-sum capitation (CAP) or fee-for-service (FFS), in which physicians receive
a fee for each service provided, with FFS typically being used in specialty care and CAP
being prevalent in primary care (for Germany, see Brosig-Koch et al. 2020). These systems,
generally, are not tied to the quality of care provided. FFS incentivizes physicians to
overserve patients, whereas CAP embeds an incentive to underserve them. Thus, paying
physicians on the basis of direct performance measures has attracted particular attention.
In health care, P4P typically complements either FFS or CAP. From a theoretical
point of view, blending P4P with FFS (FFS+P4P) is likely to affect physicians’ medical
service provision differently compared to P4P blended with capitation (CAP+P4P), due
to the different incentives of the baseline payment systems. A systematic comparison of
the effectiveness of P4P between CAP and FFS based on comparable designs is lacking.
Also, it is not well understood how patients with different severities of illness are affected by
incentives of the P4P systems. The heterogeneous impact of payment incentives on different
patient types has been indicated in recent empirical (e.g., Clemens and Gottlieb, 2014) and
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experimental studies (e.g., Hennig-Schmidt et al., 2011; Brosig-Koch et al., 2017a).
The empirical evidence on whether and, if so, how P4P affects physicians’ medical service
provision and quality of care, is rather mixed (e.g., Scott et al., 2011; Emmert et al., 2012;
Eijkenaar et al., 2013; Milstein and Schreyögg, 2016). Moreover, it has been argued that
the design of a P4P system is key to effectively changing physician behavior (Epstein, 2012;
Maynard, 2012; Kristensen et al., 2016; Anselmi et al., 2020). Potential reasons for the
difficulty in establishing a causal link between performance pay and physicians’ provision
behavior comprise the likely endogeneity of institutions (e.g., Baicker and Goldman, 2011),
the biased and incomplete performance measures (e.g., Mullen et al., 2010), measurement
errors (e.g., Campbell et al., 2009), the limited availability of data (e.g., Gravelle et al., 2010;
Maynard, 2012), and introduction of P4P in parallel to other interventions (e.g., Lindenauer
et al., 2007).
Our study contributes to better understanding the effects of different P4P systems on the
quantity and quality of care. To this end, we designed a controlled behavioral experiment, in
which the physicians’ financial incentives in baseline FFS and CAP are mirror images of each
other. We complement FFS and CAP with a discrete bonus that is kept constant across both
payment systems FFS+P4P and CAP+P4P. The bonus is paid when a quality threshold
tied to a patient’s optimal health outcome is reached. Meeting the quality threshold still
allows for over- and underprovision, as we assume asymmetric information between the
physician and the payer. Service provision according to the threshold thus might increase
the physician’s profit while still not providing the optimal care. This mirror design allows
us to systematically compare the two blended payment schemes (FFS+P4P and CAP+P4P)
– an analysis that is currently missing in the literature. In addition, we keep the patient
population constant. Physicians are confronted with identical patients regarding their
severities of illness and their marginal health benefit from each medical service provided.
This feature allows us to investigate systematically whether the effects of P4P are specific to
patients’ illnesses and severities of illness despite the mirror design of the payment systems.
Finally, we also consider health policy implications, including cost-benefit analyses, for our
experimental design of performance incentives.
Our experimental design is well grounded in theory. Behavioral predictions are derived
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from an illustrative model and are tested with physicians in lab-in-the-field conditions and
with medical and non-medical students in lab experiments. To establish the causal link
between P4P and the quantity and quality of medical service provision, we exogenously vary
physicians’ remuneration at a within-subject level from the baseline non-blended payment
schemes to the blended performance-pay systems. In a medically framed decision situation,
subjects decide on the quantity of medical services for abstracted patients with different
severities of illness (mild, intermediate, severe) and marginal health benefits (low, high).
Quantity choices determine the physicians’ own profit and the patients’ health benefits
measured in monetary terms. Participants are informed that their decisions affect the health
of real-world patients, as the money corresponding to the aggregated health benefits is
transferred to a charity and is used exclusively for surgery of cataract patients. For an
analogous procedure, see, for example, Hennig-Schmidt et al. (2011), Brosig-Koch et al.
(2016, 2017a, 2020), and Waibel and Wiesen (2021).
With our parsimonious experiment, we address the following research questions. First, we
analyze how the effect of introducing P4P affects medical service provision and the quality
of care when complementing FFS. Second, we study whether such an effect is specific to
the patients’ characteristics such as the severity of illness and the marginal health benefit.
Third, we explore the effect of P4P blended with baseline CAP, and fourth, we investigate
the effect differences that are due to the patients’ health characteristics. Finally, in a joint
analysis, we examine whether potential differences in subjects’ reactions to FFS and CAP
exist and whether the P4P effect varies between FFS+P4P and CAP+P4P, despite the
mirror-image design of financial incentives.
Our behavioral results indicate that the introduction of P4P reduces non-optimal service
provision, enhances the quality of care, and patients’ health benefit under FFS and under
CAP. We find that the effects of P4P are specific to the patients’ severities of illness. Under
FFS, the marginal benefit of P4P on medical service provision, the quality of care as well
as the patients’ health benefit decreases in patients’ severity of illness. Under CAP, we
observe the reverse pattern: the marginal benefit of P4P increases with increasing severity.
In other words, our behavioral results indicate that the introduction of pay for performance
is most beneficial for mildly ill patients under FFS, whereas it is most beneficial for highly
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ill patients under CAP. Patients of intermediate severity of illness are almost equally treated
under both performance-pay systems.
While our results suggest that P4P serves as a means to counteract misaligned financial
incentives for overprovision under FFS and underprovision under CAP, they also emphasize
the importance of its design elements. Utilizing the symmetric design components across
baseline payment conditions, we are also able to analyze the cost effectiveness of introducing
P4P under both payment conditions and derive health-policy implications. In sum, health
policy-makers need to take into account that the effectiveness of P4P is specific to a patient’s
severity of illness and the underlying baseline payment condition when designing P4P
systems.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 lists the streams in the health economics
literature to which our paper contributes. Section 2.3 describes our experimental design and
behavioral hypotheses. Section 4.5 presents the behavioral results. In Section 2.5, we discuss
implications of our results and potential limitations. Section 4.6 concludes.
2.2 Contribution to the literature
We contribute to several streams in the health economics literature. First, we complement
the empirical literature that analyzes the effects of P4P on physicians’ treatment decisions.
Quite often, P4P programs are evaluated using administrative longitudinal data. Empirical
evidence is rather mixed, showing only modest positive effects (if at all) on the quality of
medical service provision; for extensive literature reviews, see Scott et al. (2011) for primary
care, Jia et al. (2021) for general outpatient care, and Mathes et al. (2019) for inpatient care.
Mullen et al. (2010), for example, using longitudinally data from quarterly performance
reports, find only little empirical support for a positive effect of introducing P4P on process
quality of multi-specialty medical groups in the US. Studies mostly evidence some increase in
a few clinical processes; yet, the P4P effects on outcome quality are not clear (e.g., Peckham
and Wallace, 2010; Li et al., 2014). While empirical studies typically rely on aggregated
data, we add insights on a causal effect of P4P at the individual subject level. The highly
controlled environment in our experiment allows us to implement “clean” measures for the
21
quality of medical service provision of the individual physicians. It also enables us to analyze
systematically how variations in patients’ health characteristics and payment systems (CAP
versus FFS) relate to the effect of P4P.
Second, our study contributes to the scarce experimental literature analyzing performance
pay for physicians by means of controlled behavioral experiments. These studies provide first
evidence for a positive effect of P4P on physicians’ treatment behavior (e.g., Brosig-Koch
et al., 2020; Oxholm et al., 2021). Our study differs, however, from this literature by
systematically analyzing the effects of FFS and CAP as well as of the respective blended
P4P systems. The study by Brosig-Koch et al. (2020), with a representative primary-care
physician sample, investigates the effect of a threshold-based P4P system with a discrete
bonus blended with CAP, analogously to our CAP+P4P condition. A lab experiment with
Danish medical students by Oxholm et al. (2021) shows that P4P affects the allocation
of medical care across patients with low and high responsiveness to treatment compared
to lump-sum CAP payments. Considering FFS and P4P, Keser et al. (2014) report from
a laboratory experiment with German medical students that a bonus tied to the share of
optimally treated patients leads to some increase in the quality of care. In a lab experiment
with US medical students, Cox et al. (2016b) find that utilizing P4P mechanisms incentivizes
cost-effective reductions in hospital re-admissions.
Third, we add to the literature on behavioral experiments in health (Galizzi and Wiesen,
2017, 2018), focusing on incentives and physician behavior. In particular, our study comple-
ments experiments in a medical framework analyzing the effects of financial incentives on
physician behavior, such as FFS or CAP (Hennig-Schmidt et al., 2011; Hennig-Schmidt and
Wiesen, 2014; Green, 2014; Brosig-Koch et al., 2016; Lagarde and Blaauw, 2017; Di Guida
et al., 2019; Martinsson and Persson, 2019; Reif et al., 2020) and blended payment systems
(Brosig-Koch et al., 2017a, 2020). In a broader sense, we also relate to the experimental
literature on credence goods markets, which typically apply neutral framings but for which
health care characterized by high information asymmetries is a key example (e.g., Dulleck
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and Kerschbamer, 2006; Dulleck et al., 2011).15 Our study adds causal evidence on how, in
P4P systems, physician behavior is affected by the baseline payment (FFS versus CAP), how
patient characteristics influence treatment decisions, and which design features of a payment
system could potentially be implemented to enhance the quality of care for different patient
types.
2.3 Experimental design, protocol, and hypotheses
2.3.1 Decision situation
Our experiment employs a medical frame. All subjects decide in the role of physicians on
the provision of medical services. We employ a within-subject design to analyze the effect of
P4P on physicians’ provision of medical services. To this end, each subject makes his or her
decisions under non-blended and blended payments. First, subjects are incentivized either
by FFS or by CAP, which serve as baseline payments. Second, we introduce physicians’ P4P
in addition to the respective baseline payments (FFS+P4P or CAP+P4P). We randomly
assign subjects to one of the two experimental conditions.16
In all payment systems, physician i decides on the quantity of medical services q ∈ [0, 10]
for nine different patients (j = 1, . . . , 9). Patients differ in illnesses k ∈ {A,B,C} and in
the severity of illnesses l ∈ {x, y, z}. Patients are assumed to be passive and fully insured,
accepting each quantity of medical services provided by the physician. This is a common
assumption in the theoretical health economics literature (for a comprehensive review, for
example, see McGuire, 2000), corresponding to the assumption of information asymmetry
15Medical services are considered as credence goods due to high informational advantages of physicians
towards their patients. This enables physicians to exploit their patients, for example through overtreatment
under FFS. In our experimental design, we incorporate the “credence goods” problematic by assuming that our
patients are passive and accept each quantity of medical services provided by the physician. Typically applying
neutral framings, experiments in the credence goods literature showed that overtreatment can be reduced
by costly second opinions (Mimra et al., 2016), competition (Huck et al., 2016), and separating treatment
from diagnosis and prescription decisions (Greiner et al., 2017). Recent experiments show that monitoring
mechanisms with financial consequences reduce overtreatment and the overcharging of patients (Angerer
et al., 2021; Hennig-Schmidt et al., 2019; and Groß et al., 2021). We complement these experiments by
investigating whether performance-based financial incentives which implicitly rely on monitoring a physician’s
performance are capable of coping with non-optimal medical service provision such as overtreatment under
FFS.
16Notice that the general decision situation of our experiment is similar to Hennig-Schmidt et al. (2011),
Hennig-Schmidt and Wiesen (2014), Brosig-Koch et al. (2016, 2017a), and Brosig-Koch et al. (2020). In the
latter three studies, incentives under FFS (CAP) are the same as in the present paper.
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between expert (physician) and customer (patient) in the credence goods literature (e.g.,
Dulleck and Kerschbamer, 2006). In our experiment, patients’ characteristics are the same
in all payment conditions. The patient population for which a physician chooses services
thus remains constant.
Physician i’s payment is R(q) = L+ pq + blIbl , with L being the lump-sum payment, p
the fee per service rendered to a patient, and bl the bonus payment; Ibl denotes an indicator
variable which equals 1, if the physician’s chosen quantity does not differ by more than one
unit from the patient’s optimal treatment, and 0 otherwise. In FFS, L = 0 and bFFSl = 0 and
in CAP p = 0, and bCAPl = 0.
Physician i’s profit is given as
π(q) = L+ pq + blIbl − c(q), (2.1)
with L, p, bl ≥ 0, c′(q) > 0 and c′′(q) > 0. In the experiment, c(q) = q2/10 for all payment
systems.
When deciding on q, physician i simultaneously determines her own profit π(q) and the
patient’s health benefit H(q) for patient j. Common to all patients’ health-benefit functions




H0 + θq if q ≤ q∗
H1 − θq if q ≥ q∗,
(2.2)
with H0, H1 ≥ 0 and θ > 0.17 In particular, for illnesses A and B θ = 1, and for illness C
θ = 2. For illnesses A, B, and C, the maximum health benefit is HA(q∗) = 7, HB(q∗) = 10,
17Note that H1 = H0 + 2θq∗. H0 and H1 are allowed to be different, which reflects the patient health
benefit parameters in the experiment. For example, for illness A (with θ = 1) and severity x (with q∗ = 3),
H0 = 4 and H1 = 10, as H1 = 4 + 2 · 1 · 3 = 10.
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and HC(q∗) = 14, respectively. 18
The patient-optimal quantity q∗ depends on a patient’s severity of illness l. For mild (x),
intermediate (y), and high (z) severe illnesses, the patient-optimal quantities are q∗x = 3,
q∗y = 5, and q∗z = 7, respectively. Varying patients’ characteristics in our experiment are
motivated by the recent theoretical literature (see, e.g., Allard et al., 2011), which assumes
that patients’ characteristics affect the physicians’ behavior. Figure B.1.2 in Appendix B.1.3
illustrates the patient health benefits in our experiment, which are varied systematically
for the patients’ illness k and severity of illness l. The differences in optimal quantities
and marginal health benefits by patients’ characteristics are motivated by recent claims
for more value-based health care which focuses on patients’ needs. In the experiment, the
patient-optimal quantity q∗ for all patients is common knowledge, so are all parameters of
the experiment. Thus, when making their quantity choices, physicians are aware of cost,
payment, profit, and the patient’s health benefit for each quantity; for an illustration of the
decision situation, see the instructions in Appendix B.1.4.19
Our experimental design enables us to investigate how different payment schemes and
performance-based payment components, which are linked to the generated health benefit
(health outcome), affect treatment decisions. We are able, first, to analyze the quantity
of medical services and, second, to introduce a “clean” quality measure related to the
patient-optimal treatment. Moreover, the symmetric design of patient health benefits implies
that the marginal effects (i.e., the absolute value of H ′(q)) of over- and underprovision of
medical services are equivalent. This parsimonious design with mirror-image incentives
allows for a systematic comparison of incentives from P4P on the quantity and quality of
18Patients’ health benefits are measured in monetary terms. The accumulated benefits are then transferred
to a charity that supports surgical treatment of real cataract patients. Note that this “mechanism” implies
that a monetary amount deriving from subjects’ decisions in the lab is applied to the treatment of real
patients, which makes it different from the kinds of donations analyzed in the charitable-giving literature;
see, for example, Andreoni (1989) or DellaVigna et al. (2012). This procedure, which was introduced by
Hennig-Schmidt et al. (2011), has been used in several experiments in health economics, as it embeds an
incentive for subjects in the experiment that relates to real patients’ health in the real world. Equivalent
mechanisms have been employed in recent behavioral experiments in the field of health care which have
analyzed physician behavior (Hennig-Schmidt and Wiesen, 2014; Godager et al., 2016; Brosig-Koch et al.,
2016, 2017a, 2020; Byambadalai et al., 2019; Di Guida et al., 2019; Martinsson and Persson, 2019; Huesmann
et al., 2020; Waibel and Wiesen, 2021; Wang et al., 2020). In Kesternich et al. (2015) and Lagarde and Blaauw
(2017), subjects could choose from several (medical) charities to which a donation could be transferred.
19This allows a clean analysis of the extent to which patient-regarding concerns guide physicians’ medical
service provision, while excluding potential additional influences like risk preferences.
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care and a systematic cost-benefits analysis.
2.3.2 Payment systems
Recall that each subject decides in the role of a physician on the provision of medical services
under non-blended and blended payment systems. Table 2.1 provides an overview of payment
systems employed in our experiment. In part I of the experiment, subjects decide either
under FFS or CAP. Subjects paid by FFS (CAP) in part I decide under the associated P4P
system (FFS+P4P or CAP+P4P) in part II. The profit functions of FFS and FFS+P4P
systems mirror those of the respective CAP and CAP+P4P systems. While varying the
components of the payment systems, we keep maximum profit levels and marginal profits
constant. The profit parameters are illustrated in Figure B.1.3, and the complete set of
parameter values is shown in Table B.1.2 in Appendix B.1.3.
In FFS, physicians are paid a fee of p = 2 per service. Accordingly, profit is π(q) = 2q−c(q).
In CAP, physicians receive a lump-sum payment of L = 10 per patient, independently of
the quantity of medical services. Physicians’ profit per patient is thus π(q) = 10 − c(q)
with the maximum attainable profit being 10 in both payment systems FFS and CAP. The
profit-maximizing quantity of medical services for each of the nine patients is q̂FFSj = 10 and
q̂CAPj = 0 in FFS and CAP, respectively. This reflects the prevalent financial incentives for
overprovision under FFS and underprovision under CAP.
Table 2.1: Experimental parameters
First part of the experiment Second part of the experiment Subjects (physicians, medical
(Non-blended payment systems) (Blended payment systems) students, non-medical students)
Payment L p R Payment Severity l L p bl R
FFS – 2 2q FFS+P4P x – 2 5.6 2q + 5.6 52 (10, 22, 20)
y – 2 3.6 2q + 3.6
z – 2 2.4 2q + 2.4
CAP 10 – 10 CAP+P4P x 10 – 2.4 10 + 2.4 55 (10, 22, 23)
y 10 – 3.6 10 + 3.6
z 10 – 5.6 10 + 5.6
Notes. This table shows the parameters and the number of participants in each experimental part. Note that the performance
pay bl is only granted to subjects if their quantity choice fulfills the quality requirement |q−q∗| ≤ 1; otherwise the performance
pay equals zero. Data for the non-blended payment systems correspond to a part of the data analyzed in Brosig-Koch et al.
(2016).
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Our performance measure is linked to a patient’s health outcome – namely, the optimal
patient health benefit. P4P is granted if the quantity chosen by a physician does not deviate
by more than one unit from the patient-optimal quantity q∗; i.e., whenever |q − q∗| ≤ 1.
We thereby assume that the quality is not fully contractible due to information asymmetry.
P4P systems, thus, mitigate inherent incentives to provide too many services under FFS and
too few under CAP, respectively. In our experiment, we determine the profit-maximizing
quantities under P4P such that they are “closer” to the patient-optimal quantities than in
non-blended FFS or CAP, but do not coincide with them. Since the design of performance-
based bonus payments incentivizes the smallest possible deviation from q∗ instead of q∗
itself, we are also able to differentiate between profit maximization and optimal patient care
in our P4P conditions.
We set bonus rates such that incentives are comparable across payment systems. For
severities x, y, and z, bFFSx = 5.6, bFFSy = 3.6, bFFSz = 2.4 in FFS+P4P, and bCAPx = 2.4,
bCAPy = 3.6, bCAPz = 5.6 in CAP+P4P, respectively. The bonus implies an increase in the
maximum attainable profit π(q̂j) by 20 percent. For each severity, choosing q̂j equal to 4, 6,
or 8 (2, 4, or 6) in FFS+P4P (CAP+P4P) thus yields a profit of 12 for the physician.
2.3.3 Experimental protocol
Overall, 107 subjects participated in our experiment. Among these were 44 medical and 43
non-medical students who took part in the lab experiments and 20 physicians who took part
in artefactual field experiments. Each subject was randomly assigned to only one of the two
baseline payment systems. In particular, 55 subjects took part in CAP/CAP+P4P and 52
in FFS/FFS+P4P; with 22 medical students and 10 physicians under each payment system;
see Table 2.1.
The computerized experiment was programmed with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Physi-
cians and students were presented with identical computer screens, instructions, and compre-
hension questions. The only differences were a higher exchange factor from the experimental
currency to Euro for the physicians’ payoffs compared to the students’ payoffs and minor
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deviations in the experimental procedure.20 The artefactual field experiments were conducted
in 2012 and 2013 using the mobile lab of the Essen Laboratory for Experimental Economics
(elfe) at the Academy for Training and Education of Physicians (Akademie für Ärztliche
Fort- und Weiterbildung) in Bad Nauheim, Germany. At the Academy, German physicians
contracting with the statutory health insurers take mandatory annual education and training
courses. The physicians were recruited by announcements in their courses. They voluntarily
participated before or after their courses. The lab experiments were conducted between 2011
and 2013 at elfe at the University of Duisburg-Essen.21 Student subjects were recruited via
the online recruiting system ORSEE (Greiner, 2015).
The experimental procedure was as follows: Upon arrival, subjects were randomly assigned
to workstations separated by panels to ensure that decisions could be made in full anonymity.
They then were given ample time to read the instructions for part I. Subjects were informed
that the experiment consisted of two parts, but received detailed instructions for part II only
after having finished part I of the experiment. To check for the subjects’ understanding of
the decision task, they had to answer a set of control questions. The experiment did not start
unless all subjects had answered the control questions correctly. Instructions are to be found
in Appendix B.1.4. In each of the two parts of the experiment, subjects then subsequently
decided on the quantity of medical services for each of the nine patients, i.e., for each possible
combination of illnesses and severities. The order of patients was randomly determined and
kept constant for all subjects and all conditions: Bx,Cx,Az,By,Bz,Ay,Cz,Ax,Cy.
Before making their decision for a specific patient, subjects were informed about their
payment, their cost and profit, as well as about the patient benefit for each quantity from 0
to 10. All monetary amounts are given in Taler, our experimental currency. The exchange
rate is 1 Taler = EUR 0.80 in the lab experiment and 1 Taler = EUR 3.40 in the artefactual
field experiment. Compared to the lab, the payment in the field experiment was increased
20Before the experiments, physicians were briefly introduced to the experimental economics method, the
universities involved in running the experiment, and the funding institution of our research project (DFG,
German Research Foundation). After the experiment, physicians were debriefed and informed about results
of previous health-related economic experiments.
21For a picture of the setup of the mobile lab in Bad Nauheim and the typical setup of the computer
laboratory at elfe, see B.1.1 in Appendix B.1.1.
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by a factor of 4.25 to provide adequate incentives for the physicians.22 The procedure was
exactly the same in part II of the experiment. After finishing part II, we asked the subjects
to complete a questionnaire on social demographics (e.g., age and gender) and on personality
traits elicited by a ten-item personality inventory, which comprises five personality dimen-
sions: extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, and openness (Rammstedt
and John, 2007). An overview on summary statistics on social demographics and personality
traits can be found in Table B.1.1 in Appendix B.1.2.
At the end of the experiment, when all subjects had made their decisions, we randomly
determined one decision in each part of the experiment to be relevant for a subject’s actual
payoff and the patient benefit. This was done to rule out income effects. Subjects were paid
in private according to these two randomly determined decisions.
To verify that the money corresponding to the sum of patient benefits in a session was
actually transferred to the charity, we applied a procedure similar to Hennig-Schmidt et al.
(2011) and Brosig-Koch et al. (2016, 2017a). One of the participants was randomly chosen
to be the monitor. After the experiment, the monitor verified that a payment order on the
aggregated benefit in the respective session was written to the financial department of the
University of Duisburg-Essen to transfer the money to the Christoffel Blindenmission, which
used the monetary transfers exclusively to support surgical treatments of cataract patients
in a hospital in Masvingo (Zimbabwe) staffed by ophthalmologists from the charity.23 The
order was sealed in an envelope and the monitor and the experimenter then walked together
to the nearest mailbox and deposited the envelope. The monitor was paid an additional
EUR 5.
Laboratory sessions lasted for about 60 minutes. Subjects earned, on average, EUR 16.37.
The average benefit per patient was EUR 13.25. In total, EUR 1,152.80 were transferred to
the Christoffel Blindenmission. The average cost for a cataract operation amounts, according
22The amount physicians could earn in the experiment was set such that it reflects the average net hourly
wage of a physician in Germany, bearing in mind potential differences, for example across the physicians’
specialization and seniority. We set this factor after consultation with Dr. Harald Herholz of the Association
of Statutory Health Insurance Physicians in Hesse (Germany), who has been involved in budget negotiations
for physicians’ remuneration.
23Notice that we did not inform the subjects that the money was assigned to a developing country. We
wanted to avoid motives like compassion for people in developing countries that are independent of being in
need of ophthalmic surgery. Feedback from the subjects in a pre-experimental pilot session in Hennig-Schmidt
et al. (2011) actually raised this issue.
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to the Christoffel Blindenmission, to about EUR 30. Thus, our experiment allowed 38
cataract patients to be treated. The sessions of the artefactual field experiment lasted
for about 50 minutes. Physicians earned, on average, EUR 62.73. The average benefit
per patient was EUR 67.83. In total, EUR 1,356.60 were transferred to the Christoffel
Blindenmission, allowing the treatment of 45 cataract patients.
2.3.4 Behavioral hypotheses
To organize our thoughts, we now describe the physicians’ behavior more formally and
derive behavioral predictions for our experiment. To this end, we follow the intuition of an
illustrative model by Brosig-Koch et al. (2017a). The formal model is relegated to Appendix
B.2. We assume that a physician derives utility from her own profit and from a patient’s
health benefit. The weight the physician attaches to the patient’s health benefit is interpreted
as a measure for physician altruism. The assumption of physicians being altruistic has
become common in the health economics literature, since Arrow (1963) coined the importance
of physicians’ patient-regarding motivation in the delivery of medical services.24
First, we consider a physician’s behavior under the baseline payment systems FFS and
CAP. For the profit and patient benefit parameters in our experiment and the given altruism
of a physician, we conjecture that FFS induces overprovision of medical services, which
decreases in the severity of a patient’s illness and in the patient’s marginal health benefit.
On the contrary, we expect that CAP induces underprovision of medical services, which
increases in the severity of illness, and decreases in the marginal health benefit. Ample
evidence for these conjectures on effects of FFS and CAP exists from related experiments
(e.g., Hennig-Schmidt et al., 2011; Brosig-Koch et al., 2016, 2017a; Martinsson and Persson,
2019; Brosig-Koch et al., 2020). With a higher severity of illness, more medical services are
provided (Hennig-Schmidt et al., 2011; Brosig-Koch et al., 2016, 2017a; Brosig-Koch et al.,
2020). These behavioral effects related to the severity of illness are particularly relevant
in our experiment, as the levels of P4P are tied to the patients’ severity of illness; for an
24In addition to the importance for designing optimal payment schemes (e.g., Ellis and McGuire, 1986,
1990; Ma, 1994; Chalkley and Malcomson, 1998; Jack, 2005; Choné and Ma, 2011; Olivella and Siciliani,
2017), a physician’s altruism is essential, for example in analyzing referral decisions (Allard et al., 2011;
Waibel and Wiesen, 2021), responses to transparency (Kolstad, 2013), prescription of generic drugs (e.g.,
Hellerstein, 1998; Crea et al., 2019), and the delegation of treatment decisions (Liu and Ma, 2013).
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illustration, see Figure B.1.3 in Appendix B.1.3.25
Our main focus is on the effect of P4P. When introducing P4P the bonus bl is granted
if and only if a physician’s treatment decision meets the quality threshold |q − q∗| ≤ 1
for a patient with a severity of illness l. Recall that we thus assume that the quality is
not fully contractible due to information asymmetry between physician and payer. By
linking performance pay to the optimal health benefit, the interests of the physician and
the patient become (more) aligned. While P4P incentivizes less altruistic physicians to
provide medical services ‘close’ to the patient-optimal quantity, baseline financial incentives
for underprovision under CAP and overprovision under FFS are still inherent (albeit to a
substantially lower extent). Hence, we conjecture that P4P reduces overprovision of medical
services in FFS and underprovision in CAP. For the proof, see Appendix B.2.
Intuitively, whether a physician under baseline FFS and CAP chooses a quantity of
medical services corresponding to the quality threshold depends on physician i’s degree of
altruism towards the patient, which counterbalances the incentive effects of FFS and CAP.
Given a physician’s altruism αi ∈ [0, 1), we therefore expect P4P to reduce non-optimal
service provision under FFS+P4P and CAP+P4P. Previous experimental evidence (Hennig-
Schmidt et al., 2011; Brosig-Koch et al., 2016, 2017a; Brosig-Koch et al., 2020) has shown
that, in the basic payment schemes FFS and CAP, non-optimal service provision is highest
for patients where q̂ and q∗ are most misaligned. This is the case for mild-severity patients
under FFS and high-severity patients under CAP. We therefore expect the effect sizes of
P4P to vary with patients’ severities of illness. In sum, we state the following hypotheses
about physicians’ medical service provision and the quality of care.
Hypothesis 1 P4P blended with FFS.
A threshold-based performance pay system with a discrete bonus reduces the overprovision of
medical services under fee-for-service and increases the quality of care.
25Performance pay for mild-severity patients, bFFSx , is highest with bFFSx > bFFSy > bFFSz , as the “risk” of a
mild-severity patient being overserved and therefore suffering disutility is highest under FFS. In CAP, the
incentive to undertreat patients increases in the severity of illness; therefore, bCAPz > bCAPy > bCAPx (see Table
2.1).
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Hypothesis 2 FFS+P4P and patient’s health characteristics.
Under performance pay and fee-for-service, the effect of performance pay on medical service
provision and the quality of care decreases in the patient’s severity of illness and the patient’s
marginal health benefit.
Hypothesis 3 P4P blended with CAP.
Introducing performance pay reduces the underprovision of medical services under capitation
and enhances the quality of care.
Hypothesis 4 CAP+P4P and patient’s health characteristics.
Under performance pay and capitation, the effect of performance pay increases in the patient’s
severity of illness and the patient’s marginal health benefit.
Following directly from Hypotheses 2 and 4, we state:
Hypothesis 5 Comparison of FFS+P4P and CAP+P4P.
FFS+P4P leads to a larger improvement in the quality of care for mildly ill patients compared
to CAP+P4P. For severely ill patients, the increase in quality of care is larger for CAP+P4P,
while for intermediately ill patients, the quality of care does not differ between the two pay
for performance systems.
2.4 Behavioral results
In this section, we first provide an introductory, mostly descriptive analysis of medical service
provision and the quality of care under the baseline payment systems, FFS and CAP, and
the blended performance pay systems, FFS+P4P and CAP+P4P (Section 2.4.1). Second,
we test our Hypotheses 1 and 2 on the effects of performance pay when blended with FFS
(Section 2.4.2) and, third, analogously, for a blended CAP and performance pay, we test
Hypotheses 3 and 4 (Section 2.4.3). Finally, we compare the effects of blended payment
systems FFS+P4P and CAP+P4P according to Hypotheses 5 (Section 2.4.4).
In our analyses, we consider the quantity of medical services q and capture the quality
of care considering two quality measures. First, our choice-based measure is the absolute
deviation from the patient-optimal quantity ρ = |q−q∗|. Second, our outcome-based measure
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is the proportional health benefit Ĥ. It comprises the patient’s health benefit realized by
the physician’s actual quantity choice (Hkl) as a proportion of the highest achievable health
benefit (H∗l ). To facilitate the comparisons across patients (kl) who also vary in terms
of their minimal health benefit Hmin, we normalize our measure accounting for the lower






. When physician i provides
the patient-optimal quantity q∗, the proportional health benefit is highest and Ĥkl = 1. Ĥkl
implies a measurable health outcome which allows us to compare actual with optimal quality
of care across the different payment systems.
2.4.1 Introductory analyses
Figure 2.1 illustrates the average quantity under the four payment systems for each of the
nine patients who differ by illness k and severity of illnesses l.26 We find that subjects
provide significantly more services under FFS (Mean 6.69, s.d. 2.07) than under CAP (Mean
3.32, s.d. 2.13), aggregated over all patients (p < 0.001, two-sided Mann-Whitney U-test,
MWU in the following), see Panel A of Table B.3.1 in Appendix B.3. This finding is in
line with earlier experimental studies (recall Section 2.3.4). In FFS+P4P, the quantities of
medical services decrease by about 16.4 percentage points (Mean 5.59, s.d. 1.71), and in
CAP+P4P, they increase by about 32.5 percentage points (Mean 4.40, s.d. 1.66).
Under FFS, the absolute deviation from the patient-optimal quantity ρ = 1.82 (s.d.
1.95), aggregated over all patients. Introducing P4P reduces the average non-optimal service
provision ρ to 0.63 (s.d. 0.55), which is a reduction by 65.4 percentage points. Under CAP,
ρ = 1.77 (s.d. 2.01), while under CAP+P4P ρ declines to 0.65 (s.d. 0.75), a decrease by
63.3 percentage points. See Panel B of Table B.3.1 for detailed descriptive statistics on our
choice-based measure ρ.
For the proportional health benefit Ĥ, we find that, on average, around 71% of the
maximum health benefit is realized in the two basic payment systems and around 90% in
the two blended payment systems. The effect of P4P thus corresponds to an overall increase
in the proportional health benefit by 19 percentage points under CAP+P4P and FFS+P4P.
26See the distributions of medical services differentiated by payment schemes and patients in Figure B.3.1,
Appendix B.3.
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Detailed descriptive statistics on Ĥ are provided in Panel C of Table B.3.1 in Appendix B.3.
On the aggregate, the introduction of P4P leads to a significant increase in the quantity,
and in both the choice-based and the outcome-based quality measures (p < 0.001, Wilcoxon
signed-rank test, two-sided).
Figure 2.1: Mean quantity by patients’ health characteristics
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Patients (Illness/ severity of illness)
FFS FFS+P4P CAP CAP+P4P
Notes. This figure shows the mean quantity with 95% confidence interval under
the four payment systems for each of the nine patients kl. Patients vary by their
illness k = A,B,C and severity of illnesses l with mild (x), intermediate (y), and
high (z) severe illnesses.
For the proportional health benefit Ĥ, we find that, on average, around 71% of the
maximum health benefit is realized in the two basic payment systems and around 90% in
the two blended payment systems. The effect of P4P thus corresponds to an overall increase
in the proportional health benefit by 19 percentage points under CAP+P4P and FFS+P4P.
Detailed descriptive statistics on Ĥ are provided in Panel C of Table B.3.1 in Appendix B.3.
On the aggregate, the introduction of P4P leads to a significant increase in the quantity,
and in both the choice-based and the outcome-based quality measures (p < 0.001, Wilcoxon
signed-rank test, two-sided).
We further observe that the patients’ severity of illness substantially affects the subjects’
behavior in all payment systems; see Table B.3.1 in Appendix B.3. Overprovision of medical
services is highest for mildly ill patients in both FFS conditions, and underprovison is
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highest for severely ill patients in both CAP conditions. The behavioral effect is rather less
pronounced for the marginal health benefit. For a detailed overview on descriptive statistics
and non-parametric tests for all payment systems and the patients’ characteristics, see Table
B.3.2 in Appendix B.3.
We now briefly analyze whether responses to the baseline payment systems FFS and
CAP are different. To this end, we run a regression on the quantity and quality of care
at a between-subject level, see Table B.3.3 in Appendix B.3. In line with the inherent
incentives, we find that the treatment quantity is, on average, 3.44 medical services lower
under CAP than under FFS. Due to the opposing inherent incentives, effects on the quality
of care are more meaningful when comparing both payment systems. On average, neither
non-optimal care nor proportional health benefit differs significantly between both baseline
payment systems; see Panel B and C of Table B.3.3 in Appendix B.3. Our regression results
indicate that the incentives to underprovide in CAP are equally strong as the incentives to
overprovide in FFS. For a patient’s severity of illness, we find no significant differences in
non-optimal care, except in the proportional patient’s health benefit, which is on average
about 10.0 percentage points lower for an intermediately ill than for a mildly ill patient.
Patients with a high marginal health benefit receive on average a significantly higher quality
of care than patients with a low marginal health benefit.
2.4.2 The effect of blending fee-for-service with performance pay
We next analyze how introducing P4P+FFS affects the quantity and quality of medical
service provision on the individual level. These analyses are particularly important, as a
detailed experimental investigation of these effects was lacking up to now.
To estimate the P4P effect, we use OLS regressions for the independent variables qij
(quantity chosen), and ρij = |qij − q∗j | and a fractional probit response model for the
proportional health benefit Ĥij , scaled between 0 and 1. Our base econometric specification
is as follows:
yij = α+ β1P4P + β2IntermSev + β3HighSev + β4HighMHB + β5Xi + εij .(2.3)
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IntermSev and HighSev are dummy variables for intermediate and high severities of
illness, respectively. HighMHB is a dummy for the marginal health benefit being 1 if θ = 2
(high), and 0 otherwise (θ = 1, low). P4P is a dummy variable indicating the introduction
of P4P. Xi is a vector of subject i’s characteristics comprising gender, personality traits and
medical background (non-medical students, medical students or physicians). We account for
potentially confounding effects by medical background as previous experimental evidence
(e.g., Brosig-Koch et al., 2016) indicates that behavioral responses to financial incentives
might differ (merely in size not qualitatively) by subject pool. Our estimated effects of P4P
remain stable when we control for subjects’ medical background and other characteristics.27
According to Hypothesis 1, we expect that P4P reduces the quantity of medical services,
induces less overprovision, and induces a higher proportional health benefit. Models (1),
(4), and (7) in Table 2.2 show that Hypothesis 1 is supported. Introducing FFS-based P4P
leads to a highly significant reduction in treatment quantity by, on average, 1.10 medical
services. Non-optimal care also declines highly significantly, by 1.20 medical services on
average. The proportional patient’s health benefit rises by about 18.9 percentage points
when P4P is introduced. We summarize the regression results as follows:
Result 1 (P4P blended with FFS) Complementing fee-for-service with a threshold-based
performance-pay system leads to a decrease in overprovision of medical services, which cor-
responds to an increase in the quality of medical care and in the proportional health benefit.
Hypothesis 2 considers the effect the severities of illness and the marginal health benefit
have on physicians’ responses to P4P. Before testing the hypothesis, we analyze the respective
impacts on the physicians’ treatment decisions under FFS payment conditions in general.
Compared to mildly ill patients, treatment quantities increase significantly for intermediately
and severely ill patients by, on average, 1.44 and 2.90 medical services, respectively; see Model
(1) of Table 2.2. Considering treatment quality, non-optimal care significantly decreases
with increasing severity (Model (4)). The proportional health-benefit increase for severely
ill patients is significantly higher than for mildly ill patients (by 13.3 percentage points)
27For a comparisons of regression estimates without individual controls, see Tables B.3.4 and B.3.5 in




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































but does not significantly differ between intermediately and mildly ill patients (Model (7)).
These findings are in line with results reported by, e.g., Brosig-Koch et al. (2017a) and
Martinsson and Persson (2019).
Hypothesis 2 states that the effect of P4P on medical service provision and on the quality
of care decreases in the severity of illness and in the marginal health benefit. To estimate the
moderating effects that patients’ severities of illness have on responses to P4P, we consider
the following model:
yij = α+ β1IntermSev + β2HighSev + β3HighMHB + β4P4PxMildSev
+ β5P4PxIntermSev + β6P4PxHighSev + β7Xi + εij . (2.4)
Following an econometric approach by Clark and Huckman (2012), we include the terms
β4P4PxMildSev β5P4PxIntermSev, and β6P4PxHighSev, which interact P4P with
each severity level of illness to determine the extent to which the effect (marginal benefit) of
P4P depends on the patient’s severity of illness. By construction, the estimates of β4, β5,
and β6 represent the total effect of P4P for patients with either a mild severity of illness, an
intermediate severity of illness or a high severity of illness, respectively.
Regression results provide support for Hypothesis 2 (see Models (2), (5), and (8), as
well as Wald test results). First, P4P positively affects the quantity and quality of care, as
all coefficients on the effects are significantly different from zero, except the effect of P4P
on the quantity of medical services for severely ill patients (see Model (2)). Second, we
find the anticipated relation between severity of illness and P4P such that coefficients are
significantly higher for less severely ill patients.
For a patient’s level of marginal health benefit, we neither find a significant effect on the
quantity of medical service provision nor on the quality of care, see Models (1), (4), and
(7). To estimate whether the positive effect of P4P differs between patients with high and
low marginal benefits, we consider a model similar to Equation (2.4), in which we interact
P4P with each marginal health-benefit level. When comparing the effect of P4P for patients
with a low marginal health benefit (P4PxLowMHB) to the effect for patients with a high
marginal health benefit (P4PxHighMHB), we observe no significant differences; see Models
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(3), (6), and (9) of Table 2.2 and the Wald tests. We summarize our findings as follows:
Result 2 (FFS+P4P and patients’ health characteristics) While introducing perfor-
mance pay improves the quality of medical service provision across all severity types, the
effect of performance pay significantly decreases with increasing severity of illness. For
patients’ marginal health benefit, the effect of performance pay is less systematic.
2.4.3 The effect of blending capitation with performance pay
We now analyze the effects of introducing P4P to CAP on the quantity and quality of
care. An earlier study by Brosig-Koch et al. (2020) used the same design to investigate
the P4P effect with general practitioners and medical students when CAP is the baseline
payment. We repeat the analyses with our data according to our econometric specifications
in Equations (3.1) and (2.4). We thus provide the basis for jointly comparing the payment
systems FFS, CAP, FFS+P4P, and CAP+P4P in Section 2.4.4.
According to Hypothesis 3, we expect that introducing P4P to CAP increases the
treatment quantity, reduces the underprovision of medical services, and enhances the quality
of care. Our data support Hypothesis 3. Models (1), (4), and (7) of Table 2.3 show that
CAP+P4P leads to a highly significant increase in the treatment quantity by on average
1.09 services, a reduction of non-optimal care by on average 1.12 medical services, and an
increase in the proportional health benefit by about 17.5 percentage points.28 In sum, we
state:
Result 3 (P4P blended with CAP) Complementing capitation with performance pay
leads to an increase in medical services, a decrease in underprovision, and a rise in patients’
proportional health benefit.
To analyze the effects severities of illness and the marginal health benefit have on the
physicians’ responses to CAP+P4P (Hypothesis 4), we again first study the impact the
severities of illness have on the physicians’ treatment decisions, as indicated in Equation
(3.1). We find that treatment quantities for intermediately and severely ill patients are
significantly higher than for mildly ill patients by, on average, 1.47 and 2.93 medical services,












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































respectively; see Model (1) of Table 2.3. Nevertheless, the quality of care is significantly
lower for intermediately (severely) ill patients by on average 0.44 (0.96) higher deviations
from patient-optimal care. Correspondingly, the proportional health benefit is on average
14.3 (14.9) percentage points lower for these patients; see Models (4) and (7) of Table 2.3.
Hypothesis 4 states that under CAP+P4P, the P4P effect increases in the patient’s
severity of illness and in the marginal health benefit. Our estimations based on Equation
(2.4) provide the following results: While the average effect of P4P on the quantity and the
quality of medical services is positive and significant for all severity levels, we find substantial
heterogeneity when splitting the P4P effect by severities. P4P enhances q by, on average,
0.32, 1.04, and 1.90 medical services for mildly, intermediately, and severely ill patients. This
corresponds to a reduction in ρ by, on average, 0.31, 1.31, and 1.91 medical services, and to
an increase in Ĥ by, on average, 5.5, 15.7, and 18.0 percentage points, respectively; Wald
tests show that effect sizes are significantly different from each other, see Models (2), (5),
and (8) of Table 2.3. Under CAP, the quantity of medical services for severely ill patients
deviates the most from the patient-optimal quantity, resulting in the lowest proportional
health benefit (Table B.3.1). As physicians respond to P4P, these patients are those who
benefit the most from introducing CAP+P4P, which is in line with Hypothesis 4.
We also find that patients with a high marginal health benefit receive significantly more
medical services and quality of care compared to patients with a low marginal health benefit.
Moreover, while both patient types benefit from CAP+P4P, the patients with a low marginal
benefit gain more from the introduction of P4P than those with a high marginal benefit;
see Models (6) and (9) of Table 2.3 and the respective Wald tests. This pattern is not
in line with Hypothesis 4. However, differences in effect sizes of P4P for patients with
a low and high level of marginal health benefit are rather small, and adding interaction
terms of marginal health benefits and P4P does not explain better the variation in our data
(comparing Models (1) to (3), (4) to (6), and (7) to (9)). In sum, we state:
Result 4 (CAP+P4P and patients’ health characteristics) The effect of performance
pay significantly increases in patients’ severities of illness. Patients with a low as well as a
high level of marginal health benefit gain from performance pay; yet, the effect on quality is
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smaller for patients with a higher marginal benefit.
Results 3 and 4 are in line with findings by Brosig-Koch et al. (2020) for the effect of P4P
on treatment quantity and the quality of care. In their study, the effects for the marginal
health benefit go in the same direction, but they are statistically not significant.
2.4.4 Comparison of performance pay effects in capitation and fee-for-
service payment systems
In this section, we investigate how subjects’ responses to performance pay differ between
FFS and CAP conditions. Although the payment systems are structurally symmetric due to
our mirror-image design, the effect sizes may be different for the following reasons. FFS, a
piece-rate system with fees higher than marginal costs, incentivizes the provision of care
to be more than patient-optimal. Under CAP, however, physicians have an incentive for
underprovision as each medical service provided is costly, thus reducing the physician’s profit.
Depending on the baseline payment condition, introducing P4P provides incentives that go
in opposite directions: to reduce services under FFS and to expand treatment under CAP.
To address Hypothesis 5, we investigate whether the severity-specific effects of P4P on
the quality of care differ between FFS+P4P and CAP+P4P.29 Figure 2.2 shows that the
effects of blended P4P systems on ρ seem to depend on the patient’s severity of illness.
In order to investigate Hypothesis 5 further, we use regression analyses, extending our basic
econometric model by the between-payment system comparison as follows:
yij = α+ β1CAP + β2IntermSev + β3HighSev + β4HighMHB
+ β5CAP× IntermSev + β6CAP×HighSev
+ β7CAP+P4P×MildSev + β8FFS+P4P×MildSev
+ β9CAP+P4P× IntermSev + β10FFS+P4P× IntermSev
+ β11CAP+P4P×HighSev + β12FFS+P4P×HighSev
+ β13Xi + εij . (2.5)
29Note that a comparison of the effect differences in quantity appears unreasonable, since P4P leads to
opposite responses, i.e., a decrease under FFS or an increase under CAP. Thus, a joint comparison of effects
on quantity of care for both payment systems does not allow us to draw any meaningful inferences.
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The variable CAP is a dummy which equals 1 if a physician is remunerated by CAP, and 0 if
he or she is remunerated by FFS. IntermSev×CAP and HighSev×CAP show interaction
effects between CAP and the respective level of severity. To determine how severity-specific
effects of P4P vary by the underlying remuneration condition, we interact the variables
CAP+P4P and FFS+P4P, which are dummies for the respective blended payment systems
with each level of severity. The estimate for β7 thus represents the total effect of P4P for
mildly ill patients under CAP, while β8 represents the total effect for mildly ill patients
under FFS and, respectively, for β9 to β12.
Table 2.4 provides more detailed descriptive statistics on the two quality measures ρ






















































FFS to FFS+P4P CAP to CAP+P4P
Notes. This figure shows the reduction in ρ achieved by introducing per-
formance pay, differentiated by FFS and CAP conditions and severities of
illness.
and Ĥ differentiated by patients’ severities of illness and marginal health benefits. For
mildly ill patients, the improvement in the quality of care is significantly higher under
FFS+P4P than under CAP+P4P (p < 0.001, two-sided Mann-Whitney U-tests for both
quality measures). We observe the reverse pattern for severely ill patients (p < 0.001) and
no significant differences for patients with an intermediate severity of illness (p ≥ 0.598).
When differentiating patients by their marginal health benefit, no significant differences in
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the P4P effect across payment conditions are found; neither for patients with a low nor with
a high level (p ≥ 0.308).30
Table 2.4: Comparison of effects of performance pay blended with fee-for-service and
capitation on the quality of care
FFS to FFS+P4P CAP to CAP+P4P Diff. p-value
A. Change in absolute deviation from optimal care ρ
Aggregate -1.20 (1.73) -1.12 (1.79) -0.08 0.278
Mild severity -1.99 (2.14) -0.31 (1.04) -1.68 <0.001
Intermediate severity -1.18 (1.40) -1.13 (1.51) -0.05 0.598
High severity -0.42 (1.11) -1.91 (2.24) -1.49 <0.001
Low marginal health benefit -1.21 (1.78) -1.17 (1.87) -0.04 0.519
High marginal health benefit -1.17 (1.63) -1.01 (1.63) -0.16 0.316
B. Change in proportional health benefit Ĥ
Aggregate 0.19 (0.27) 0.18 (0.29) 0.01 0.286
Mild severity 0.28 (0.31) 0.04 (0.15) 0.24 <0.001
Intermediate severity 0.24 (0.28) 0.23 (0.31) 0.01 0.608
High severity 0.06 (0.16) 0.27 (0.32) 0.21 <0.001
Low marginal health benefit 0.19 (0.28) 0.19 (0.30) 0.00 0.550
High marginal health benefit 0.19 (0.26) 0.16 (0.26) 0.03 0.308
Observations 468 495
Subjects 52 55
Notes. The table reports descriptive statistics on the changes in our quality measures ρ and Ĥ
when moving from unblended to pay for performance payment schemes (means; standard deviations
in parentheses). We differentiate by patients’ severities of illness and the marginal health benefit.
Column “Diff” reports average differences in effect sizes between both payment schemes; reported
p-values are based on two-sided Mann-Whitney U tests.
Table 2.5 presents estimates for two versions of Equation 2.5 for each quality measure
which differ in that they include Xi as the vector of subject i’s characteristics. Effect
differences at a between-subject level may be sensitive to individual characteristics. We
find that our estimates on the severity-specific effects of P4P are robust to controlling for
individual characteristics (comparing Models (1) to (2) and (3) to (4) of Table 2.5). For
simplicity, we, thus focus on Models (2) and (4) when describing our estimation results.
Our findings that the effects of blended P4P systems are severity-specific support
30For the effect of patients’ marginal health benefits, see the estimation results in Table B.3.8 in Appendix
B.3.
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Hypothesis 5. We find that the marginal benefit of P4P on the quality of care is highest for
mildly ill patients under FFS+P4P. Models (2) and (4) of Table 2.5 show that the absolute
deviation from the patient-optimal quantity is reduced by on average 1.99 medical services,
and the patients’ health benefit increases by about 17.0 percentage points. On the contrary,
the effect is lowest for mildly ill patients under CAP+P4P. Estimates indicate a reduction
in ρ by about 0.31 medical services and an increase in Ĥ by 5.4 percentage points. The
introduction of P4P is therefore 6.5 times (3.1 times) more effective in terms of ρ (Ĥ) for
mildly ill patients under FFS+P4P than under CAP+P4P.
For severely ill patients, the estimates show a reverse pattern in that the P4P effect is
significantly higher under CAP+P4P compared to FFS+P4P. P4P leads to a reduction in ρ
by about average 1.91 medical services under CAP+P4P and about 0.42 medical services
under FFS+P4P. Ĥ increased by 16.7 (7.7) percentage points under CAP+P4P (FFS+P4P).
For intermediately ill patients, we find no significant difference in P4P effects between payment
systems. Put differently, the introduction of P4P yields similar quality improvements for
intermediately ill patients, which lead to a reduction of about 1.13 (1.18) in ρ and a higher
Ĥ by about 14.8 (15.0) percentage points under CAP+P4P (FFS+P4P). In sum, we state
the following result:
Result 5 (Comparisons of FFS+P4P and CAP+P4P) The effect of performance pay
on the quality of care is specific to the patient’s severity of illness for the two blended pay for
performance systems. While the effect on quality of care is significantly higher for mildly ill
patients under FFS+P4P, it is significantly higher for severely ill patients under CAP+P4P.
For intermediately ill patients the effect of performance pay on the quality of care does not
differ between payment systems.
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Table 2.5: Comparison of effects of blended performance pay systems
A. Absolute deviation B. Proportional
from patient-optimal care ρ health benefit Ĥ
Method: OLS OLS Frac. Probit Frac. Probit
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4)
CAP -1.828∗∗∗ -1.832∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗
(0.342) (0.310) (0.037) (0.032)
IntermSev -0.936∗∗∗ -0.936∗∗∗ 0.020∗ 0.020
(0.147) (0.148) (0.012) (0.012)
HighSev -1.782∗∗∗ -1.782∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗
(0.253) (0.254) (0.021) (0.020)
HighMHB -0.086∗∗ -0.086∗∗ 0.013∗∗ 0.013∗∗
(0.033) (0.034) (0.005) (0.005)
CAP×IntermSev 1.784∗∗∗ 1.784∗∗∗ -0.243∗∗∗ -0.241∗∗∗
(0.201) (0.201) (0.029) (0.028)
CAP×HighSev 3.540∗∗∗ 3.540∗∗∗ -0.492∗∗∗ -0.484∗∗∗
(0.354) (0.355) (0.033) (0.033)
CAP+P4P×MildSev -0.309∗∗∗ -0.309∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗
(0.107) (0.107) (0.017) (0.016)
FFS+P4P×MildSev -1.994∗∗∗ -1.994∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗
(0.274) (0.275) (0.017) (0.016)
CAP+P4P×IntermSev -1.133∗∗∗ -1.133∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗
(0.187) (0.188) (0.018) (0.017)
FFS+P4P×IntermSev -1.179∗∗∗ -1.179∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗
(0.181) (0.182) (0.017) (0.016)
CAP+P4P×HighSev -1.909∗∗∗ -1.909∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗
(0.289) (0.290) (0.018) (0.017)
FFS+P4P×HighSev -0.423∗∗∗ -0.423∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗
(0.110) (0.111) (0.015) (0.015)
Constant 2.759∗∗∗ 2.950∗∗∗
(0.316) (0.324)
Individual controls No Yes No Yes
Wald tests (p-value):
H0: CAP+P4P×MildSev = FFS+P4P×MildSev <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
H0: CAP+P4P×IntermSev = FFS+P4P×IntermSev 0.860 0.860 0.872 0.884
H0: CAP+P4P×HighSev = FFS+P4P×HighSev <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Observations 1926 1926 1926 1926
Subjects 107 107 107 107
(Pseudo) R2 0.240 0.312 0.094 0.129
Notes. For Panel A, OLS estimates are reported with robust standard errors clustered for subjects (in brackets). For Panel
B, average marginal effects based on a fractional probit response model are reported with robust standard errors clustered
for subjects (in brackets). CAP = 1 if physicians are remunerated by CAP, and = 0 otherwise (by FFS). P4P is a dummy
variable indicating the introduction of P4P. IntermSev and HighSev are dummy variables for intermediate and high severities
of illness. HighMHB is a dummy for the marginal health benefit being 1 if θ = 2 (high), and 0 otherwise (θ = 1, low). Controls
for subjects’ individual characteristics comprise gender, medical background (non-medical student, medical student, physician),




In this section, we discuss implications of our behavioral results from a health policy
perspective. In particular, we focus on whether and, if so, under which circumstances
a P4P system with discrete bonuses and quality thresholds based on health outcomes is
effective to improving the quality of care. Needless to say, we thereby keep in mind that the
behavioral results need to be interpreted within the confines of our experimental design and
parameterization (for a discussion of limitations, see Section 2.5.3).
Our behavioral results suggest that the effects of P4P on the quality of care are specific to
the baseline payment system FFS or CAP, and the patients’ severity of illness. The largest
effects occur when physicians’ financial interests (profit) and patients’ interests (health
benefit) are most misaligned under FFS and CAP. This means that mildly ill patients benefit
the most from P4P when it is blended with FFS, whereas severely ill patients benefit most
when it is blended with CAP. For intermediately ill patients, P4P-induced improvements in
the quality of care are comparable across payment systems. These results seem to encourage
the introduction of P4P to counteract misaligned financial incentives for overprovision and
underprovision under FFS and CAP, respectively. When designing P4P systems, health
policy-makers should take into account that P4P effects are specific to the patients’ health
characteristics and the underlying baseline remuneration.
Identifying and classifying patient types based on their severities (and needs of medical
services) might be complicated for designing performance-based thresholds in the real world.
While it might be possible to discriminate between the different severity of illness types
in general, a more precise distinction for designing P4P bonus payments with a sufficient
precision might not be feasible or might requires excessively high screening costs. In this case,
a change in the baseline payment system from CAP to FFS and vice versa could provide an
alternative to introducing P4P. We address these considerations by testing for equality of the
estimated coefficients of Model (3) of Table 2.5. First, we test whether the absolute deviation
from patient-optimal care for mildly ill patients significantly differs if treated under CAP
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or FFS+P4P. We find no significant differences in coefficients (p = 0.272). Second, we test
whether the quality of care for severely ill patients under FFS differs from CAP+P4P. Again,
we find no significant differences in the quality of medical service provision (p = 0.278).31
As a key implication of these findings, a change of the baseline payment systems for
mildly and severely ill patients seems to be a meaningful alternative to the introduction of
P4P to enhance the quality of care. For intermediately ill patients, however, a significant
increase in the quality of care can only be achieved by introducing P4P regardless of the
baseline payment condition. To ensure a fairly high quality of medical care, mildly and
intermediately ill patients should be treated under a CAP baseline payment, ideally blended
with precisely designed P4P bonus payments. Even if we assume that imprecisely designed
P4P bonus payments do not lead to any improvements in the quality of care compared to
the non-blended condition, the quality of care for these patients would still be better under
(non-blended) CAP than under FFS. For severely ill patients, on the other hand, potentially
misaligned P4P components could lead to a fairly low quality of medical care under CAP,
as a non-blended CAP system turns out to be the most harmful for these patients with
highest deviations from patient-optimal care. Thus, a (non-blended) FFS system seems
more reasonable to ensure a reasonably high quality of medical care for severely ill patients.
Moreover, this would also prevent severely ill patients from possibly not being treated under
CAP in the first place due to cream-skimming of healthier patients (e.g., Iversen and Lurås,
2000; Glazier et al., 2009).
This implication is in line with considerations by Barham and Milliken (2015), who show
that severely ill patients should be treated by physicians paid by FFS, whereas the physicians
treating rather healthy patients should be paid by CAP. Recent empirical evidence by Chami
31Based on the estimated coefficients of Model (2) in Table 2.5, we calculated the respective absolute
deviations of medical services from the patient-optimal quantity. First, we compare the absolute deviation
for mildly ill patients treated under CAP to those treated under FFS+P4P. We find that the quantity of
medical services deviates on average about 1.12 medical services from the patient-optimal quantity for mildly
ill patients under CAP (Constant + CAP = 2.95 + (−1.83) = 1.12), while it deviates by on average 0.96 for
mildly ill patients under FFS+P4P (Constant+FFS+P4P×MildSev = 2.95+(−1.99) = 0.96). Based on a
Wald test, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients are equal (p = 0.272). Second, we calculate
the coefficients for severely ill patients under FFS and under CAP+P4P. On average, it deviates by 1.17 for
highly ill patients under FFS (Constant + HighSev = 2.95 + (−1.78) = 1.17) compared to 0.97 for severely
ill patients under CAP+P4P (Constant + CAP + HighSev + CAP × HighSev + CAP+P4P × HighSev =
2.95 + (−1.83) + (−1.78) + 3.54 + (−1.91) = 0.97). Again, we cannot reject the null hypothesis when testing
for equality of coefficients (p = 0.278).
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and Sweetman (2019) on primary care physicians (who generally treat a rather healthy
population) reveals that changing the remuneration from FFS+P4P to a baseline CAP
payment system, which is mixed with FFS for non-basic services, leads to a reduction in
inappropriate medical service provision. The introduction of mixed FFS and CAP payment
systems (CAP+FFS) complements the consideration that changing the underlying payment
system might serve as a meaningful alternative to improve quality of care. This argument is
also supported by findings of Brosig-Koch et al. (2017a).
2.5.2 Benefits and costs of introducing performance pay
Most research on the effect of P4P initiatives has focused on the targeted quality measures,
thereby often neglecting the pertinent issue of their effect on health outcomes and costs
(Meacock et al., 2014). In the following, we address this issue by analyzing the effect of
introducing P4P on health outcomes (measured as patients’ health benefit) and costs of
incentive payments.32
Given our experimental parameters, the average patient health benefit H is 7.92 and
8.01 in FFS and CAP, respectively (see Table 2.6). Under P4P, H significantly increases to
9.47 in FFS+P4P and to 9.51 in CAP+P4P (p < 0.001, Wilcoxon signed rank-test).33 Also,
the physicians’ remuneration increases significantly when introducing P4P compared to the
non-blended payment schemes (p < 0.001, Wilcoxon signed rank-test). This finding is in
line with, for example, Mullen et al. (2010) and does not come as a surprise, as subjects in
our experiment do react to the more costly P4P incentives.
Moreover, it has been argued that the key to an effective P4P system is the design of
its elements (Epstein, 2012; Maynard, 2012; Kristensen et al., 2016). Therefore, we take
a closer look at cost and benefits for different severities of illness, as physicians’ incentive
payments are systematically varied for the three different severities of illness. First of all,
32Notice that, for a cost effectiveness analysis of P4P schemes, Meacock et al. (2014) propose the following
“cost categories”: (i) set up/development costs (e.g., staff time, infrastructure investment); (ii) running costs
(e.g., administration); (iii) incentive payments, (iv) costs to providers of participating in the scheme, (v)
cost savings (e.g., reduced complications, length of stay, readmissions) due to improving the quality of care
resulting in superior health outcomes. In our parsimonious experimental design, we focus on the effect of
additional incentive payments and therefore also restrict our analysis of costs to this category.
33In absolute terms, the maximum health benefit which can be achieved by patient-optimal medical service
provision is on average 10.33.
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Table 2.6: Patients’ benefits, costs for physicians’ remuneration, and changes in costs and
benefits
Aggregated Mild severity Interm. severity High severity
H R H R H R H R
FFS 7.92 13.38 6.72 11.38 7.92 13.38 9.10 15.38
FFS+P4P 9.51 15.02 9.35 12.93 9.52 14.75 9.65 17.38
Change 1.59 1.64 2.63 1.55 1.60 1.37 0.55 2.00
Ratio (∆R/∆H) 1.03 0.59 0.86 3.64
CAP 8.01 10.00 9.15 10.00 8.03 10.00 6.86 10.00
CAP+P4P 9.47 13.77 9.53 12.31 9.51 13.53 9.36 15.46
Change 1.46 3.77 0.38 2.31 1.48 3.53 2.50 5.46
Ratio (∆R/∆H) 2.58 6.08 2.39 2.18
Notes. This table shows the average patients’ health benefits H and remuneration R for FFS,
CAP, FFS+P4P, and CAP+P4P, both aggregated and differentiated for severities of illness (mild,
intermediate, high). It further shows the marginal payment, marginal patient health benefit, and
the ratio of marginal payment to marginal patient health benefit, also aggregated and separately
for the three severities of illness.
we find that patients’ health benefits and physicians’ remunerations (significantly) increase
for all severities (p < 0.010, Wilcoxon signed rank-test). Under CAP, the increase in health
benefit is highest for the severely ill patients (43.7%), while under FFS the increase is highest
for mildly ill patients (39.1%). Accordingly, the change in remuneration is 54.6% for the
severely ill patients under CAP and 13.6% for the mildly ill patients in FFS. The difference
in percentage changes between payment systems indicates that the effectiveness of P4P
might vary when costs are also taken into account.
To investigate this further, we now consider the ratio between remuneration and patient
health benefits between non-blended and blended P4P payment systems. For a one-unit
increase in patient health benefit, physicians’ remuneration needs to increase by 2.58 units
in CAP conditions and by 1.03 monetary units in FFS conditions. Under CAP, the ratio
is lowest for severely ill patients (2.18), due to the large increase in patient health benefit.
The ratio is highest for mildly ill patients (6.08), driven by the rather small increase of 4.2%
in patient health benefit. Under FFS, the ratio is 0.59 for patients with a mild severity of
illness, and for patients with an intermediate severity of illness the ratio is 0.86. This implies
an increase in remuneration by less than one monetary unit for an increase in patients’
health benefit by one unit for patients with mild and intermediate severity of illness. For
severely ill patients, the introduction of P4P is less effective, requiring substantial financial
resources (indicated by a ratio of 3.64).
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Needless to say, the conversion of one monetary unit to a one-unit change in a patient’s
health benefit is a stylized simplification. Keeping the limitation of laboratory experiments
in mind when interpreting our results beyond qualitative implications, the calculated ratios
of marginal payment to marginal patient health benefit can serve as rough guidance for
the effectiveness of introducing P4P to the different baseline payment systems. Our results
suggest that incentivizing physicians’ medical service provision with P4P is a good idea in
general for health care policy-makers, whose aim is solely to enhance the patients’ health
benefit, regardless of the costs due to additional payment to physicians. Taken at face value,
it would be most effective to introduce P4P for mildly ill patients under FFS and for severely
ill patients under CAP.
Taking into account, however, the relative effectiveness when changing the baseline
payment systems instead of introducing P4P, we found the ratio of marginal payment to
marginal patient health benefit to be 0.58 when switching from FFS to CAP for mildly ill
patients, and 2.40 when switching from CAP to FFS for highly ill patients. Hence, the ratios
based on a change in the underlying payment system are close to the ratios based on the
introduction of P4P, see Table 2.6. Whereas this suggests that both policy instruments are
similar in terms of cost-benefit effectiveness, the highest (absolute) patient’s health benefit
can only be achieved by a performance-based bonus payment. Keeping in mind that patients’
severity types might be difficult to observe in the real world, the introduction of P4P is
generally favorable as it leads, at the aggregate, to an increase in patients’ benefits for all
severity types.
2.5.3 Limitations
Our study faces potential limitations. First, our findings might be sensitive to the design
of performance-based bonus payments. As briefly outlined in Section 2.5.1, it might be
relatively difficult to determine the individual patient-optimal treatment quantity for health
care policy-makers in a real-world environment in the absence of a highly controlled setting.
Thus, performance-based bonus components according to the patients’ specific medical
needs most probably are difficult to design. In our study, bonus payments are tied to the
severity-specific patient-optimal treatment quantity and also differ in size with regard to the
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level of severity. While the latter design element ensures that we can compare effects across
payment schemes, we leave it to further research to investigate how behavioral responses
might differ with a stable bonus level and thus lower financial incentives for decreasing
non-optimal medical service provision. Even though we incorporate information asymmetry
in assuming that the quality is not fully contractible and bonus payments are also granted
when deviating one unit from the patient-optimal quantity, we do not consider a full lack
of information when designing P4P. As a result, our paper does not yield insights on P4P
effects in which the appropriate level of medical service provision is uncertain. There is
good reason to believe that uncertainty in the effect on the patients’ health benefits does
not significantly affect medical service provision (indicated by experiment of Martinsson and
Persson, 2019). An extension could thus focus on the P4P effect when not only patients’
benefit but also payments are somewhat uncertain.
Second, the obtained results are based on stylized laboratory and artefactual field
experiments which comprise a highly controlled, but at the same time artificial, decision
environment. While the high control of the decision environment points to a weakness, as it
might reduce the external validity of the results, it simultaneously represents one of the key
advantages of laboratory experiments. In particular, the environment which can be controlled
more tightly than in any other context allows us to identify causal effects. In the field, existing
institutions are adopted endogenously, which leads to difficulties in rendering causal inferences
about their effects. The lab, however, allows exogenous changes in institutions. It provides
the opportunities for controlled ceteris paribus variations which are necessary to establish a
causal link beyond the identification of simple correlations. According to Falk and Heckman
(2009): “Laboratory experiments are very powerful whenever tight control [...] is essential.
[...] Tight control [...] also allows replicability of results, which is generally more difficult with
field data” (p. 537). As we are primarily interested in establishing the causal link between
P4P and provision behavior and in comparing experimental data to theoretical predictions,
employing a laboratory experiment seems a natural but complementary approach to other
methods of analysis. While taking into account the objections towards lab experiments,
we cautiously derive direct external implications from our experimental data; see also the
discussion in Hennig-Schmidt et al. (2011).
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Conducting laboratory experiments can be considered a complementary rather than a
substitute to other methods. Lab experiments can serve as a test bed for investigating the
behavioral impact of policy interventions like introducing P4P in our case, before they are
implemented in the field. It provides insights into behavioral responses to policy interventions
also in health care policy, like varying physicians’ incentives, without adverse effects for
patients’ health. While we do not claim that results from laboratory testing always readily
apply to real-world decision environments, the ability to test behavioral hypotheses under
carefully controlled conditions provides an indispensable (and relatively inexpensive) tool to
to understand behavioral mechanisms better, before running costly RCTs, for instance, or
directly implementing policy measures in the field (Galizzi and Wiesen, 2018). Falk and
Heckman (2009) argue that economic engineering, a combination of theory and experiments,
has improved the design and functioning of markets and institutions. Examples in health
care are matching doctors to entry level positions in the general medical labor market
(Roth, 2002) or testing clinical decision support systems to improve decisions about hospital
discharges (Cox et al., 2016a).
Finally, recent study have shown that the criticism of lab experiments having low
external validity may be not as serious as it might appear at first sight. Herbst and
Mas (2015) published a direct systematic comparison of the same economic parameter
estimated in laboratory experiments and field studies - the estimated spillover effect of
worker productivity on the productivity of co-workers - based on 39 studies. The authors
show that the results of this class of lab experiments can be generalized to the field because
they provide quantitatively precise descriptions of productivity spillovers between workers
(Charness and Fehr, 2015). Running a large-scale incentivized survey, a very recent study by
(Snowberg and Yariv, 2021)find that different types of elicited behavioral attributes, e.g., risk-
aversion, altruism, over-confidence, over-precision, implicit attitudes toward gender and race,
various strategic interactions, are comparable between undergraduate university students, a
representative sample of the general US population and a sample of Amazon Mechanical
Turk, a crowdfunding marketplace commonly used to conduct large-scale economic studies.
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2.6 Conclusion
While the idea of using P4P for physicians as a way of improving health care outcomes has
increasingly made its way into health policy, the effects on physicians’ provision behavior
and patients’ health benefits are not well understood. To this end, we performed controlled
laboratory and artefactual field experiments to analyze the causal effect of pay for performance
on medical service provision. At a within-subject level, we introduced P4P - with performance
thresholds tied to the patient-optimal treatment and adjusted for the patients’ severity of
illness levels - which either complements FFS or CAP. Under P4P, subjects increase, on
aggregate, the quality of health care provision compared to non-blended payments. We
unpack the positive effect of P4P, as we find that the intensity of an effect is significantly
driven by the patients’ severity of illness. At a between-subjects level, we are able to
determine further how the severity-specific behavioral responses to P4P differ between
both baseline payment systems. While the quality of medical services for intermediately ill
patients increases likewise by the introduction of P4P under both payment systems, mildly
ill patients marginally benefit the most from P4P when complementing FFS, as opposed to
highly ill patients, who benefit the most of the introduction of P4P when complementing
CAP.
In our parsimonious experimental design, we reduced the complexity of a physician’s
treatment decisions, abstracted from multitasking, considered a one-dimensional quality,
and we refrained from measurement issues of a physician’s quality of treatment. In contrast,
we focused on exogenously introducing P4P while keeping all other variables constant. We
incentivized physicians for certain health outcomes - in particular, if a physician’s treatment
choice either renders the patient’s health benefit or deviates only by one unit from the
patient-optimal treatment - which neither generated uncertainty in physicians’ payoffs nor
in patients’ outcomes. Taking a more general perspective, a controlled lab experiment could
be regarded as a “wind tunnel study”, which allows us to test for the behavioral effects of
important design elements of P4P prior to implementing these elements, for example in a
large-scale randomized controlled trial (RCT) in the field (Galizzi and Wiesen, 2018).
In our experiment, we found P4P implying an increase in a physician’s maximum
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attainable payoffs by 20% to be effective in inducing a higher quality of medical service
provision. Also, our behavioral data showed that adjusting P4P for the patients’ severity of
illness was reasonable to cope with strong overtreatment of low-severity patients under FFS
and with strong undertreatment of high-severity patients under CAP. P4P bonus payments
are designed such that performance thresholds which are tied to the patient-optimal care
are accurately adjusted for severity of illness levels and account for severity-specific patients’
benefits by precisely varied bonus sizes. It might not always be feasible to design P4P bonus
payments such accurately. Whenever this is the case, a general distinction between patient
groups of rather high and low medical needs, however, is possible, patients belonging to the
former group should be always be treated under FFS, while patients with knowingly rather
low medical needs should be treated under CAP. This approach would guarantee that harm
to patients, which is caused by deviations from the patient-optimal medical care induced by
opposing financial incentives between physician profit and patient benefit, is kept small.
Further, cost effectiveness is another important issue for the economic evaluation of P4P
systems (Meacock et al., 2014). It is often argued that P4P schemes can be considered
cost-effective when quality increases are achieved with equal or lower costs or when the same
quality is achieved with lower costs. When quality improvements are large, P4P may be
viewed as cost-effective even if it leads to cost increases. In general, however, the evidence
on cost effectiveness of P4P seems rare and inconclusive. Most of the studies suggest quality
improvements at the expense of cost (Emmert et al., 2012; Meacock et al., 2014). Analyses
of effectiveness based on our experimental data reveal that the patients’ health benefit
increases through P4P. On the other hand, additional expenditures for physicians’ payments
rise disproportionately. Note that our calculations are limited to incentive costs. However,
there are other “cost categories” which might be affected by the introduction of P4P. For
example, “cost savings” seem likely as P4P induces care with superior health outcomes,
which in turn has consequences for future health care costs. A health care policy-maker
might also take these considerations into account when evaluating the (cost-)effectiveness of
P4P schemes.
Finally, physicians respond differently to incentives from P4P. This calls for future work to
understand better what drives the heterogeneity. What is the role, for example, of individuals’
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underlying social preferences or personality traits? These individual characteristics might
not only explain health care workers’ responses to performance pay (e.g., Donato et al., 2017)
and self-selection into the payment systems (e.g., Dohmen and Falk, 2011; Brosig-Koch et al.,
2017b). Knowledge on the underlying preferences that predict sorting are therefore of great
importance for researchers and health care policy-makers alike. Moreover, policy-makers
need to account for physicians’ capabilities to manipulate the systems by only treating
patients for whom they are able to generate the performance-based bonus payments as an
unintended consequence of incentive schemes emphasized by a recent study evaluating a
pilot program on reducing hospital costs (Alexander, 2020). Finally, further research is
needed to compare systematically the effects of different blended payment menus of payment




Physicians’ performance pay and personality traits
3.1 Introduction
A key question in health economics addresses the issue on how to remunerate physicians
to improve the quality of care. It is widely acknowledged that traditional approaches to
remunerate physicians provide financial incentives to deviate from a patient-optimal level of
care. Fee-for-service (FFS) payments encourages overprovision and lump-sum capitation
(CAP) payments underprovision of medical services. Pay for performance (P4P) bonus
payments present a promising policy approach to align physicians’ financial incentives with
a high quality of care.
Despite the increasing popularity of P4P initiatives in practice34, empirical evidence on
the effect on the quality of care is rather mixed and inclusive (for extensive literature reviews,
see Scott et al., 2011; Mathes et al., 2019; and Jia et al., 2021). Empirical studies typically
assess the effectiveness of P4P programs at the aggregate level and face the challenge to
identify a causal effect of performance pay on the quality of care. Due to various confounds
in the field, health outcomes are difficult to observe and may be biased (Campbell et al.,
2009; Gravelle et al., 2010; Roland and Olesen, 2015). Experimental studies represent a
valuable complement rendering control over the decision situation, incentive design, and
quality measures. While recent experimental evidence shows that introducing performance
pay increases the quality of medical care, it also reveals a lot of heterogeneity in behavior
(e.g., Brosig-Koch et al., 2020; Oxholm et al., 2021). Up to now, a profound understanding
34In the USA for example, see, e.g., Rosenthal et al., 2006; Stokes et al., 2018; Song et al., 2019, and in
the UK, see, e.g., Roland, 2004; Doran et al., 2006; Roland and Campbell, 2014.
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of the underlying mechanisms for the observed heterogeneity is mostly lacking.
The physicians’ personal characteristics are a likely source contributing to the heteroge-
neous responses to P4P. Personality traits are defined as an individual’s “relatively stable,
consistent, and enduring internal characteristics” (American Psychological Association, nd).
There is a rapidly growing general economics literature which acknowledges their potential
to explain variations in labor market performance and responses to financial incentives
(e.g., Bowles et al., 2001; Almlund et al., 2011; Fulmer and Walker, 2015; Cubel et al.,
2016). In health economics contexts, some evidence exists that personality traits relate to
the performance of medical service providers (Callen et al., 2018; Eilermann et al., 2019).
However, very little is known on how personality traits relate to the effect of P4P on providers’
performance. To the best of our knowledge, only one experimental study addresses this
issue directly. Using a field experiment observing maternity care providers in rural India,
Donato et al. (2017) find differences in providers’ responses to performance-based financial
incentives according to two personality traits. A comprehensive understanding of how and
under which conditions personality traits moderate the effect of P4P is still lacking.
In this study, we aim to narrow this gap in the literature. We investigate whether
physicians’ personality traits affect how they respond to the introduction of P4P under
two traditional baseline payment systems (CAP or FFS). This payment schemes differ by
inherent financial incentives for either underprovision or overprovision of medical services.
To this end, we utilize data from a series of behavioral experiments in an abstract medical
frame and surveys on personality traits with physicians, medical students, and non-medical
students. The experimental environment allows to identify the causal effect of P4P on a
clean measure of quality of care at the individual subject level. Our study provides valuable
insights on how personality traits relate to physicians’ responses to P4P, absent confounding
effects on patients’ health outcome. For two baseline payment systems, we address the
following research question: Do certain personality traits indicate why some physicians
respond more or less to performance-based financial incentives than others?
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3.2 Background
A well-established construct to measure personality is the Big Five personality model.35
Differences in personality at the subordinated level are typically reflected by five primary
traits; defined as follows: “extraversion” reflects the orientation of one’s interests and ener-
gies toward the outer world of people and things rather than the inner world of subjective
experience; “neuroticism” reflects a chronic level of emotional instability and proneness to
psychological distress; “openness” reflects the tendency to be open to new aesthetic, cultural,
or intellectual experiences; “conscientiousness” reflects the tendency to be organized, respon-
sible, and hardworking; and “agreeableness” reflects the tendency to act in a cooperative,
unselfish manner (Dictionary of Psychology of the American Psychological Association).
Although the influences of traits on individuals’ behavior may vary depending on the
decision context, personality traits are generally suggested to affect many economic and
social outcomes; for an excellent overview on the role of personality traits in economics, see,
e.g., Borghans et al. (2008), Almlund et al. (2011). We briefly outline the main findings of
the streams in literature most relevant for our study.
In labor market economics, the evidence is rather mixed. While experimental stud-
ies share the consistent finding that neuroticism is negatively related to performance in
real-effort tasks under piece-rate payment schemes (Müller and Schwieren, 2012; Cubel
et al., 2016), the relation to other traits is less uniform. Müller and Schwieren (2012) find
that openness negatively relates to individual’s performance, whereas there is positive link
between conscientiousness and performance is reported by Cubel et al., 2016. In addition,
further (mostly survey) studies suggest that agreeableness is associated with lower labor
market outcomes (e.g., Nyhus and Pons, 2005), and extraversion with better labor market
outcomes (e.g., Fletcher, 2013).
In health economics, the limited empirical evidence on the impact of personality traits
on a provider’s performance is rather mixed with respect to the behavioral relevance of each
trait. Callen et al. (2018), for example, show that the performance of health care providers
35For an extensive summary on the history and measurement of Big Five personality dimensions, see John
et al. (2008).
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in Pakistan is related to their personality traits: physicians higher in conscientiousness are
more likely to be present at work at (unannounced) health inspections and physicians higher
in all traits but openness are less likely to falsely report their attendance compared to those
lower in the respective traits. However, within the frame of a laboratory experiment with
medical students and non-medical students Hennig-Schmidt et al. (2019) find no systematic
effects between personality traits and dishonest behavior when investigating false reports
of birth weights in a neonatal care context.36 Eilermann et al. (2019), in turn, report
that conscientiousness affects treatment decisions of pediatricians in an artefactual field
experiment: more conscientious pediatricians deviate significantly less from the appropriate
therapy length of antibiotic treatment for a series of routine pediatric cases. Since treatment
decisions in the experiment are not incentivized, interactions between personality traits and
responses to financial incentives cannot be studied. Up to now, Donato et al. (2017) present
the only experimental evidence on a link between personality traits and P4P in health
care. In a maternity care setting in rural India, they study how providers respond to P4P
incentives corresponding to their level of conscientiousness and neuroticism. The provider’s
performance is assessed by the incidence of adverse health outcome, i.e., the post-partum
hemorrhage rates among her patients. The positive effect of P4P on a provider’s performance
is reported to be less strong for more conscientious and more neurotic providers who, at the
same time, are the ones to perform better absent P4P.
We add to this first evidence in a health care context. In a more general approach, we do
not refer to one particular health care setting, but utilize data from laboratory experiments in
an abstract medical frame. Unlike in observational studies, the closely monitored conditions
in laboratory settings allow to precisely measure individual’s performance whilst accounting
for the baseline payment system and a patient’s health characteristics. In addition, we
account for the mixed evidence on the behavioral relevance of each trait in the labor and
health economics literature, making it a natural approach to explore how each of the five
traits relates to individual behavioral, rather than restricting our analyses to certain traits a
priori.
36Also Groß et al. (2021) in a complementing paper observe no link between personality traits and dishonest
reporting behavior.
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3.3 Experiment, Data, and Methods
We utilize experimental data from a medically framed laboratory experiment which was
designed to investigate systematically how introducing P4P affects medical service provision
under either a baseline CAP or a FFS payment system.37 Overall 107 subjects (20 physicians,
44 medical students, and 43 non-medical students) participated in the experiments between
2011 and 2013.38 In a between-subjects design, subjects were randomly assigned to only one
payment condition (CAP or FFS with 55 and 52 subjects, respectively), but experience the
variation in performance pay at a within-subject level. Thus, each subject participates in
two consecutive experimental parts which only differ in the existence of P4P.
In the role of a physician, subjects are asked to decide on the provision of medical services
for nine abstract patients in each part. While patients vary in terms of health characteristics
within each part, the characteristics of the patient population are kept constant across both
parts. In the first part, subjects decide on medical service provision under traditional CAP or
FFS (absent P4P), whereas, in the second part, they decide on it when the baseline payment
systems are enhanced with performance pay (CAP+P4P or FFS+P4P). All decisions in the
experiment are incentive-compatible, such that they bear real consequences. When deciding
on the quantity of provided medical services, a subject determines her own profit and the
patient’s health benefit simultaneously.39 Even though subjects make their decision on a
computer screen and no patients are physically present, real patients outside the lab are
affected by the subjects’ medical service decisions. In particular, the patient’s health benefit
realized by the participants’ decisions is transferred to a charity which exclusively uses the
money for treatment of cataract patients.40
Every provided medical service leads to costs for a physician. Under CAP, subjects
37For a detailed description on the experimental design and protocol, see Section 2.3 of Chapter 2.
38The medically framed laboratory experiment with 44 medical students and 43 non-medical students
was conducted at the University of Duisburg-Essen, Germany, and the artefactual field experiment with 20
physicians at the Academy for Training and Education of Physicians (Akademie für Ärztliche Fort- und
Weiterbildung) in Bad Nauheim, Germany. For a summary of descriptive statistics of our sample, see Table
B.1.1 in Appendix B.1.2.
39At the end of the experiment, when all subjects had made their decisions, one decision in each part of
the experiment was randomly determined to be relevant for a subject’s actual payoff and the patient benefit.
For further details on the payment procedure, see Section 2.3 of Chapter 2.
40In total, EUR 2,509.40 were transferred to the charity, enabling the treatment of 83 cataract patients.
61
are paid a fixed lump-sum payment which is, then, reduced by the costs incurring for the
provision of the chosen quantity of medical services. Under FFS, subjects receive a (piece-
rate) fee per medical service rendered to a patient which is always higher than the incurring
costs per service. Hence, FFS provides an incentive for subjects to overserve patients,
while CAP provides an incentive to underserve patients. To mitigate the inherent financial
incentive in FFS (CAP) to provide too many (few) services, P4P payments introduced
in part 2 of the experiment are designed to make the interests of physicians and patients
become (more) aligned. To this end, subjects receive bonus payments whenever their medical
service provision does not deviate from the patient-optimal quantity by more than one
medical service. By definition, the patient-optimal quantity always leads to the highest
patient health benefit. Note that all parameters of the experiment are common knowledge
and subjects are aware of the patient-optimal quantity which varies for individual patient
types. Assuming that the quality is not fully contractible due to information asymmetry, we
allow variations from the patient-optimal quantity by one unit. By linking performance pay
to the patient’s health benefit, we reduce the trade-offs between the maximization of profit
and the optimization of the patient’s health benefit. However, inherent financial incentives
for non-optimal service provision under CAP and FFS are still prevalent. The overall design
of payment systems is symmetric in level and marginal incentives, and P4P are set such
that incentives are comparable between CAP and FFS.
To elicit personality traits, the short version of the BIG Five Inventory (BFI-10) by
Rammstedt and John (2007) is included in a post-experimental questionnaire. The BFI-10
asks subjects to rate their agreement to ten statements on a five point Likert scale, two out
of the ten statements, thereby, form one trait.41
To investigate how P4P-effects on the quality of care relate to personality traits, we apply
the following estimation model for each baseline payment system:
yij = β0 + β1P4Pj + β2Traiti + β3P4PjxTraiti + β4Xi + β5Zj + εij , (3.1)
41For a detailed description of the BFI-10, see Table C.1.1 in Appendix C.1.1.
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where yij is the quality outcome of interest, namely the absolute deviation from patient-
optimal care (|qij − q∗j |). It is measured by the absolute number of medical services that a
subject’s i chosen quantity (qij) for a patient j deviates from the patient optimal quantity
(q∗j ). A physician provides the highest quality of care whenever she is delivering the patient-
optimal quantity of medical services (yij = 0), which, by definition, implies the highest health
benefit for a patient. The larger the difference to the patient-optimal quantity, the lower
is the quality. P4Pj is a dummy variable indicating the introduction of performance pay.
Traiti is a vector of subjects’ personality traits representing the score of each personality of
the BFI-10. Our main interest are the interaction effects between P4P and each Traiti.42
Xi represents a vector of time-invariant subject characteristics, i.e., gender and medical
experiences (non-medical student, medical student, or physician). Though not our research
focus, we account for the impact of patients’ health characteristics on quality of care
(reported in Chapter 2) by including patient’s severity of illness and marginal health benefit
per provided service as controls in our subsequent regression analyses, represented by vector
Zj .
3.4 Results
We now analyze how the effects of P4P on the quality of care interacts with individuals’
personality traits.43 Figure 3.1 shows the distributions of personality traits for subjects
under each baseline payment system. On average, our subjects exhibit fairly high levels of
conscientiousness, extraversion and openness, moderate levels of agreeableness and rather
42To detect a potential problem of multicollinearity when including all traits in a joint model, we checked
for several warning signals. Neither the tolerance and variance inflation matrix, nor the correlations of
estimated coefficients give reason for concern. We performed separate trait by trait regressions for robustness
analyses and report estimates in Tables C.2.3 and C.2.4 in Appendix C.2 for CAP and FFS, respectively.
While the findings are qualitative similar to the estimates of our joint model, we note that the adjusted R2 is
higher for our model.
43For a systematic comparison on the overall and patient-severity specific effects of P4P on the quality of
care between CAP and FFS, see Chapter 2.
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CAP conditions FFS conditions
Extraversion Neuroticsm Openness Conscientiousness Agreeableness
Notes. This figure shows violin plots on the distributions of personality traits among subjects by payments
conditions. Personality traits are measured by the BIG Five Inventory (Rammstedt and John, 2007). Subjects
rate their agreement to ten statements on on a five point Likert scale with 1 corresponding to disagree strongly,
2 to disagree a little, 3 to neutral, 4 to agree a little, and 5 to agree strongly, two out of the ten statements form
one trait.
low levels of neuroticism.44 As Figure 3.1 shows, there is a substantial degree of between-
subject heterogeneity for each trait which makes it reasonable to study whether variations
in personality traits relate to variations in responses to P4P. The variations across CAP and
FFS seem similiar whatsoever.45
We, first, focus on the effect of P4P and personality traits on the quality of care under
CAP, applying Equation (3.1). Panel A of Figure 3.2 illustrates our main findings with
the regression results reported in Table 3.1.46 Recall that quality of care is assessed by
44Note that the measurement reliability (Cronbach alpha; α) for our data ranges only from good to fairly
low; extraversion (α = 0.74), neuroticism (α = 0.58) openness (α = 0.42), conscientiousness (α = 0.42), and
agreeableness (α = 0.18). Since α coefficients depend on the number of items used, it is not suprising that
the consistency is rather low (Furnham, 2008). Thus, when using Cronbach’s alpha as reliablity measure for
a two-item scale, the true reliability is usually underestimated (Eisinga et al., 2013). Our α’s do not appear
particularly striking compared to the reported α’s of other studies using the BFI-10, which range from α =
0.03 to α = 0.75 (e.g., Thalmayer et al., 2011; Crede et al., 2012; Carciofo et al., 2016; Balgiu, 2018 and
Hennig-Schmidt et al., 2019).
45Overall, samples under CAP conditions and FFS conditions appear fairly similar in all personality
measures. P -values of Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) tests (p ≥ 0.382) indicate that there is no statistical
evidence of a difference in personality traits between the distributions; for a detailed analysis of differences in
personality traits between both subsamples, see Appendix C.1.2.
46Though not shown and discussed in detail here, we performed several analyses for robustness checks,
reported in Appendix C.2. These include regression estimates for several versions of our base model Equation
(3.1) (see Table C.2.5), estimations based on tobit and multilevel regressions (see Table C.2.6), and separate
trait by trait analyses (see Tables C.2.3 and C.2.4). The estimation results of each of these additional analyses
are qualitatively similar to the results shown in Table 3.1.
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the absolute deviation from patient-optimal care with negative regression estimates indi-
cating quality improvements. First, P4P leads to an overall higher quality of care. Second,
we find that more conscientious and more agreeable subjects provide a higher quality of
care. Third, the positive estimates on the interaction between P4P and conscientious-
ness is statistically significant different from zero. Similarly, the positive interaction effect
of P4P and agreeableness is also of statistical significance. These findings imply that the
positive effect of P4P on the quality of care decreases for subjects scoring higher in both traits.











P4P x Conscientiousness 
P4P x  Agreeableness
Personality traits
Interaction Effects
−2 −1 0 1 2 −2 −1 0 1
A. CAP B. FFS
Notes. This figure shows regression coefficients from separate regressions on the impact of performance pay (P4P)
and personality traits on the quality of care for both baseline payment systems, capitation (CAP) in Panel A
and fee-for-service (FFS) in Panel B. Error bars represent 90 percent confidence intervals, with standard errors
clustered at the individual subject level. For a better interpretation of our regression estimates, we rescaled Big
Five scores to [-1, 1]. Thus an one unit increase in the respective trait reflects a change from the theoretical
minimum to the (neutral) midpoint or from the midpoint to the theoretical maximum). All regressions include
subject’s individual controls, i.e., gender and medical experience, and patients’ individual controls, i.e., severity
of illness and marginal health benefit per provided service. Regression estimates corresponding to this figure are
reported in Table 3.1.
Or put differently, subjects who are less conscientious and agreeable respond stronger
to performance incentives. In contrast to more conscientious and agreeable subjects who
provide a closer to patient-optimal quality of care absent P4P incentives, these subjects
also offer a higher potential for quality improvements in the first place. Thus, P4P may
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Table 3.1: Regression model on the interaction effects of performance pay and personality
traits on quality of care
Absolute deviation
from patient-optimal care




























Notes. This table shows estimates from OLS regressions on the effects of per-
formance pay (P4P) and personality traits on quality of care under capitation
(CAP) or fee-for-service (FFS) baseline payment systems. Robust standard er-
rors clustered for subjects are shown in parentheses. All personality traits are
measured on a scale from -1 to +1. The coefficients thus reflect the effect of
a one-unit change; for example, a change from the theoretical minimum to the
(neutral) midpoint or from the midpoint to the theoretical maximum. All mod-
els control for patient’s health characteristics which comprise severity of illness
and patient’s marginal health benefit. Both models include subjects’ controls
comprising gender and medical experience (non-medical students, medical stu-
dents, physicians). For the respective estimates, see Table C.2.5 in Appendix
C.2. *p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01
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not be as effective to improve the quality of care for subjects high in agreeableness and
conscientiousness under CAP, for whom the quality of care is already higher in the absence
of P4P.
We now study behavioral responses to P4P under FFS and the impact of personality
traits, therein, see Panel B of Figure 3.2 and Table 3.1. Consistent with previous findings,
introducing P4P leads to an increase in the quality of care. Personality traits, however,
do not relate to the provided quality of care in any statistical significant way, neither in
the absence nor in the presence of P4P. In contrast to our findings under CAP, individual
responses under FFS are not affected by personality traits. This difference suggests that
subjects seem to perceive both payment systems differently, despite the mirror image design
of payment systems in level, marginal profit and patients’ benefit.
Taken together, we find no empirical support that individuals respond stronger to
performance incentives according to any personality trait. In contrast, our results (if at
all) indicate a reversed relationship such that the effect of P4P is weaker among more
conscientious and agreeable individuals under CAP. It needs to be emphasized that the
effect still remains positive. This adds to the findings of Donato et al. (2017) who report a
similar relation for providers higher in conscientiousness and neuroticism.
3.5 Discussion and conclusion
We study how personality traits relate to the effect of P4P when complementing either
CAP or FFS. Thereby, we contribute to the growing literature on how P4P initiatives need
to be tailored to efficiently improve the quality of care. To this end, we use data from
controlled experiments which allow to obtain a clean measure of quality of care and relate it
to individuals’ personality traits.
Our behavioral data shows that the underlying baseline payment system is crucial for
answering the question whether personality traits influence the effectiveness of P4P. We
present experimental evidence that certain personality traits, namely conscientiousness
and agreeableness, are behaviorally relevant for the quality of care under CAP conditions
but not under FFS conditions. This demonstrates that the perception of medical service
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provision under both payment systems might differ. Under CAP, more conscientious and
more agreeable subjects, who absent performance incentives provide relatively higher quality
of care, respond less strong to the incentives compared to subjects lower in these traits.
In general, CAP provides financial incentives for underprovision as every additionally
provided medical service is costly and only payoff decreasing. To obtain higher profits
(which occur at the expense of lower patients’ benefits), subjects need to follow a “no/low
effort”-policy. Individuals higher in conscientiousness, who tend to be more responsible and
hardworking, might be more reluctant to adopt such a policy. In contrast, the motivation
to provide medical services under FFS with general financial incentives for overprovision is
made salient in order to enhance profits. At the same time, the provision of medical services
still requires efforts since every provided service is costly for the physician. Under CAP,
however, deviations from patient-optimal care do require no such effort and might rather
be construed as selfish behavior. More agreeable subjects who tend to act in an unselfish
manner might, thus, feel more obligated to provide some kind of sacrifice which, under CAP,
can only be achieved in providing (more) medical services at the expense of own profit. The
reported link to agreeableness adds to experimental findings derived from neutrally framed
dictator games which emphasize that subjects’ agreeableness is positively associated with
higher giving (e.g., Ben-Ner et al., 2004). Note that, in a broader sense, our CAP-decision
task relates to giving in a general dictator game decision task.
The introduction of P4P renders different incentives across baseline payment systems,
i.e., to enhance the quantity of medical services under CAP and to reduce it under FFS.
While subjects irrespective of personality traits respond similar positively strong to P4P
under FFS, the positive effect of P4P on the quality of care is weaker for more conscien-
tious and agreeable subjects under CAP. These subjects already provide a fairly close to
patient-optimal quality absent P4P though. On the one hand, they might simply respond
less strong to P4P because they have less potential for quality improvements compared
to others who behave less patient-regarding absent P4P. On the other hand, in line with
the finding that individuals who are rather intrinsically motivated are hardly sensitive to
financial incentives (e.g., Lagarde and Blaauw, 2017), these subjects might generally respond
less strong to financial incentives such as P4P incentives.
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Within the confines of the experiment, the key take-aways of this study are as follows.
Certain personality traits of physicians mitigate the effectiveness of P4P. More precisely,
introducing P4P to CAP might not effectively improve the quality of care in settings partic-
ularly attractive for physicians high in conscientiousness and agreeableness. Even though
personality traits (if at all) negatively relate to responses to P4P, the moderating effects on
the quality of care are not detrimental for patients. Nevertheless, from a viewpoint of cost
efficiency, our findings suggests that whether P4P serves as a means to efficiently improve the
quality of care under CAP also depends on the shares of physicians high in contentiousness
and agreeableness. While certain personality traits indicate why some physicians respond
less to P4P than others, important to highlight, they also indicate a higher quality of care
without additional performance incentives. Thus, selecting more conscientious and agreeable
physicians might lead to an improved quality of care and presents an alternative approach
to the introduction of P4P in care settings which are characterized by CAP payments. In
Germany, for example, primary care could represent such a care setting with CAP as the
predominant payment form (e.g., Brosig-Koch et al., 2020).
With empirical evidence reporting that certain personality traits can be linked to occupa-
tional choices of future physicians (e.g., Mullola et al., 2018; Bexelius et al., 2016), our study
adds to the potential of personality traits within the scope of worker selection strategies. In
line with recent claims on selecting workers according to specific characteristics to improve
the performance (e.g., Ashraf and Lee., 2016), our findings can be useful in developing
targeted interventions aimed at selecting an efficient and patient-oriented medical workforce.
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Chapter 4
Physician altruism: The role of medical education
4.1 Introduction
Physician altruism is a key characteristic of behavior in healthcare markets and the notion
of the benevolent, sacrificial physician is deeply rooted in medical ethics dating back to the
ancient Hippocratic Oath (e.g., Pellegrino, 1987; Beauchamp and Childress, 2001). The
modern view in economics is coined by Arrow (1963), who emphasized that a physician’s
behavior is “supposed to be governed by a concern for the customer’s welfare which would not
be expected of a salesman” (Arrow, 1963, p. 949). Following Arrow, a large literature showed
that physician altruism has important implications, for example, on physicians’ responses to
incentives (e.g., Ellis and McGuire, 1986; Alexander, 2020), concerns for transparency (e.g.,
Kolstad, 2013), referrals (e.g., Allard et al., 2011; Liu and Ma, 2013), prescription patterns
(e.g., Hellerstein, 1998; Crea et al., 2019), and occupational choices (e.g., Nicholson and
Propper, 2011; Li, 2018).
Surprisingly, while altruistic preferences play a key role in modeling physicians’ behavior,
little is known about their origin, their distribution in the population of future doctors, and
their formation during the course of education. In this respect, it is unclear how medical
education shapes future physicians’ patient-regarding altruistic preferences towards the
patients’ health in the sense of Arrow (1963). It is thus key to, first, better understand
the distribution of altruism, in the population of future doctors, and, second, to identify
the effect of medical education on physicians’ altruism while accounting for the prevailing
heterogeneity in a parsimonious way. In the paper at hand, it is our objective to make an
important step in this direction. For this purpose we designed an incentivized behavioral
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experiment to study medical students’ patient-regarding altruistic preferences.
Our paper builds on several streams of the literature on estimating altruistic preferences
among medical students and physicians. A first strand of empirical literature estimates
altruism among primary care physicians using their prescription choices. This stream
of the literature, originating from Hellerstein (1998), relies on a theoretical framework
assuming that both the (indirect) utility of the patient and the insurance expenditures
enter the utility function of the physician.47 Within this framework, empirical studies
compare physicians’ marginal utility from patient welfare with their marginal disutility from
insurance expenditures (e.g., Hellerstein, 1998; Lundin, 2000; Crea et al., 2019). Making use
of prescriptions data on seven different drugs from two Swedish pharmacies in 1992 and 1993,
Lundin (2000) estimates a random effects probit model for whether physicians prescribed
the branded or generic version of the drugs and finds some support for physicians’ altruism:
higher coverage decreased (increased) the probability of prescribing a generic (branded)
version of a drug. Using a national panel register containing all statins prescriptions in
Finland from 2003 to 2010, Crea et al. (2019) estimate the likelihood that physicians prescribe
generic versus branded versions of statins as a function of the shares of the difference between
what patients have to pay out of their pocket and what is covered by the insurance. Estimated
coefficients associated with altruism are nearly zero while, instead, Crea et al. (2019) find
strong evidence of habits persistence in prescribing branded drugs.48
A second strand of literature focuses on health benefits of patients based on experimental
economics methods. Compared to studies using medical prescriptions data, behavioral
experiments allow to investigate the nature of patient-regarding altruism at an individual-
subject level. This approach is theoretically guided by early formalizations of physicians’
behavior by Arrow (1963) and Ellis and McGuire (1986), in which a physician’s utility
47Hellerstein (1998) assumes that the branded version of the drug is more expensive than the generic
version. The model shows that, if the physician places a higher weight on the patient’s utility than on
insurance expenditures, an increase in the insurance coverage decreases (increases) the likelihood of the generic
(branded) prescription. An increase in the insurance coverage, in fact, increases insurance expenditures
and decreases patient’s expenditures, ceteris paribus. As both these variables have a similar effect on the
physician’s utility, higher insurance coverage leads to a lower probability of generic prescribing when the
physician values the utility of the patient more than the insurance expenditure.
48In this paper, we focus on physician altruism, and we do not consider studies on other healthcare
providers like, for instance, Douven et al. (2019) who analyze the altruistic preferences of mental health
workers using a large data set from the Netherlands. For a summary of other examples, see Galizzi et al.
(2015).
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increases in the patient’s health benefit. A prototypical early example is Hennig-Schmidt
et al.’s (2011) medically framed laboratory experiment with a small sample of German medical
students. Using data from this experiment, Godager and Wiesen (2013) estimate the marginal
rate of substitution between patient benefit and profit as a measure of physician altruism.
Their estimation results show patient-regarding altruism with substantial heterogeneity
therein. Following Godager and Wiesen (2013), Wang et al. (2020) also estimate the
distribution of altruism among 178 Chinese medical students and 99 Chinese physicians and
compared it to those 42 German medical students participating in Hennig-Schmidt et al.’s
(2011) experiment. Their estimates show that physician altruism is quite similar between
Chinese doctors, Chinese medical students, and German medical students.
In a third strand of the literature, altruistic preferences of medical students are elicited
experimentally in scenarios with no specific connection to a physician-patient relation. The
standard experimental setting is a neutrally framed modified dictator game where altruism
is identified by the tradeoff between self-interest and other’s benefit. Following the seminal
paper of Andreoni and Miller (2002), preferences over monetary sums are decomposed into
two qualitatively different tradeoffs: a first tradeoff between self-interest and other’s benefit,
and a second tradeoff between equality and efficiency. In two related papers, Li et al. (2017,
2018) use an online experiment to elicit altruistic preferences of 503 US medial students
over distributing monetary sums between themselves and an anonymous other person from
the American Life Panel.49 Both studies report widely heterogeneous social preferences in
terms of their altruism and equality-efficiency tradeoffs. Also, Li et al. (2017) report that
medical students are similar in altruism, equality and efficiency preferences compared to
non-medical student subjects in comparable samples but are substantially less altruistic and
more efficiency-focused than the full ALP sample.
In this paper, we designed an experiment at the crossroad between the experimental
designs of Hennig-Schmidt et al. (2011) and Li et al. (2017). More precisely, we elicit altruism
preferences of future physicians using a medical frame and standard experimental economics
methods similar to, for example, Andreoni and Miller (2002), Fisman et al. (2007), Choi
49The American Life Panel is a probability-based panel which is representative for the US-population and
can be used to regularly interview participants over the internet.
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et al. (2007), and Bruhin et al. (2019). Instead of relying on out-of-pocket expenses or
monetary gains, our experimental design involves a series of medically framed choice tasks
in which future physicians decide for 30 stylized patients on the treatment options rendering
a profit for the physician and a health benefit for the patient. It is an important feature
of our experimental decision situation that the receiving person being an actual patient is
made salient. In particular, the patient health benefit is measured in monetary terms in
the experiment, and real patients outside the experiment benefit from the medical students’
decisions as the money was earmarked for surgery of cataract patients. This procedure on
average elicited 25 percent of the per-patient cost of surgery from each participant. Our
sample consists of 733 medical students from the University of Cologne, a major German
public university teaching medicine. Students are spread according to the major progress
steps of the six years of medical education in Germany: from freshmen, to pre-clinical studies
(first and second year), clinical studies (third to fifth year), and practical year as assistant
clinician in hospitals (sixth year).
Following the bulk of experimental elicitation of altruism preferences, we estimated a
decision model based on a CES utility function in the fashion of Andreoni and Miller (2002)
with two parameters, one capturing the altruism tradeoff and the other the equality-efficiency
tradeoff. The size of the parameters estimated from the proposed sequence of binary choices
informs us about the relative importance of different preference components, controlling for
study progress. To account for medical students’ characteristics which could potentially
confound our estimates, we survey individuals about their socio-demographics, social and
economic preferences according to Falk et al. (2016), personality traits (Gosling et al., 2003;
Rammstedt and John, 2007; Ashton and Lee, 2009), and stated occupational preferences
with an extensive post-experimental questionnaire.50
Our structural estimation results show that, on the aggregate, medical students are
considerably altruistic. Nevertheless, medical education significantly affects medical students’
patient-regarding altruism. We find a non-linear, U-shaped relationship between their
patient-regarding altruism and their progress in medical education. Compared to freshmen,
50This paper is part of a broader panel study with medical students, who participate in the study up to
four times in the course of their medical education.
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medical students in the pre-clinical phase are more profit-oriented with the maximum
profit orientation being observed during the clinical phase. Patient-regarding altruism
slightly increases again in the practical year. The effects of study progress remain stable
when controlling for medical students’ gender, general altruism, other social and economic
preferences, personality traits, and unobserved heterogeneity. Compared to a control group
of non-medical students, medical students’ patient-regarding altruism is significantly higher.
To assess the predictive power of our preference estimates, we further link medical students’
patient-regarding altruism to their future income expectations and their stated specialty
choices. Lower patient-regarding altruism relates to higher estimates of their own future
income expectations. We also find a stable link to specializing in pediatrics and surgery such
that medical students opting for these specialties reveal significantly higher patient-regarding
altruism.
The remainder of the paper is laid out as follows. Section 4.2 provides some background
on medical education in Germany and on our sample. In Section 4.3, we present our
experimental design and procedure. Section 4.4 describes our econometric strategy for
estimating the behavioral model’s parameters at different levels of aggregation. Section 4.5
presents the behavioral results and the structural estimation results. Finally, Section 4.6
concludes.
4.2 Background and sample
4.2.1 Medical education in Germany
The vast majority of prospective physicians in Germany is educated at one of the 36 public
medical schools (e.g., Zavlin et al., 2017). The admission to medical education is centralized
nationally by the non-profit governmental Foundation for Admission to Higher Education
(Stiftung für Hochschulzulassung), and is highly competitive, as only about one out of five
applicants is admitted to a German medical school.51 Admission criteria to medical schools,
typically, are grades according to the General Certificate of Education (GCE), A-levels,
waiting terms, and the applicants’ performance in entry tests for studying medicine (TMS,
51For example, in the winter term 2018/2019, according to the Stiftung für Hochschulzulassung 43,631
prospective students applied to study medicine in Germany while only 9,232 places were available.
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Test für Medizinische Studiengänge). At the time of data collection, 20% of the available
places at medical school were assigned to applicants with the best GCEs and to applicants
based on accumulated waiting terms, respectively. The remaining places (60%) were allocated
based on a medical school’s individual selection criteria (e.g., TMS).52
The medical education in Germany is highly regulated. Structure, curriculum, and
examination guidelines are standardized in the Medical Licensure Act (Approbationsordnung
für Ärzte, ÄApprO, 2002) to ensure that all medical students obtain an appropriate and
equivalent medical education.53 Medical education lasts for at least six years and three
months and concludes with the “Approbation”, the official German license to practice as a
physician, upon successfully passing the physician state exam (Staatsexamen). Along the
different parts of the physician exam, medical education in Germany typically comprises
three phases: (i) pre-clinical phase, (ii) clinical phase, and (iii) practical year.
In the first two years of the medical studies, the pre-clinical phase, students are taught the
basics of medicine and natural sciences and take part in a nursing internship. Traditionally,
the pre-clinical phase concludes with the first part of the physician exam. Instead of one
final exam at the end, medical students in Cologne take separate tests at different times of
the pre-clinical phase which serve as an equivalence to the first part of the state exam. The
subsequent clinical phase comprises a minimum of three years. In this more practical phase
all relevant clinical subjects are covered and students gain first experiences in practicing
medicine as physician-interns in hospitals and outpatient settings prior to taking the second
part of the physician exam. Medical education concludes with the practical year, the aim
of which is to familiarize students with practical work in clinics. The students spend four
months each at the hospital’s department of internal medicine, the department of surgery,
and an elective department different from the former ones. After the practical year and
having successfully completed the third part of the physician exam, medical students receive
their license to practice medicine, and may start their actual specialization for a specific
52In line with general guidelines implying a high weighting of GCE, every medical school can decide on
applying their own selection criteria. At the University of Cologne, the internal selection is performed based
on GCE (51%) and the applicants’ performance in TMS (49%).
53Note that slight and predefined deviations from the standardized course of study are possible (§41




4.2.2 Our medical student sample
A total of 733 medical students of the University of Cologne participated in our study from
April 2017 to December 2020. The sample consists of four cohorts: Freshmen in the first
week of their medical studies who did not get any prior medical education at the University
of Cologne, and students from each of the three study phases (pre-clinical, clinical, and
practical year). Table 4.1 provides an overview on the composition of our sample: freshmen
35.3%, pre-clinical 32.1%, clinical 21.6%, and practical year, 11.1%. 74% of the observations
were collected in 2017 (summer and winter term) with the average response rate being
15%.54
Our sample consists of 440 (60%) females, the overall average age when starting
Table 4.1: Sample composition by study progress
Freshmen Pre-clinical phase Clinical phase Practical year
Curriculum First week of Basic science, Clinical topics, Practical work
medical studies nursing internship internship as a physician in hospital
Year(s) of studies 0 1-2 3-5 6
Medical student sample 259 235 158 81
(N= 733) 35.3% 32.1% 21.6% 11.1%
Control group of non- 40 23 56 26a
medical students (N= 145) 27.6% 15.9% 38.6% 17.9%
Notes. a6 years of studies and more
medical education was 20.7, and the share of Germans by nationality is 92.5%. The sample
composition is a rather good approximation of the medical student populations in Germany
and at the University of Cologne in terms of gender, age, nationality, and admission quotas,
see Table 4.2.
In addition to our sample of medical students, we study a control group of 145 non-
medical students of different majors such as business administration, economics, politics,
law, history, linguistics, literature, pedagogy, and natural sciences enrolled at the University
54For freshmen, pre-clinical, clinical, and practical year students response rates were 43%, 23%, 11%, and
4%, respectively, of those who were invited to participate in the study. We approached students at specific
study terms, and, therefore, calculated the response rates based on the number of medical students in the
respective study terms.
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Table 4.2: Our medical student sample in context
Our total Comparison for 2017
sample Germanya University of Cologneb Our samplec
Female (%) 60.0 61.5 61.7 61.0
Age at starting medical educationd 20.7 19.5e 22.5f 21.2
Share of Germans (%) 92.5g 87.3 86.5h 92.6i
Admission quotaj
School-leaving grade (%) 21.8 20.0 20.0 21.9
Accumulated waiting terms (%) 9.9 20.0 20.0 10.3
University-specific selection criteria (%) 68.3 60.0 60.0 67.9
Notes. For the German student population descriptive statistics are only available for the winter term 2017/2018. Our
sample comprises data from both the summer term and the winter term 2017 as the University of Cologne (UoC) is one
of the few medical schools in Germany where students can enroll in both the summer and the winter term, and collecting
our data started in April 2017. aGerman Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2021 ). Data for the
winter term 2017/2018: n = 93, 946; bSummer term 2017 and winter term 2017/2018: n = 6, 034; cSummer term 2017
and winter term 2017/2018: n = 554; dFreshmen only; eData only available for average age of graduates (Statistisches
Bundesamt, 2018a). We, therefore, approximate the age at start of medical studies for overall Germany by subtracting
the average study duration from the average age of graduates; fData available only for summer term 2017: n = 3, 000;
gDue to missing data: n = 657; hDue to missing data: n = 539; iDue to missing data: n = 539; j The calculation
of the admission quota rests on lower numbers than reported in Table 4.1, namely n = 616 for our total sample
and n = 507 for the 2017 sample. Further deviations are due to procedural requirements in Germany, as some quo-
tas are deducted from the total number of available German medical study places before allocating them to the applicants.
of Cologne. The cohorts match the medical student sample regarding the study progress in
years, see Table 4.1.
4.3 The experiment
4.3.1 General design and decision situation
We introduce a novel experimental task in a stylized medical frame to elicit patient-regarding
altruism. N = 733 medical students each decide in the role of a physician (i) and face
J = 2 treatment alternatives (referred to as “A” and “B” in the instructions) for 30 stylized
“patients” (T = 30 choice occasions). Physician own profit (payment to self) is represented
by sjt, and ojt represents the patient benefit (payment to other) for treatment alternative j
and patient t. Henceforth, we use the labels “physician” and “patient” to indicate the roles
in our experiment.
Physician profit as well as patient benefit are expressed in monetary terms. While all
subjects in the experiment make decisions in the role of physicians for stylized patients,
real patients’ health outside the experimental setting is affected by their choices. Similar
to earlier controlled experiments on physician behavior, the monetary equivalent of the
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patient’s benefit resulting from the treatment alternative chosen is transferred to a charity
and is earmarked for surgical treatment of cataract patients.55 The treatment of a cataract
patient costs about EUR 30. For procedural details, see Section 4.3.2.
Each of the 30 choice occasions implies a systematically varied trade-off between physician
profit and patient benefit such that one treatment alternative is always more patient-regarding,
see Table 4.3. The values for physician profit and patient benefit can take five values: EUR
3, 6, 9, 12, and 15.56 The computerized experiment was programmed in ILIAS, a free
software used as online learning platform in German universities. Medical students in
Cologne are familiar with ILIAS, as it is commonly used for surveys and tests. The 30 choice
occasions were shown in a pre-determined randomized order on subjects’ computer screens.
A subject’s total payoff consisted of a physician profit (from a randomly selected patient)
and a lump-sum payment for filling in the post-experimental questionnaire (EUR 5).
4.3.2 Experimental protocol
The recruitment procedure was as follows. Sessions with freshmen were conducted during the
first (introductory) week of their studies prior to starting their medical education. Besides
freshmen, we approached pre-clinical students mainly at the end of their first year or in their
second year, clinical students mainly in their fourth year as well as practical-year students
in their sixth year.
In total, we conducted 16 experimental sessions between April 2017 and December 2019.
We run 11 laboratory sessions in a large lecture hall equipped with computer terminals at
the medical school of the University of Cologne. The remaining five sessions were conducted
online for a period of 10 to 26 days in order to reach students across all study phases who
55This procedure was introduced by Hennig-Schmidt et al. (2011) and has been applied in several
experiments in health economics, as it embeds an incentive for subjects in the lab to account for real patients’
health outside the lab. Equivalent mechanisms have been employed in recent behavioral experiments in health
analyzing physician behavior (Hennig-Schmidt et al., 2011; Hennig-Schmidt and Wiesen, 2014; Godager et al.,
2016; Brosig-Koch et al., 2016, 2017a, 2020; Byambadalai et al., 2019; Di Guida et al., 2019; Martinsson and
Persson, 2019; Huesmann et al., 2020; Wang et al., 2020; Waibel and Wiesen, 2021). In Kesternich et al.
(2015) and Lagarde and Blaauw (2017), subjects could choose from several (medical) charities to which a
donation should be transferred.
56The specific values of the treatment alternatives were chosen to guarantee that participants’ average
earnings correspond to the hourly wage of a student assistant at the University of Cologne (EUR 10). We
excluded values of zero to avoid end points. We used the command ’dcreate’ in STATA 14.0 (Hole, 2015) to
guide the parameterization of our choice occasions.
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Table 4.3: Physician profit and patient benefit for treatment alternatives A and B for the 30
patients
Treatment A Treatment B
Patient t Profit sAt Benefit oAt Profit sBt Benefit oBt
1 3 15 6 9
2 3 15 9 9
3 3 15 15 3
4 3 15 6 6
5 9 15 12 12
6 6 9 15 3
7 15 3 6 9
8 3 15 6 3
9 3 15 12 6
10 9 9 3 15
11 3 9 9 3
12 15 3 3 15
13 3 15 12 12
14 3 12 12 3
15 6 12 9 6
16 3 9 6 6
17 12 12 15 9
18 3 12 15 3
19 9 6 3 12
20 6 6 3 15
21 12 12 3 15
22 12 3 3 9
23 15 6 6 12
24 6 3 3 6
25 3 9 15 3
26 6 9 3 15
27 6 9 9 6
28 15 6 9 12
29 15 9 9 15
30 6 12 15 3
were not able to participate in the laboratory sessions. We collected 457 (62.4%) observations
via laboratory sessions and 276 (37.6%) observations via online sessions. Between November
2019 and January 2020, we run an online experiment with a control group of 145 non-medical
students of the University of Cologne, who were recruited via the online recruiting system
ORSEE (Greiner, 2015).
Prior to the experiment, subjects received detailed information on the data protection,
the experimental decision task, the procedure and the payment process. For more detail,
see the instructions provided in Appendix D.1.1. All subjects decided for the same 30
stylized patients. After subjects had taken their decisions, they were asked to complete a
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comprehensive questionnaire (see Section 4.3.3)57.
It took subjects, on average, about 60 minutes to complete the decision tasks and the
questionnaire. On average, medical students earned EUR 12.11 (profit EUR 7.11 plus EUR
5 for completing the questionnaire), and non-medical students were paid EUR 11.68 (profit
EUR 7.68 plus EUR 4). The average patient benefit amounted to EUR 7.89 for medical and
EUR 7.32 for non-medical students. In total, EUR 6,846 were transferred to the Christoffel
Blindenmission, a charity that used the money exclusively for financing cataract surgery
by their own ophthalmologist staff in developing countries. Our study, thus, enabled the
treatment of 228 cataract patients at the average cost for a surgery of EUR 30. As subjects’
decisions realize an average patient benefit of EUR 7.80, this makes up for one fourth of the
total cost of an eyesight-restoring surgery by each participant.
4.3.3 Post-experimental questionnaire
A comprehensive post-experimental questionnaire provided data that allow us to analyze
how medical students’ characteristics relate to their patient-regarding altruistic behavior.
In addition to students’ main characteristics (study cohort, gender, and age; recall Section
4.2.2), we collect information on subject’s personality traits, on their social and economic
preferences, and on their future work-related preferences (e.g., preferred specialty and future
income expectations).58
To get a comprehensive picture on subjects’ preferences, we elicited social and economic
preferences through experimentally validated survey-based methods according to Falk et al.
(2016, 2018). Social preferences comprise preferences for general altruism, trust, positive and
negative reciprocity, and economic preferences comprising time and risk preferences. Note
that the measure for general altruism is of particular relevance for our study as it enables
us to relate subjects’ general altruism to subjects’ incentivized patient-regarding altruistic
choices. Additionally, we elicited subject’s personality traits extraversion, agreeableness,
conscientiousness, neuroticism/emotionality, and openness using the 11-item short-version of
57All questionnaire items, which were only applicable for medical students, were dropped for the non-
medical student sample.
58As our study is part of a broader panel study, the post-experimental questionnaire comprises several
more items. In this paper, we only mention those questionnaire items relevant for the purpose of this study.
80
the Big Five Inventory (Gosling et al., 2003; Rammstedt and John, 2007). From winter term
2018 onwards, we use the more detailed 60-item HEXACO Personality Inventory (Ashton
and Lee, 2009).59 For a detailed description of the questionnaire items, see Table D.1.1 in
Appendix D.1.2.
4.4 Empirical strategy
4.4.1 Behavioral model of altruism
To characterize the distribution of altruism at the aggregate, we employ a behavioral model
of altruism following previous literature (e.g., Andreoni and Miller, 2002; Fisman et al., 2007;
Bruhin et al., 2019). As a utility function ui for subject i we consider a constant elasticity
of substitution (CES) parametric form, defined as:
ui(s, o, ai, ri) = (aisri + (1− ai)ori)
1
ri , (4.1)
where ai ∈ [0, 1] represents the weight a physician puts on her own profit, correspondingly
1 − ai represents the weight a physician puts on the patient’s health benefit, and ri < 1
reflects the elasticity of substitution between own profit and the patient’s health benefit.
The elasticity of substitution is defined as σi = 1ri−1 .
Depending on the values of a and r, subjects belong to different preference types. For
example, a subject with a equal to one is a purely selfish type, because she does not put any
weight on the patient’s health benefit. (i) When a ∈ (0.5, 1], the subject places more weight
on own profit compared to the patient health benefit; (ii) when a = 0.5, the individual
places the same weight on own profit and the patient’s benefit; (iii) when a ∈ [0, 0.5), the
individual places less weight on own profit compared to the patient’s benefit.
The parameter r reflects the curvature of the altruistic indifference curves. It ranges
from −∞ to 1: (i) when r ∈ (0, 1], preference is weighted toward increasing the sum of own
profit and patient benefit, with CES approaching a perfect-substitute utility function as
59The HEXACO Personality Inventory elicits the same personality traits as the 11-item short-version Big
Five Inventory, yet with 10 items each. As the additional trait honesty-humility is not included in the Big
Five Inventory and, therefore, data is limited to 179 medical students, we neglect this trait in our subsequent
analyses.
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r → 1; (ii) when r ∈ (−∞, 0), the individual’s distributional preference is instead weighted
toward reducing the difference in own profit and patient benefit with CES approaching the
Rawlsian or Leontief utility function min{as, (1− a)o} as r → −∞; (iii) when r → 0, CES
is approaching the Cobb-Douglas function sao(1−a), in which case the allocation to patient
benefit o and physician s is constant.
4.4.2 Structural estimation
In this section, we describe our strategy for estimating the parameters of the behavioral
model. To estimate the parameters of this model, a and r, we apply McFadden’s (1981)
random utility model for discrete choices. In the experiment, N subjects faced J = 2
alternatives on T = 30 choice occasions (patients). We assume that subjects choose the
alternative that maximizes their utility for each choice occasion. The random utility of
subject i from choosing alternative j in a choice occasion (for a patient) t is defined as:
Uijt = ui(sjt, ojt) + εijt, (4.2)
where ui(sjt, ojt) is the deterministic utility of the allocation of own profit to the physician
sjt and the benefit to the patient ojt and the error term is distributed extreme value. The
choice probability between option j = 1 and option j = 2 for subject i in choice occasion t,
can be written:






Where µi > 0 is a noise parameter with the following interpretation: when µi → 0 the choice
becomes deterministic, when µi → +∞ the choice becomes entirely random.
For the sake of simplicity, we denote θi = (ai, ri, µi) the set of parameters for the CES
preference functional. Let yit = 1 if the subject chooses option j = 2 for choice t (and yit = 0
otherwise), the likelihood associated with this choice is:
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Pit(θi)yit(1− Pit(θi))1−yit






We use a series of transformation functions to account for theoretical restrictions on
parameters. First, the estimation procedures account for parameter constraints on noise
with an exponential transformation (µi = gµ(ζµi ) = exp(ζ
µ
i )) of the parameter value to
guarantee the noise parameter is positive. For CES, the estimation procedures account for
parameter constraints with transformation of the estimated parameter values ζai and ζri . For
parameter ai we use a logistic function (ai = ga(ζai ) = 11+exp(−ζai )) guaranteeing ai, which
is a share, is always between zero and one. For parameter ri we use a translated negative
exponential function (ri = gr(ζri ) = 1− exp(−ζri )), guaranteeing ri is always lower than one.
In vector notation, for the CES preference functional, θi = g(ζi), with ζi = (ζai , ζri , ζ
µ
i ) and
g() = (ga(), gr(), gµ()).
The regression tables in the main text (see Section 4.5) report the value of the transformed
regression coefficients in preference parameters and noise, i.e. when regression coefficients are
transformed back to the original scale. In other words, the constant is defined by θi = g(ζi)
and represents median parameters.
The first version of the random utility model pools the data and estimates aggregate
parameters, a and r, that are representative for all subjects. These aggregate estimates
represent the most parsimonious characterization of altruism.





The estimation procedure maximizes the log-likelihood with respect to unconstrained pa-
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Reported standard errors are clustered at the individual level and computed with the
(multivariate) Delta method (see Appendix D.2 for details).
Aggregate estimations provide a parsimonious characterization of preference but neglect
heterogeneity. In order to account for observed heterogeneity between participants we include
in the structural estimation several covariates relating to study cohort, gender, preferences
under risk, time preferences, social preferences and a series of personality measures. This
defines six econometric models, each associated with a different set of covariates: Model (1) is
the base model without covariates, Model (2) adds term cohorts (our main research interest)
as explanatory variable, Model (3) adds gender as explanatory variable, Model (4) adds the
measure of the questionnaire item ’general altruism’ as explanatory variable, Model (5) adds
measures of risk aversion, discounting, trust, positive reciprocity and negative reciprocity as
explanatory variables, and Model (6) adds personality measures as explanatory variables.
More formally, let Xi denote the column vector of K regressors for individual i. The first
element of Xi is a one. We denote η by the 3× (K + 1) matrix of parameters such that:
ζi = ηXi.





The regression tables in the main text report the value of the preference and noise
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parameters when regression coefficients are transformed back to their original scale.60
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Descriptives and non-parametric analyses
To start with our analysis, we first focus on descriptives and present non-parametric analyses.
Table 4.4 shows the summary statistics for the proportion of patient-regarding choices
(prcs, Panel A). The prc refers to the treatment alternative which provides the patient with
the higher health benefit in each choice occasion. We also report summary statistics for
subjects’ characteristics (Panel B). Medical students decide in a patient-regarding way by,
on average, taking 56.3% prcs. When differentiating between study progress, we find a
U-shaped relationship. Freshmen are the most patient-regarding cohort (66.0%). Patient
orientation decreases in the pre-clinical phase (53.7%), reaches its minimum in the clinical
phase (46.0%), and rises to 52.0% in the practical year.
Patient-regarding behavior of freshmen is significantly higher compared to the three
other cohorts (p < 0.001, t-test). prcs in the pre-clinical phase are significantly higher
than in the clinical phase (p = 0.009) but do not differ significantly between practical-year
students and students in the pre-clinical or clinical phase (p > 0.170).
Figure 4.1 illustrates the distributions of prcs by study cohorts. Except for comparing
clinical-phase and practical-year students, the Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test rejects the hypothe-
sis of identical distributions for all cohort comparisons (p < 0.05). Figure 4.1 also shows
how medical students differ in their behavior. Pure profit-maximizers, who do not make any
prc, are located at the bottom of the graphs. For freshmen, their share is lowest (2.7%). It
amounts to 3.0% in the pre-clinical phase, but increases to 15.8% in the clinical phase and
to 13.6% in the practical year. On the other hand, the share of pure altruists, those always
60In other words, the constants are defined by θ0 = g(η0) and represents median parameters. For the
dummy variables, such as gender (or cohort), the tables with marginal effects report g(η0 + ηfemale) − g(η0),
the (partial) effect setting the female dummy to one. The same applies to cohort. For preference parameters,
distributed with a range of 1 (from -0.5 to 0.5 for risk aversion, with 0 indicating risk neutrality, from 1 to 0
for discounting, with 1 indicating no discounting and from 0 to 1 for other preference items), marginal effects
are equal to g(η0 + ηpreference item × 0.1) − g(η0). For personality measures, distributed over the support
[−1, 1], marginal effects are equal to g(η0 + ηpersonality item × 0.2) − g(η0). Standard errors are computed with
the Delta method.
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Table 4.4: Descriptive statistics of medical students’ behavior and characteristics
Mean M s.d. N
A. Patient-regarding choices
Total sample 16.9 (56.3%) 9.0 733
Freshmen 19.8 (66.0%) 8.1 259
Pre-clinical 16.1 (53.7%) 8.3 235
Clinical 13.8 (46.0%) 9.6 158
Practical Year 15.6 (52.0%) 9.6 81
B. Characteristics
Social and economic preferences
Altruism 0.38 0.17 729
Trust 0.57 0.24 729
Positive reciprocity 0.36 0.18 729
Negative reciprocity 0.47 0.16 729
Risk aversion 0.07 0.15 731
Time discounting 0.27 0.16 731
Personality traits
Agreeableness 0.09 0.37 729
Conscientiousness 0.39 0.35 729
Extraversion 0.25 0.41 729
Neuroticism/emotionality -0.08 0.43 729
Openness 0.27 0.44 729
Notes. This table presents summary statistics on the number of patient-
regarding choices and on subject’s characteristics, the latter comprising
social and economic preferences according to Falk et al. (2016; 2018), per-
sonality traits by the Big Five Inventory, (Gosling et al., 2003; Rammstedt
and John, 2007) or the HEXACO Personality Inventory (Ashton and Lee,
2009). Altruism, trust, positive and negative reciprocity are measured on
a [0, 1]-scale with 0 being the theoretical minimum and 1 the theoretical
maximum. Risk aversion is transformed such that 0 implies risk neutrality,
a positive value entails risk aversion and a negative value risk seeking.
Time discounting being 0 entails patience, while a positive value implies
impatience. All personality traits are measured on a [−1, 1]-scale. See
Table D.1.1 in Appendix D.1.2 for a detailed description of all variables.
The lower number of observations in Panel B is due to subjects leaving the
survey before completing the questionnaire.
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Figure 4.1: Distributions of patient-regarding choices by cohorts
Notes. This figure shows distributions and box plots for number of patient-regarding choices
by study cohort. Pure profit-maximizers are located at the bottom of the graph and pure
altruists at the top.
choosing the high-benefit alternative, is highest for freshmen (12.4%), while it is 4.3% in the
pre-clinical phase, 7.0% in the clinical phase and 4.9% for practical year students.
So far, our analysis provides evidence that the majority of medical students reveal
preferences, which deviate from pure profit-maximization, and that patient benefit plays an
important role in their treatment decisions. By contrast, our control group of non-medical
students is significantly less patient-regarding in all study progress stages. For further details
on the choice behavior and descriptive statistics of our control group, see Appendix D.3.
We now turn to characteristics of the individual participants that were elicited in the
questionnaire part of our study (see Section 4.3.3). Panel B in Table 4.4 shows the descriptive
statistics on subjects’ social and economic preferences (general altruism, trust, positive and
negative reciprocity, risk, and time discounting) as well as on subjects’ personality traits
(agreeableness, conscientiousness, extraversion, neuroticism/emotionality, and openness).
Altruism, trust, positive and negative reciprocity are measured on a [0, 1]-scale with 0
being the theoretical minimum and 1 the theoretical maximum. Risk aversion is transformed
such that 0 implies risk neutrality, a positive value entails risk aversion and a negative
value risk seeking. Time discounting being 0 entails patience, while a positive value implies
impatience.
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For our medical student sample, the general altruism measure is Maltruism=0.38, which
is below the theoretical midpoint of 0.50 and indicates that on the stated preference level,
the students tend to be more selfish than altruistic. Our sample tends to be trusting
(Mtrust = 0.57), and is slightly more positively reciprocal than being negatively reciprocal
(Mpos.recipr.=0.47, Mneg.recipr.=0.36). Mrisk=0.07 points to a risk aversion of our partici-
pants, while the positive value for time discounting (Mtimedisc.=0.26) indicates impatience.
All personality traits are measured on a [−1, 1]-scale. Regarding agreeableness and
neuroticism/emotionality, the sample means are close to the neutral midpoint (Magr.=0.09
and Mneurot.=-0.08). The positive values for the remaining personality traits reveal that our
students are rather conscientious, extraverted, and open (Mconscient.=0.39, Mextrav.=0.25
and Mopenn.=0.27). The impact of preferences and personality traits on subjects’ patient-
regarding choices will be accounted for in the structural estimation analyses.
4.5.2 Structural estimation with observed heterogeneity
We next present the aggregate estimation results. Table 4.5 shows the estimation results with
transformation of the estimated parameters into preference parameters, noise parameters,
and marginal effects.61 In our base model without covariates, a indicates a rather moderate
profit orientation. Medical students put a weight of about one third on their own profit and
two thirds on the patient health benefit. Parameter r is negative, implying that medical
students express a tendency for inequity aversion; see Model (1) of Table 4.5.
Our estimation results support our non-parametric analyses. Medical students’ patient-
regarding altruism significantly declines with progress in medical education. Recall that a
characterizes participants’ own-profit orientation, and, thus, a negative (positive) coefficient
for a implies an increase (decrease) in the weight subjects put on the patient benefit. Model
(2) of Table 4.5 shows, that compared to freshmen (our reference category), the medical
students in the pre-clinical phase are more profit-oriented and profit orientation is highest
during the clinical study phase. Only in their practical year, medical students’ patient-
regarding altruism slightly increases again compared to the clinical studies. Figure 4.2 shows
61The estimation results of the aggregate model without transformation of the estimated parameters are
shown in Table D.4.1 of Appendix D.4.1.
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the typical indifference curves for the different study cohorts based on parameter estimates
from Model (2). This effect of the study phase remains stable when controlling for medical
students’ gender, general altruism, other social and economic preferences, and personality
traits; see Models (2) to (5) of Table 4.5. For an illustration of the heterogeneity implied by
the different set of covariates, see Figure D.4.1 in Appendix D.4.1.
Our estimations show that female medical students are more altruistic on behalf of their
patients than male medical students; see Model (3) of Table 4.5. We also observe that
patient-regarding altruism is positively related to Falk et al.’s general altruism measure
meaning that medical students with higher general altruism put significantly less weight on
their own profit compared to the patient’s health benefit. These findings are also robust
when controlling for other social and economic preferences, as well as personality traits; see
Models (4) to (6) of Table 4.5.
Figure 4.2: Indifference curves for different study cohorts
Notes. This figure shows the indifference curves between own profit and patient health benefit
for the different study cohorts based on CES preference parameter estimates from Model (2)
of Table 4.5.
Overall, medical students reveal inequity averse preferences, as indicated by the estimates
for the parameter r; see Model (1) of Table 4.5. Also, estimates for r tend to increase
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with medical students’ term but with no firm results when adding further controls to the
regressions. Further, estimations show that women and individuals with higher general
altruism have lower values of r; see Models (2) to (6) of Table 4.5. Noise µ tends to be lower
for pre-clinical students and larger for students in practical years.
Table 4.5: Aggregate estimations, preference parameters, noise and marginal effects, CES
preferences
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
a
Constant 0.339∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗ 0.293∗∗∗ 0.531∗ 0.708∗∗∗ 0.739∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.024) (0.035) (0.052) (0.090) (0.109)
Pre-clinical 0.168∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.041) (0.048) (0.047) (0.051)
Clinical 0.258∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗ 0.213∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.043) (0.047) (0.050) (0.053)
Practical year 0.189∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.084) (0.070) (0.068) (0.064)
Female −0.111∗∗∗ −0.064∗∗∗ −0.041∗∗∗ −0.044∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.031) (0.027) (0.040)
General altruism −0.079∗∗∗ −0.056∗∗∗ −0.054∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.013) (0.018)
r
Constant −0.956∗∗∗ −1.240∗∗∗ −0.493∗∗∗ −0.354∗∗∗ −0.485∗∗∗ −0.364∗∗∗
(0.097) (0.137) (0.168) (0.197) (0.423) (0.489)
Pre-clinical 0.342∗ 0.149∗ 0.132∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗
(0.218) (0.189) (0.167) (0.218) (0.232)
Clinical 0.393∗ 0.183 0.254∗∗∗ 0.276∗∗∗ 0.332∗∗∗
(0.273) (0.240) (0.188) (0.245) (0.240)
Practical year 0.486∗ −0.092 0.100 −0.118 −0.014
(0.376) (0.477) (0.341) (0.545) (0.524)
Female −1.066∗∗∗ −0.490∗∗∗ −0.489∗∗∗ −0.424∗∗∗
(0.205) (0.186) (0.243) (0.272)
General altruism −0.101∗∗∗ −0.119∗∗∗ −0.105∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.063) (0.073)
µ
Constant 2.623∗∗∗ 2.519∗∗∗ 2.313∗∗∗ 2.247∗∗∗ 2.007∗∗∗ 1.951∗∗∗
(0.092) (0.128) (0.170) (0.308) (0.487) (0.528)
Pre-clinical −0.198 −0.171 −0.194∗∗ −0.149∗ −0.275∗∗∗
(0.194) (0.217) (0.224) (0.212) (0.254)
Clinical 0.041 0.112 −0.106 −0.075 −0.158∗
(0.265) (0.307) (0.286) (0.266) (0.279)
Practical year 0.373 0.787∗∗∗ 0.552∗∗∗ 0.951∗∗∗ 0.768∗∗∗
(0.363) (0.650) (0.572) (0.691) (0.741)
Female 0.127 −0.128 −0.064 −0.006
(0.198) (0.200) (0.176) (0.215)
General altruism 0.041∗ 0.026 0.017
(0.048) (0.054) (0.055)
Soc./econ. preferences No No No No Yes Yes
Personality traits No No No No No Yes
N 733 733 733 729 729 729
Log-likelihood -13,331.09 -13,002.64 -12,884.71 -12,394.66 -12,028.09 -11,997.39
Notes. This table shows the estimation results of the aggregate model for the CES preference functional with study
progress, gender, and general altruism in the set of covariates. Model (5) and (6) control for social and economic
preferences and Model (6) for personality traits to account for observed heterogeneity. For the estimates of the full list
of covariates, see Table D.4.2 in Appendix D.4.1. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. Differences in
the number of observations in Models (4-6) is due to missing data on some questionnaire items. ∗p<0.10; ∗∗p<0.05;
∗∗∗p<0.01.
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4.5.3 Robustness of results
Our next focus is on the robustness of our estimation results. In particular, we test whether
results may be sensitive to the choices we have made on our econometric strategy. One
potential source of sensitivity is how we extend our econometric model to account for individ-
ual heterogeneity. To check for this sensitivity, we consider several alternative econometric
specifications. This section provides a brief overview on alternative econometric approaches
to account for individual heterogeneity. Details of each of these econometric models and the
respective estimation results can be found in Appendices D.4.2 to D.4.4.
First, an alternative direction to account for heterogeneity identifies distinct preference
(and noise) types with a finite mixture model without covariates. We estimated finite mixture
models with three types (C = 2, 3, 4). These finite mixture models apply an endogenous
classification procedure of distinct preference types and show that the heterogeneity in
preferences types is substantial; for methodological details and estimation results, see Ap-
pendix D.4.2. This direction supports our econometric approach to account for (observed)
heterogeneity in the aggregate estimation as the results support discrimination between
purely altruistic and moderately strong social preferences.
Another potential direction to account for heterogeneity between subjects incorporates
observed and unobserved heterogeneity in a random coefficient model. We use Bayesian
methods for our estimations. The estimation results on our a parameter of Table D.4.7 in
Appendix D.4.3 are consistent with those reported in Table 4.5 based on the aggregate esti-
mation. This suggests that our findings of selfish preferences to increase with study progress
and with a maximum attained in the clinical phase are robust to estimating unobserved
heterogeneity with a random coefficient model.62
Figure 4.3 shows a visual comparison between the distributions of observed vs. un-
observed heterogeneity for the preference parameters a and r and the noise parameter
µ, when the full list of covariates is included.63 The comparison of the two distributions
62Tables with a full list of all estimated parameters are provided in Appendix D.4.3, Table D.4.5 and
Table D.4.7.
63Because histograms are based on non-linear transformations of estimated parameters and mean individual-
level draws across iterations for observed vs. unobserved heterogeneity, there is no natural comparison
benchmark between each pair of distributions for noise and preference parameters.
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shows that observed characteristics generate a rich variation in preference parameters a and r.
Figure 4.3: Observed vs. unobserved heterogeneity in the random coefficient model
a r noise




































Notes. This figure shows the distributions of individual preference and noise parameter
based on CES preference parameter estimates from Model (6) with the random coefficient
model. The top row represents observed heterogeneity, the bottom represents unobserved
heterogeneity. Unobserved heterogeneity is based on transformed mean individual-level draws
across iterations for the underlying multivariate normal distribution with all covariates equal
to zero.
A last alternative is to estimate the preference and noise parameters for each individual
separately. The summary statistics confirm that, on average, concerns for patients are
higher than for own profit. In particular, the mean of the individual a estimates is close to
the aggregate estimate. Table D.4.8 provides an overview of descriptive statistics for the
individual parameter and preference estimates.
Our results may be sensitive to our choice of the structural model of altruistic preferences,
the CES preference utility function. To examine the robustness of our findings to this
potential sensitivity, we consider a Fehr and Schmidt (1999) parametric form as another
variant for the utility function. The social preference model by Fehr and Schmidt captures
preferences of disadvantageous and advantageous inequality through two distinct parameters;
for more details on the behavioral model, see Appendix D.5.1. Overall, applying a Fehr and
Schmidt preference functional supports our main findings that patient-regarding altruistic
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preferences decrease with study progress, with the lowest altruistic preferences in students
in the clinical study phase. Within the framework of the utility function, we find that our
medical students are extremely averse to advantageous inequality, i.e., averse of them as
physicians to be ahead of the patient, with clinical phase students being the least averse.
At the same time, our medical student sample is also somewhat (albeit less) averse to
disadvantageous inequality, i.e., averse of being behind, with the highest aversion attained in
clinical phase students. We provide results for the aggregate estimation in Appendix D.5.2
and for the random coefficient model in Appendix D.5.3.
Finally, we additionally perform all estimations including the control group of non-medical
students. In Appendix D.4.5, we present all additional analyses for CES preferences in
detail. The estimation results of each analysis are consistent with our presented main results.
Nevertheless, we find that non-medical students behave less patient-regarding compared to
medical students.
4.5.4 Patient-regarding altruism, income expectations, and specialty choices
Previous literature mainly focuses on the importance of income differences for choosing
a specific specialty. While most studies report that a higher expected income positively
affects this choice, the reported effect sizes are rather small (Bazzoli, 1985; McKay, 1990;
Nicholson, 2002; Thornton and Esposto, 2003; Gagné and Léger, 2005). Moreover, a range
of non-monetary factors, such as expected working hours (McKay, 1990), a regular working
schedules and generous annual leave (Thornton and Esposto, 2003), a controllable lifestyle
(Dorsey et al., 2003), intellectual content (Harris et al., 2005), and procedural work or
academic opportunities (Sivey et al., 2012), are further reported to play an important role
in the choice for a specialty.
Empirical evidence, however, is inconclusive on the kind of non-monetary factors that
are most influential for selecting a particular specialty and on the impact of medical students’
personality and individual preferences therein. In their literature review, Borges and Savickas
(2002) summarize that evidence on a link between personality traits and specialty choices is
rather weak, as there seems to be no specific specialty where all physicians show a unique
pattern of personality traits.
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To the best of our knowledge, Li (2018) is the first to link experimentally measured
altruistic preferences to specialty choices of future physicians. She finds that lower altruism
relates to selecting into high-income specialties. In order to do so, she constructs a binary
measure grouping medical students’ stated specialties into a low- or high-income group.
Assigning income to specialties is based on two particular data sources. The cutoff for
defining high-income specialties is having an annual average income of at least $300,000.
This is close to the median income of specialties chosen by the medical student subjects
in the sample ($304,000). This approach implies, however, that, first, the classification
of income groups is not highly sensitive to the chosen source of income data and, second,
that medical students are aware of the income they may be able to earn in the different
specialties. It is not implausible to question that particularly those future physician with a
lower emphasis on profit orientation might lack the particular knowledge about the income
distribution across specialties. Also, it is questionable whether a medical students’ choice
for a specialty she would like to practice in should be narrowed down to a binary choice
between a high- or a low-income group.
The assumptions Li (2018) made for classifying specialties to income groups based on
average statistics data may hold for the US; they can be questioned, however, to hold
for Germany. Here high income variations across specialities do exist in the outpatient
care sector with differences in the net income for resident physicians up to EUR 212,000
(own computations based on Statistisches Bundesamt, 2018b, Tabelle 3.2, p. 21). This
does, however, not apply for physicians employed in hospitals. Their salaries typically
follow fixed payment schedules based on collective agreements. Thresholds for higher salary
groups are based on physician’s experience and length of affiliation to the respective hospital
career (Marburger Bund, nd). Moreover, even when focusing solely on the average incomes
of resident physicians, a classification into either a high- or low-income specialty group
would appear arbitrary due to limited data availability for each specialty and divergent
classifications of different data sources, like official statistics of Statistisches Bundesamt
(2018b) or the “Physician Practice Panel” (Zentralinstitut für die Kassenärztliche Versorgung,
2016). Given our concerns, we follow an approach different to Li (2018).
We, first, investigate how the altruistic preferences of our medical student sample relate
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to their individual future income expectations.64 In particular, they had to indicate their
expected monthly net income five years after having completed their specialty education
and state the probability of falling into each of five income categories given a full-time job:
(1) < EUR 3,000, (2) EUR 3,000 to 3,999, (3) EUR 4,000 to 4,999, (4) EUR 5,000 to 5,999,
(5) > EUR 6,000. For each subject, we calculate an expected value for her future income
expectations derived as the sum of the stated probabilities multiplied by the mean income
of the respective category.65 Second, we study how their altruistic preferences relate to their
stated choice for a certain specialty without classifying specialties to any income groups.
Overall, our medical student sample (N=693) expects to earn on average EUR 4,427
net per month (s.d. 737). Hereafter, we split the continuous expected income variable at
the median, dividing our sample into discrete groups to facilitate the interpretation of our
estimation results. In particular, the dummy variable “Expected income” equals 1 in case a
medical student expects a future income above the median (EUR 4,400), and 0 otherwise.
We add the income variable to our previous models (described in Section 4.5.2) in order to
account for observed heterogeneity in expected future income when estimating our altruistic
preferences. For medical students with future income expectations above the median, the
estimated preference parameter a is significantly higher, see left column of Panel A and B
of Table 4.6. As an increase in a implies a higher profit orientation, medical students who
expect to earn relatively more in their future put significantly more weight on their own
profit compared to the patient’s health benefit.
We finally study how our altruism measure relates to the stated speciality choices.
Overall, the four most frequently stated specialties which were chosen by more that 10%
of our medical student sample are surgery (N= 137, 19%), internal medicine (N= 110,
15%), pediatrics (N= 97, 13%), and neurology/psychiatry (N= 84, 12%). The remaining
64Subject’s own specifications on their expected future income support our concerns to follow the approach
of (Li, 2018). Comparing the own future income expectations of those students who state a preference for a
specialty which would be classified into a high-income group based on Statistisches Bundesamt (2018b) to
those stating a low-income group specialty reveals no consistent pattern. In particular within the high-income
group, 54% expect to earn an income above the median in the future. The respective number is 51% in the
low-income group.
65In order to keep the range per category constant, we used EUR 2,500 and 6,500 as average values for
the lower and upper bound. For the cases (N= 82) in which the sum of indicated probabilities doesn’t add
up to 100 percent, we transformed the scaling according to the probability sum. We note that our results
could be sensitive to the choices we have made in constructing the expected income variable.
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Table 4.6: Aggregate estimations and random coefficient model, preference parameters, noise
and marginal effects, CES preferences, expected income
A. Aggregate estimation B. Random coefficient model
a r µ a r µ
Constant 0.798∗∗∗ 0.081 1.441∗∗∗ 0.618∗∗∗ −0.105 0.587∗∗∗
(0.112) (0.393) (0.371) (0.085) (0.244) (0.116)
Expected income 0.040∗∗∗ 0.040 0.201∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.024 −0.006
(0.021) (0.115) (0.179) (0.006) (0.017) (0.025)
Pre-clinical 0.073∗∗∗ 0.076∗ −0.123∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ −0.006 0.006
(0.053) (0.168) (0.185) (0.033) (0.017) (0.029)
Clinical 0.094∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ −0.052 0.155∗∗∗ 0.028 −0.077∗∗
(0.057) (0.195) (0.212) (0.039) (0.019) (0.037)
Practical year 0.082∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗ 0.151 0.146∗∗∗ 0.056∗ −0.051
(0.055) (0.245) (0.372) (0.045) (0.030) (0.034)
Female −0.035∗∗∗ −0.347∗∗∗ 0.070 −0.021 −0.058∗∗∗ 0.070∗
(0.038) ( 0.256) (0.202) (0.019) (0.021) (0.038)
General altruism −0.041∗∗∗ −0.049∗∗∗ −0.005 −0.044∗∗∗ −0.091 0.173
(0.025) (0.066) (0.050) (0.010) (0.055) (0.123)
N 693 693 693 693 693 693
Log-likelihood -11,276.86 -11,276.86 -11,276.86 -5,216.73 -5,216.73 -5,216.73
Notes. This table shows the estimation results of the aggregate model and the random coefficient model for the CES preference
functional with an expected income variable (=1 if expected income is above the median, =0 otherwise), study progress, gender,
and general altruism in the set of covariates. The model also includes risk, time and social preferences and personality traits as
covariates to account for observed heterogeneity. For the estimation results with the full list of covariates, see Tables D.6.1 - D.6.3
in Appendix D.6. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. The lower number of observations compared to the full
sample of N = 733 is due to subjects leaving the survey before completing the questionnaire. ∗p<0.10; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01.
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specialities were regrouped as “Others” (N= 305, 41%).66
Table 4.7 shows the estimation results of the aggregate estimation (Panel A) and of
the random coefficient model (Panel B) when adding the speciality categories to the list of
covariates. First, the effects of study progress, gender, and general altruism remain stable
when controlling for specialty choices.67 Second, stated preferences for specific specialties
are linked to our altruism parameters. In our aggregate estimation, stating a preference
for pediatrics or surgery relates to a significantly lower own-profit orientation a; see left
column of Panel A. For specializing in neurology/ psychiatry, a negative relation is only of
weak statistical significance. When we additionally incorporate unobserved heterogeneity
applying the random coefficient model, we find that the likelihood to state a preference
for pediatrics and for surgery relates to a lower profit orientation; see left column of Panel
B. Third, the aggregate estimation results suggest that inequity aversion tends to play a
role for specialty selection. In particular, a preference for internal medicine, pediatrics or
neurology/ psychiatry is linked to a decrease in parameter r; see middle column of Panel A.
This implies that medical students opting for these specialties express a lower tendency for
inequity aversion. We, however, find no such link when estimating the random coefficient
model.
4.6 Discussion and conclusion
The primary contribution of this paper is to the literature on eliciting preferences of (prospec-
tive) physicians. We also add to the more general economic literature on heterogeneity of
social preferences using structural estimation techniques. In addition, some of our insights
are relevant for several areas in health economics and also to the medical ethics and ed-
ucation literature that examines the role and development of altruism among healthcare
professionals.
This study introduces a methodology to structurally estimate patient-regarding altruistic
preferences of future physicians. In a novel experimental task, we measure the trade-off
66For the full list of specialties, see Table D.6.4 in Appendix D.6.
67Note that the same holds for other social and economic preferences and personality traits which are
included in the list of covariates in the estimations but not explicitly reported in Table 4.7. The respective
estimates are shown in Table D.6.5 and Table D.6.6 in Appendix D.6.
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Table 4.7: Aggregate estimations and random coefficient model, preference parameters, noise
and marginal effects, CES preferences
A. Aggregate estimation B. Random coefficient model
a r µ a r µ
Constant 0.757∗∗∗ −0.462∗∗∗ 2.157∗∗∗ 0.612∗∗∗ −0.658∗ 0.664∗∗∗
(0.124) (0.613) (0.624) (0.055) (0.388) (0.088)
Surgery −0.027∗∗ 0.069 −0.254∗∗∗ −0.009∗ −0.014 0.017
(0.050) (0.215) (0.243) (0.005) (0.019) (0.025)
Internal medicine −0.010 0.201∗∗∗ −0.536∗∗∗ −0.017 −0.028 0.004
(0.031) (0.187) (0.234) (0.011) (0.029) (0.029)
Pediatrics −0.032∗∗∗ 0.298∗∗∗ −0.464∗∗∗ −0.015∗∗∗ 0.007 −0.035
(0.041) (0.267) (0.271) (0.005) (0.015) (0.026)
Neurology/psychiatry −0.020∗ 0.317∗∗∗ −0.182 −0.006 0.015 −0.066∗
(0.052) (0.272) (0.312) (0.008) (0.015) (0.035)
Pre-clinical 0.083∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗ −0.279∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.002 −0.0001
(0.048) (0.263) (0.290) (0.020) (0.015) (0.026)
Clinical 0.113∗∗∗ 0.307∗∗∗ −0.159 0.168∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗ −0.086∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.256) (0.308) (0.021) (0.017) (0.032)
Practical year 0.062∗∗∗ −0.084 0.834∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ −0.024
(0.071) (0.725) (0.910) (0.024) (0.019) (0.033)
Female −0.049∗∗∗ −0.489∗∗∗ 0.013 −0.050∗∗ −0.074∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗
(0.041) (0.335) (0.260) (0.022) (0.026) (0.030)
General altruism −0.053∗∗∗ −0.129∗∗∗ 0.028 −0.043∗∗∗ −0.053 0.152
(0.021) (0.098) (0.064) (0.010) (0.042) (0.115)
N 729 729 729 729 729 729
Log-likelihood -11,931.48 -11,931.48 -11,931.48 -5,522.58 -5,522.58 -5,522.58
Notes. This table shows the estimation results of the aggregate model and the random coefficient model for the CES preference functional
with occupational choices, study progress, gender, and general altruism in the set of covariates. The model also includes other social
and economic preferences and personality traits as covariates to account for observed heterogeneity. The lower number of observations
compared to the full sample of N = 733 is due to subjects leaving the survey before completing the questionnaire. For the results of the
full list of covariates, see Tables D.6.5 - D.6.7 in Appendix D.6. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. ∗p<0.10; ∗∗p<0.05;
∗∗∗p<0.01
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between the physician’s own profit and the patient benefit in a stylized physician-patient
relationship for a large sample of medical students (N= 733). We find medical students to
be rather altruistic by putting a weight of about two thirds on the patient health benefit and
only one third on their own profit. In contrast, Li (2018), who studies altruistic preferences
in a neutral context, finds that medical students put, on average, a weight of about two
thirds on their own payoff and only one third on the payoff of an anonymous person. This
difference highlights the importance of a distinction of physician altruism towards their
patients and their altruism towards the general population. In comparison to our control
group of non-medical students, our medical student sample behaves more patient-regarding
overall, suggesting that altruistic motives already play an important role in the decision to
enter medical school.
Our results further indicate that medical education affects patient-regarding altruistic
preferences. Altruism is highest when starting medical education and significantly declines
with study progress. Only at the end in the practical year patient-regarding altruism slightly
increases again. One potential reason why patient-regarding altruism decreases could be a
form of disillusionment of medical students. Students might realize a discrepancy between
their own expectations and the professional reality when increasingly working in clinics
and institutes during their medical education. The increase in patient-regarding altruism
for practical-year students somewhat contradicts this reasoning. However, these students,
who are about to graduate, represent a particular selective sample as they have successfully
mastered the highest hurdles within the frame of medical education in Germany, namely
the first and second part of the state exam. The selection process might have led to higher
altruism in practical-year students. Moreover, medical education up to the practical year
follows a rather strict, predefined curriculum. In the more theoretical oriented phases of
medical education, patients might be rather considered as “learning objects”. Whereas, the
educational focus in the practical year lays on the interaction with patients. The more
intense patient contact might lead to a reactivation of their own ideals prevalent prior
to medical education. The National Competence-Based Learning Objectives Catalog of
Medicine formulates training objectives in medical studies, based on targeted profiles of
graduates with orientation to the physician role. It requires the deanery of medical schools
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and policy-makers alike to set the course such that these objectives are worked towards or
learned throughout medical education. As altruism plays a key aspect in the (benevolent)
physician role, its teaching should be included in medical students’ curriculum as advocated
in the UK (Wicks et al., 2011). Also in Germany, the Medical German Education recom-
mends that medical attitudes, ethical behavior and social skills should be taught during the
course of study (Bundesärztekammer, 2020).
Our analyses also reveal that patient-regarding altruism are linked to subjects’ charac-
teristics, social preferences, income expectations, and specialty choices. Female medical
students and students scoring higher in general altruism put significantly more weight on the
patient’s health benefit compared to their own profit. Less profit-oriented medical students
also expect to earn less in their future when practicing as a physician. Finally, subjects who
put a higher weight on the patient’s health benefit are more likely to choose pediatrics and
surgery as their preferred specialties.
One might argue that our results are sensitive to our choice of the structural model of
altruistic preferences, the CES preference utility function. We found, however, that applying
a Fehr and Schmidt (1999) preference functional, overall supports our main findings that
patient-regarding altruistic preferences decrease with study progress. Medical students
exhibit a high aversion to advantageous inequality. In our physician-patient context, this
means that they as physicians are averse to gain a profit which is higher than the patients’
benefits from the respective treatment choice. are reluctant to gaining more profit than the
patient will benefit from their treatment choice. At the same time, students are somewhat
(albeit less) averse to disadvantageous inequality. While clinical-phase students are the
least concerned about advantageous inequality aversion, they exhibit the highest aversion to
disadvantageous inequality.
We also add to a better understanding of how future physicians’ altruistic preferences
relate to their occupational choices. So far, experimental evidence has been inconclusive as
to which extent expected earnings are behaviorally relevant for selecting into a particular
specialty and whether other economic or non-economic factors might be more influential.
We have formulated our concerns towards the approach Li (2018) used in her analysis of
linking experimentally measured altruistic preferences to specialty choices of future physi-
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cians. She categorizes US medical students’ stated specialties into a low- or a high-income
group by using a statistically defined cutoff point. One of our arguments was that it may
be inappropriate to boil the analysis down to a decision between a group of high- and of
low-income specialties. On the one hand, a physician’s income is not solely determined by
self-selection into a particular specialty. In Germany but also in other countries with publicly
financed health care systems, a physician’s income largely depends on many other factors,
like the decision to work in a hospital or as resident physician, on regional differences, and
the practice style which can - especially in the outpatient care sector - influence the earnings.
On the other hand, various other non-monetary factors might influence the decision for a
certain specialty, such as expected working hours (McKay, 1990), leisure time (Thornton and
Esposto, 2003) and non-pecuniary attributes of work contracts (Holte et al., 2015). Given
these findings, we included medical students’ individual income expectations and specialty
choices in the list of covariates. Our finding that less profit-oriented medical students also
expect to earn less in the future when practicing as a physician admittedly could be sensitive
to the way we constructed the expected income variable. Further analyses will be necessary
to check for the robustness of our results.
There is an ongoing political debate on appropriate policy instruments to counterbalance
current physician shortages. Statistics on physician supply in Germany, for instance, reveal
high variations in the number of prospective physicians specializing in different medical fields
as well as over time (Bundesärztekammer, 2019). Model calculations based on data from a
nation-wide survey with medical students in Germany indicate that reoccupation rates can
vary massively depending on the specialty (Jacob et al., 2019). For example, the modeled
reoccupation rate for surgery as well as general medicine amounts to 54%, which means that
only 54% of the current positions can be filled in future, and thus that every second positions
would remain vacant. In contrast, the modeled rate for pediatrics amounts to 177%, which
in turn means that about 77% more practical-year students want to become pediatricians
than there are positions to fill. These developments can lead to insufficient supply in various
medical specialties. In order to address the challenges effectively through policy interventions,
a better understanding of the underlying motives of prospective physicians for selecting a
specific specialty is essential.
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While altruism is key in describing physician behavior, it is unclear whether self-selection
into medical specialties is driven by patient-regarding altruism as well. Answers to our
post-experimental questionnaire shed further light on a potential linkage, as we were able
to show a stable positive relation between patient-regarding altruistic preferences of our
medical student sample and their stated specialty choices. In particular, subjects who weigh
the patient’s health benefit higher, are more likely to select pediatrics and surgery as their
preferred specialties. Since pediatrics includes the treatment of children and adolescents, who
represent a particular vulnerable patient population, it is not unreasonable to assume that
students with higher patient-regarding altruistic motives choose this specialty. Somewhat
surprisingly, surgery is also linked to higher patient-regarding altruism. In surgery, however,
the healing of patients is more visible and salient by the operations carried out than in
other specialties which might relate to the higher weight on patients’ health. Insofar, there
seems to be a fit between our participants’ patient-regarding motivations and selecting a
specialty where such a motivation is particularly needed in the physician-patient relationship.
Further, we also found a tendency that preferred specialty choices change in the course of
medical education. The preference for pediatrics is comparatively stable from the beginning.
Neurology/ psychiatry is decreasingly preferred and surgery substantially so, while the
preference for internal and general medicine is increasing during the course of study; see
also Table D.6.4 in Appendix D.6. The link between individuals’ altruism and occupational
choices is important from a health policy perspective, as medical education shapes preferences
which then in turn have some predictive power to explain future physicians’ labor market
decisions. These important insights need to be studied in more detail in the future.
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A Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Additional information about the experiment
A.1.1 Experiment instructions
Instructions for the baseline treatment (NANF), translated from German. [The text in
brackets is for the treatments 10ANF, 10AF, and 75AF.]
Description of the experiment
General information
You are participating in an economic decision-making experiment. Please read the experiment
description carefully. It is very important that you do not talk with other participants
for the entire duration of the experiment. If you violate this rule, you will be excluded
from the experiment and will not receive any payment.
If there is anything you do not understand, please take another look at this description of
the experiment. If you still have questions, please raise your hand. We will come to your
cubicle and answer your question personally.
You can earn money in the course of the experiment. The amount of your earnings
depends on your decisions. All monetary amounts are displayed in ‘Taler’, at the following
rate:
1 Taler = 1 Euro Cent.
At the end of the experiment, you will receive the payment you have earned in cash.
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You will make your decisions on a computer screen in your cubicle. Your decisions cannot
be attributed to you personally. All data and answers will therefore be analyzed anonymously.
Decision situation
The experiment is based on a decision situation in the obstetrics practice of a hospital’s large
neonatal care unit. During the experiment, you are entrusted with recording the weight of
very early-born infants (birth weights). All participants in this experiment are confronted
with the same decision situation.
You have the task of recording different birth weights, which are displayed on a
scale, into a birth report. The recorded birth weight determines the lump-sum reim-
bursement per case, which comprises one part of your payment for the experiment.
In total, six birth weights of different early-born infants will be displayed on
the scale, in grams (g), on your computer screen. The birth weights displayed can have
values between 1,150g and 1,550g. Each birth weight appears only once.
You can record the birth weights in the report in 50-gram intervals, i.e., 1,150, 1,200,
1,250, 1,300, 1,350, 1,400, 1,450, 1,500, or 1,550.
The birth weight recorded in the report determines which lump-sum reim-
bursement (in Taler) will be paid for the treatment of an early-born infant. The
medical treatment of the early-born infants incurs costs, which should, on average, be
compensated by the the lump-sum reimbursement. The costs are dependent on the birth
weight displayed on the scale. It is provided for that the early-born infants receive optimal
medical care in the neonatal care unit, irrespectively of the lump-sum reimbursement paid.
Lump-sum reimbursements and costs by birth weight are as follows:
Birth weight (in g) 1,150 1,200 1,250 1,300 1,350 1,400 1,450 1,500 1,550
Lump-sum reimburse-
ment (in Taler) 380 380 200 200 200 200 200 120 120
Costs (in Taler) 340 300 260 230 200 180 160 140 130
[The newborn will be weighed again the day after birth. This weight will also be recorded
in the birth report, by a different person. It should be noted that a newborn baby loses up
to 5% of its birth weight in the first 24 hours.
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In order to audit hospital bills, the health insurer randomly compares the weights you
recorded with the weights measured on the day after the baby’s birth. This audit occurs
after all birth weights have been recorded with a probability of 10% [10ANF and
10AF], 75% [75AF].
If the weight measured on the day after birth is higher than the recorded birth weight,
the health insurer assumes that the recorded birth weight was too low. This constitutes a
serious fake entry.
Example: Given a birth weight of 1,500g, the weight 24 hours after birth is at least 1,425g.
If the recorded birth weight is, for example, 1,400g, then the health insurer assumes a serious
fake entry since the weight on the day after birth is in fact over 1,400g.]
You make your decisions about what birth weight to record individually and anonymously on
your computer screen. An example of the decision screen is found in the following screenshot:
You enter the birth weight in the designated field. After you have entered the birth weight,
you have the opportunity to learn about the costs arising from the medical care of the
early-born infant [and about the minimal weight on the day after birth]. To access this, click
on the ‘Information’ button. The following screenshot provides an example:
You confirm your decision by clicking on ‘OK’ and continue to the next screen.
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[The left panel shows the screen for the no-audit-no-fine treatment, the right panel for the audit treatments.]
Payments in the experiment
Your payment for each recorded birth weight is determined as follows:
Lump-sum reimbursement per case according to the recorded birth weight
minus
Costs for treatment of the early-born infant according to the birth weight displayed on the scale.
After you have made your six decisions, your payment for all entries is calculated as the
sum of all six decisions.
Additionally, you will receive a fixed amount of 400 Taler. Your total payment is
therefore comprised of your payment for the recorded birth weights and the fixed amount.
[In the event of the insurance provider’s audit showing that the weight on the day after
birth for at least one newborn baby is larger than the recorded weight, this constitutes
a serious fake entry. You will therefore be punished with a reduction in your total
payment equaling the amount of your payments for all recorded birth weights,
and you will receive the fixed amount only. This means that the hospital has to treat
all children without lump-sum reimbursements. It is not known at the time the treatment is
provided whether or not this is the case and therefore has no effect on medical care.
You will learn at the end of the experiment whether the birth weights you entered were
audited and whether a fake entry was discovered.]
Your total payment for the experiment will be converted into Euro and paid out to you at
the end of the experiment.
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Before the actual experiment begins, we would like to ask you to answer several practice
questions that should help you to understand the experiment better.
After you have made all of your decisions, we would ask you to answer a series of questions
contained in a questionnaire.
A.1.2 Parameters in the experiment
Table A.1.1: Profit matrix
True birth Reported birth weight ŵj (in g)
weight wj (in g) 1150 1200 1250 1300 1350 1400 1450 1500 1550
1200 80 80 -100 -100 -100 -100 -100 -180 -180
1250 120 120 -60 -60 -60 -60 -60 -140 -140
1300 150 150 -30 -30 -30 -30 -30 -110 -110
1350 180 180 0 0 0 0 0 -80 -80
1400 200 200 20 20 20 20 20 -60 -60
1500 240 240 60 60 60 60 60 -20 -20
Notes. This table shows profits for the weights in the subjects’ choice range (first column) and the
birth weights that can be entered in the birth report (second row). Note that reimbursements
depend on the reported birth weights. DRG thresholds are at 1,250 and 1,500. Costs depend on
the true birth weight and increase with decreasing birth weights. All monetary amounts are given
in Taler, our experimental currency, the exchange rate being 1 Taler = 0.01 EUR.
A.1.3 Decomposition of the effects of audits and fines
In our experiment, we observe four of six possible combination of detection probabilities
and fines:
Table A.1.2: Decomposition of the effects of audits and fines
Detection
probability No fine Fine M
0% (no audit) ȳ00 (NANF) —
10% ȳ10 (10ANF) ȳ11 (10AF) ȳ11 − ȳ10
75% — ȳ21 (75AF)
M ȳ10 − ȳ00 ȳ21 − ȳ11
Assuming that participants are randomly allocated to a cell, NANF can serve as the
counterfactual out- come for 10ANF, and 10AF as the counterfactual outcome for 75AF.
Hence, for the effect of audits, we consider two vertical comparisons:
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• M(10ANF, NANF) = ȳ10 − ȳ00: for the introduction of an audit with small detection
probability (10%) without a fine
• M(75AF, 10AF) = ȳ21 − ȳ11: for a substantial increase in the detection probability,
i.e., raising the detection probability from small (10%) to large (75%)
For the effect of fines, we consider the horizontal comparisons:
• M(10AF, 10ANF) = ȳ11 − ȳ10: for the introduction of a fine at a 10%-detection
probability
A.1.4 Graphical explanation of detectable and undetectable upcoding
Figure A.1.1: Graphical explanation of upcoding
A.1.5 Further details on the experimental procedure
Experimental protocol
For our six experimental sessions in Cologne, subjects were recruited via the online recruiting
system ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) as well as via advertisements through the Faculty of Medicine
at the University of Cologne. The recruiting process of subjects via ORSEE was the following:
Students who registered in ORSEE for laboratory experiments at the CLER were invited
via automatically generated e-mails to participate in the experimental conditions of our
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experiment. Four further sessions were conducted in a seminar room of the medical school
using the mobile labs of the CLER. Medical students were invited via e-mails sent from the
Student Deanery of the Medical Faculty. In order to participate, they had to sign up for
one of the sessions online in advance. When signing up, subjects did not know about the
decision task, the composition of subjects, or about our research objective. This procedure
guaranteed the random allocation of students to experimental treatments and excluded
self-selection into treatments.
The recruiting process for subjects who participated in Bonn was the same. For a detailed
experimental protocol for the sample of Bonn, please refer to Hennig-Schmidt et al. (2019).
The procedure in all treatments and both locations was as follows: Upon arrival, subjects
were randomly allocated to cubicles. They were then given ample time to read the instructions
and to ask any clarifying questions, which were answered in private. To verify that the
subjects had understood the decision task, they had to answer a set of control questions.
The experiment did not start unless all subjects had answered all control questions correctly.
For the control questions, see Appendix A.1.5. Then, subjects anonymously decided, for six
early-born infants, which birth weight to enter into each early-born’s medical record after
having seen the true birth weight on the computer screen. The introduction stressed that
the subjects’ decisions were confidential and anonymous and that the experimenter could
not identify who had entered which birth weight. Subjects were free to leave the study at
any time.
Before entering the birth weight of a specific baby, subjects could learn about the respective
lump-sum remuneration, the treatment cost for each birth weight, and the resulting payment
by clicking an information button on their computer screen. In the audit-and-fine treatments,
i.e., 10ANF, 10AF, and 75AF, subjects could also learn about the lower bound of the
preterm infant’s weight on the day after birth. All monetary amounts were given in Taler,
our experimental currency, the exchange rate being 1 Taler = 0.01 EUR.68 Subjects were
also informed about the fixed payment F amounting to 400 Taler.
After having made all six decisions, the subjects were asked to answer a questionnaire
68The exchange rate was calculated to result in an hourly wage of a student assistant at the Universities
of Bonn and Cologne, which is about EUR 10.
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on gender, age, integrity, personality traits and risk attitudes. Measures on personality
comprise the Big-Five Inventory on personality traits by Rammstedt and John (2007) and
the 18-items Integrity Scale by Schlenker (2008). They received EUR 4 for answering the
questionnaire. Finally, they were paid by a confidential payment procedure that did not
allow us to trace any individual subjects’ decisions, and they subsequently left the laboratory
or seminar room. Sessions lasted about 45 minutes, including filling in the post-experimental
questionnaire. Subjects earned EUR 10.30 on average, including the payment of EUR 4 for
answering the questionnaires.
Control questions
Control questions translated from German. The first nine questions apply to all treatment
groups. Question 10 only applies to treatment groups including an audit. Correct answers
are written in italics. [The text in brackets is for the conditions 10ANF, 10AF, and 75AF.]
Exercise Questions
Question 1
Are the following statements true or false?
a) Each participant in the experiment decides which birth weight (in g) to write into the
birth record for six early-born infants.
 True
 False. Correct answer: _________
b) The birth weights displayed can have values between 1,400g and 1,500g.
 True
 False. Correct answer: between 1,150 g and 1,550 g.
c) Birth weights can be recorded in 25-gram intervals.
 True
 False. Correct answer: in 50-gram intervals.
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Question 2
Complete the following sentences.
a) Each birth weight appears once.
b) Your recorded birth weight determines which lump-sum reimbursement (in Taler) will
be paid for the treatment of the early-born infant.
Question 3
Complete the following table by filling in the missing case-based lump sums in Taler.
Birth weight (in g) 1,150 1,200 1,250 1,300 1,350 1,400 1,450 1,500 1,550
Lump-sum reimburse-
ment (in Taler) 380 380 200 200 200 200 200 120 120
Question 4
a) How is your payment for each recorded birth weight determined?
Lump-sum reimbursement per case according to the recorded birth weight
minus
Costs for treatment of the early-born infant according to the birth weight displayed on the scale.
b) Additionally, you receive a fixed amount of 400 Taler.
Question 5
Suppose that the scale has shown a birth weight of 1,250g and a weight of 1,200g has been
recorded in the birth record.
a) Which lump-sum reimbursement per case is paid out? 380 Taler
b) How high are the arising costs? 260 Taler
c) What is the payment? 120 Taler
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Question 6
Suppose that the scale has shown a birth weight of 1,300g and a weight of 1,300g has been
recorded in the birth record.
a) Which lump-sum reimbursement per case is paid out? 200 Taler
b) How high are the arising costs? 230 Taler
c) What is the payment? -30 Taler
Question 7
Suppose that the scale has shown a birth weight of 1,400g and a weight of 1,300g has been
recorded in the birth record.
a) Which lump-sum reimbursement per case is paid out? 200 Taler
b) How high are the arising costs? 180 Taler
c) What is the payment? 20 Taler
Question 8
Suppose that the scale has shown a birth weight of 1,400g and a weight of 1,450g has been
recorded in the birth record.
a) Which lump-sum reimbursement per case is paid out? 200 Taler
b) How high are the arising costs? 180 Taler
c) What is the payment? 20 Taler
Question 9
Suppose that the scale has shown a birth weight of 1,500g and a weight of 1,450g has been
recorded in the birth record.
a) Which lump-sum reimbursement per case is paid out? 200 Taler
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b) How high are the arising costs? 140 Taler
c) What is the payment? 60 Taler
Question 10
Please cross off what is not applicable:
a) The newborn will be washed / weighed / fed again the day after birth. This weight
will also be reported in the birth report, by a different person. It should be noted that
a newborn infant loses up to 5 gram / up to 5 percent of its birth weight in the first 24
hours.
b) An audit occurs before / during /after all birth weights have been recorded with a
probability of 1% / [10ANF, 10AF: 10%] / [75AF: 75%] /90% /100%.
c) If the weight measured on the day after birth is higher/ lower than the recorded /
measured birth weight, the health insurer assumes that the recorded birth weight was
too low. This constitutes an unfortunate error /an irrelevant fake entry /a serious
fake entry.
d) In the event of the insurance provider’s audit showing that the weight on the day after
birth for at least one /at least two /all newborn is larger than the recorded weight,
this constitutes a serious fake entry. This has [10AF, 75AF: an influence] / [10ANF:
no influence] on your payment].
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A.1.6 Integrity scale
Table A.1.3: The 18-items Integrity Scale by Schlenker (2008): Items
Item
Number Item wording
1 It is foolish to tell the truth when big profits can be made by lying. (R)
2 No matter how much money one makes, life is unsatisfactory without a strong
sense of duty and character.
3 Regardless of concerns about principles, in today’s world you have to be
practical, adapt to opportunities, and do what is most advantageous for you.
(R)
4 Being inflexible and refusing to compromise are good if it means standing up
for what is right.
5 The reason it is important to tell the truth is because of what others will do to
you if you don’t, not because of any issue of right and wrong. (R)
6 The true test of character is a willingness to stand by one’s principles, no
matter what price one has to pay.
7 There are no principles worth dying for. (R)
8 It is important to me to feel that I have not compromised my principles.
9 If one believes something is right, one must stand by it, even if it means losing
friends or missing out on profitable opportunities.
10 Compromising one’s principles is always wrong, regardless of the circumstances
or the amount that can be personally gained.
11 Universal ethical principles exist and should be applied under all circumstances,
with no exceptions.
12 Lying is sometimes necessary to accomplish important, worthwhile goals. (R)
13 Integrity is more important than financial gain.
14 It is important to fulfill one’s obligations at all times, even when nobody will
know if one doesn’t.
15 If done for the right reasons, even lying or cheating are ok. (R)
16 Some actions are wrong no matter what the consequences or justification.
17 One’s principles should not be compromised regardless of the possible gain.
18 Some transgressions are wrong and cannot be legitimately justified or defended
regardless of how much one tries.
Notes. Subjects are asked to indicate the extent of their agreement or disagreement where 1
= strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither disagree nor agree, 4 = agree, and 5 = strongly
agree. Items marked (R) are reverse scored.
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A.2 Additional analyses
A.2.1 Comparison of samples
In order to test whether student samples in Cologne in Bonn differ, we first compare sample
characteristics and second upcoding behavior for treatments NANF and 10AF which were
conducted in both locations. In total, 23 subjects participated in Cologne and 98 in Bonn.
Subsamples do not differ either by sample characteristics (see Table A.2.1) nor by upcoding
behavior.
Table A.2.1: Comparison of sample characteristics between Bonn and Cologne
Samples
Bonn Cologne p-value
Age (Mean, s.d.) 23.1 (5.17) 22.9 (2.66) 0.873
Share of females 46.9% 34.8% 0.291
Share med. students 52.0% 34.8% 0.136
N subjects 98 23
Notes. This table compares the sample characteristics for both
locations. The last column reports p-values of non-parametric
analyses for differences. We perform a χ2-test for differences in
shares by gender and medical studies and a t-test for age differences.
To test whether upcoding behavior differs between student samples in Cologne and Bonn, we
compare the distributions of upcoding behavior for both locations. To this end, we analyze
whether the mean shares of upcoding per subject, calculated as the sum of upcoded birth
weight entries over the overall number of decision in which upcoding is possible (i = 5),
differ between Bonn and Cologne for the treatments which were performed in both locations,
i.e., treatments NANF and 10AF. Panel A of Figure A.2.1 shows the cumulative distribution
functions (cdf) of mean shares per subject for the baseline treatment (NANF), and Panel B
for our 10%-audit-and-fine treatment (10AF). The blue lines refer to the cdfs of mean shares
of upcoding behavior per subject for Cologne, while the red lines refer to the same for Bonn.
The similar course of the lines indicates that upcoding behavior between both locations
does not differ a lot. Moreover, we find no statistical support for a difference in upcoding
behavior between locations. First, employing the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality
of distribution functions, we cannot reject the null hypotheses of identical distributions
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for Bonn and Cologne (p>0.100). Second, there is no statistical difference either between
the empirical characteristic functions of both locations based on the Epps-Singleton test
(p>0.100). Since both tests result in p-values above significance level, there is no evidence of
a difference between the distributions by location. Hence, we combine the data sets of Bonn
and Cologne for the NANF and the 10AF treatment.
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Notes. This figure shows the cumulative distribution functions (c.d.f.) of mean shares of upcoding per subject
differentiated by location for the baseline treatment (NANF; Panel A on the left side) and 10%-audit-and-fine
treatment (10AF; Panel B on the right side). The blue line refers to subjects of Cologne and the red to
subjects of Bonn. In NANF, 44 subjects participated in Bonn, and 12 in Cologne; in 10AF, 54 subjects
participated in Bonn, and 11 in Cologne.
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A.2.2 Descriptive statistics on individual characteristics, differentiated by treat-
ment
Table A.2.2: Individual characteristics by treatment
A. Overall B. NANF C. 10ANF D. 10AF E. 75AF
Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Mean s.d.
Age 23.57 5.20 22.68 2.32 24.84 6.35 23.38 6.17 23.92 5.11
Share of females (in %) 44.7 35.7 44.7 52.3 44.7
Personality traits
Extraversion 0.19 0.42 0.16 0.30 0.22 0.55 0.23 0.37 0.12 0.51
Agreeableness 0.29 0.30 0.32 0.26 0.25 0.34 0.30 0.31 0.24 0.30
Conscientiousness 0.33 0.37 0.25 0.30 0.39 0.41 0.32 0.40 0.43 0.37
Neuroticism -0.03 0.44 0.03 0.34 -0.02 0.52 -0.04 0.42 -0.13 0.53
Openness 0.31 0.46 0.20 0.36 0.38 0.60 0.34 0.39 0.38 0.51
Integrity 0.14 0.17 0.15 0.14 0.10 0.23 0.14 0.17 0.17 0.15
N 197 56 38 65 38
Notes. This table shows the share of females as well as means and standard deviations for individual characteristics (i.e.,
age, personality traits (Big-Five Inventory), integrity (Schlenker, 2008), by treatments. All personality characteristics
such as personality traits and integrity are measured on a scale from 1 to +1, with -1= theoretical minimum, 0= neutral
midpoint, and 1= theoretical maximum.
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A.2.3 Additional analyses on treatment effects
Table A.2.3: Differences of birth weight reporting by treatments, proportion of participants
(in %)
Upcoding Honest
Detectable Undetectable reporting Unclassified
NANF 62.1 20.0 11.4 6.4
10ANF 52.1 24.2 14.2 9.5
10AF 30.5 27.7 33.5 8.3
75AF 7.9 28.9 54.2 8.9
Notes. This table shows the proportions in reporting types of participants
by treatments. Upcoding is defined as payment-increasing misreports of
birth weights. Detectable upcoding reflects upcoding which is detectable
in case of an audit (upcoding by 100g or more). Undetectable upcoding
means that individuals misreport birth weights by only 50g, which cannot
be detected even in case of an audit. Honest reporting considers honest
birth weight reporting. We include all true birth weights except of 1,200g
where payment-increasing upcoding is not possible (n= 197 subjects,
k=985 decisions). All birth weights reports which cannot be classified
into the above defined categories are considered as unclassified. The
proportions of unclassified observations do not differ significantly with
treatments.
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Table A.2.4: Descriptive statistics and analyses of differences in upcoding between treatments
(proportion of participants)
A. Honest reporting when only detectable upcoding is possible
(at 1,300g, 1,350g, and 1,400g; k=591 decisions)
Detection prob. No fine Fine M, in pp (p-value)
0% (no audit) 14.9% (NANF) —
10% 21.1% (10ANF) 48.7% (10AF) 27.7 (<0.001)
75% — 75.4% (75AF)
M, in pp (p-value) 6.2 (0.357) 26.7 (0.001)
B. Honest reporting when undetectable upcoding is possible
(at 1,250g; k=197 decisions)
Detection prob. No fine Fine M, in pp (p-value)
0% (no audit) 7.1% (NANF) —
10% 2.6% (10ANF) 6.2% (10AF) 3.5 (0.374)
75% — 23.7% (75AF)
M, in pp (p-value) −4.5 (0.297) 17.5 (0.020)
C. Honest reporting when undetectable and detectable upcoding
are feasible (at 1,500g; k=196 decisions)
Detection prob. No fine Fine M, in pp (p-value)
0% (no audit) 5.5% (NANF) —
10% 5.3% (10ANF) 15.4% (10AF) 10.1 (0.079)
75% — 21.1% (75AF)
M, in pp (p-value) −0.2 (0.968) 5.7 (0.478)
Notes. This table reports the proportions of honest reporting by treatments
and differences in proportions. Panel A refers to proportion of honest reporting
for infants for whom only detectable upcoding is possible (1,300g, 1,350g, and
1,400g; k=591 decisions). Upcoding is defined as payment-increasing misreports
of birth weights. Panel B refers to infants for whom undetectable upcoding is
possible (1,250g, k=197 decisions). Undetectable upcoding means that individuals
misreport birth weights by only 50g, which cannot be detected by an audit. Panel
C refers to infants for whom undetectable upcoding is possible but less gainful
than detectable upcoding (1,500g, k=196 decisions). Treatment effect differences
M are based on the marginal effects based on logit models reported A.2.6 and
multinominal logit models for upcoding at 1,500g reported in Table A.2.7 of the
Appendix.
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Table A.2.5: Descriptive statistics and analyses of differences in detectable and undetectable
upcoding at 1,500g (proportions of participants)
A. Detectable upcoding
(at 1,500g; k=196 decisions)
Detection prob. No fine Fine M, in pp (p-value)
0% (no audit) 72.7% (NANF) —
10% 55.3% (10ANF) 30.8% (10AF) −24.5 (0.013)
75% — 7.9% (75AF)
M, in pp (p-value) −17.5 (0.082) −22.9 (0.001)
B. Undetectable upcoding
(at 1,500g; k=196 decisions)
Detection prob. No fine Fine M, in pp (p-value)
0% (no audit) 21.8% (NANF) —
10% 39.5% (10ANF) 53.9% (10AF) 14.4 (0.153)
75% — 71.1% (75AF)
M, in pp (p-value) 17.7 (0.068) 17.2 (0.073)
Notes. This table reports the proportions of upcoding cases at 1,500g by treatments and
differences in proportions (k=196 decisions). "Detectable upcoding" takes place when
an individual reports a weight of 1,250g or lower, "Undetectable upcoding" takes place
when an individual reports a (fraudulent birth) weight of 1,450g. Estimates for "Honest
reporting" are reported in Table 1.2. We excluded one subject with a birth-weight entry
of 1,550g. Treatment effects (M) are differences in marginal effects (percentage points,
pp). Full regression results are reported in Table A.2.7 of the Appendix.
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Table A.2.6: Treatment effects on the likelihood of detectable upcoding, undetectable
upcoding and honest reporting, logit regression models, MEMs
Honest reporting
A. At 1,300g, B. At 1,250g
1,350g and 1,400g
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Base cat.: NANF (No-audit-no-fine)
10ANF (10%-audit-no-fine) 0.062 0.074 −0.045 −0.056
(0.067) (0.064) (0.043) (0.043)
10AF (10%-audit-and-fine) 0.338∗∗∗ 0.400∗∗∗ −0.010 −0.017
(0.065) (0.065) (0.046) (0.046)
75AF (75%-audit-and-fine) 0.606∗∗∗ 0.615∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗ 0.143∗
(0.071) (0.075) (0.077) (0.080)
Effect differences
M (10ANF, 10AF) 0.277∗∗∗ 0.326∗∗∗ 0.035 0.039
(0.074) (0.079) (0.040) (0.038)
M (10ANF, 75AF) 0.544∗∗∗ 0.541∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗
(0.079) (0.088) (0.074) (0.075)
M (10AF, 75AF) 0.267∗∗∗ 0.214∗∗ 0.175∗∗ 0.160∗
(0.077) (0.088) (0.075) (0.088)
Birth-weight controls No Yes No No
Individual controls No Yes No Yes
k decisions 591 591 197 197
n subjects 197 197 197 197
Pseudo R2 0.170 0.214 0.089 0.120
Notes. This table reports marginal effects at the means of the covariates (MEMs) based
on logit models. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. For Panel A standard errors
are clustered at the individual subject level. Honest reporting is definied as reporting the
true birth weights. Upcoding is defined as payment-increasing misreports of birth weights.
Models (1) and (2) are estimated for true birth weights, for which only detectable upcoding
is possible (1,300g, 1,350g, and 1,400g; k=591 decisions). Models (3) and (4) are estimated
for true birth weight of 1,250g (k=197 decisions), for which undetectable upcoding is possible.
Undetectable upcoding means that individuals misreport birth weights by only 50g, which cannot be
detected by an audit. Individual control variables comprise gender, age, medical major, person-
ality traits (Big-Five Inventory), and integrity (Schlenker, 2008). ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A.2.7: Treatment effects on the likelihood of detectable upcoding, undetectable
upcoding and honest reporting at true birth weight 1,500g, multinominal logit regression,
MEMs
A. Without individual controls B. With individual controls
Detectable Undetectable Honest Detectable Undetectable Honest
upcoding upcoding reporting upcoding upcoding reporting
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Base cat.: NANF (No-audit-no-fine)
10ANF (10%-audit-no-fine) −0.175∗ 0.177∗ −0.002 −0.184∗ 0.192∗ −0.008
(0.101) (0.097) (0.047) (0.108) (0.103) (0.038)
10AF (10%-audit-and-fine) −0.420∗∗∗ 0.320∗∗∗ 0.099∗ −0.513∗∗∗ 0.394∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗
(0.083) (0.083) (0.054) (0.087) (0.088) (0.056)
75AF (75%-audit-and-fine) −0.648∗∗∗ 0.492∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗ −0.685∗∗∗ 0.553∗∗∗ 0.131∗
(0.074) (0.092) (0.073) (0.079) (0.095) (0.070)
Effect differences
M (10ANF, 10AF) −0.245∗∗ 0.144 0.101∗ −0.329∗∗∗ 0.202∗ 0.128∗∗
(0.099) (0.101) (0.058) (0.108) (0.109) (0.056)
M (10ANF, 75AF) −0.474∗∗∗ 0.316∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗ −0.500∗∗∗ 0.361∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗
(0.092) (0.108) (0.075) (0.098) (0.112) (0.069)
M (10AF, 75AF) −0.229∗∗∗ 0.172∗ 0.057 −0.171∗∗ 0.160 0.012
(0.072) (0.096) (0.080) (0.075) (0.101) (0.082)
k decisions 196 196 196 196 196 196
n subjects 196 196 196 196 196 196
Notes. This table reports marginal effects at the means of the covariates (MEMs) based on multinomial logit models. Standard errors are
shown in parentheses. All models consider reporting behavior for a true birth weight of 1,500g (k=196 decisions). With respect to the entered
birth weight, a subject’s reporting behavior is classified into one of three categories. "Detectable upcoding" takes place when an individual
reports a (fraudulent birth) weight lower than 1,450g, "Undetectable upcoding" takes place when an individual reports a (fraudulent birth)
weight of 1,450g. "Honest reporting" takes place when an individual reports the true birth weight of 1,500g. We excluded one subject with a
birth-weight entry of 1,550g. In Panel B, we control for individual characteristics, i.e., gender, age, medical major, personality traits (Big-Five
Inventory), and integrity (Schlenker, 2008). ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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A.2.4 Distribution of individuals’ decisions
Table A.2.8: Frequency of reported birth weights by true birth weights: No-audit-no-fine
treatment
Reported weight
True weight 1150 1200 1250 1300 1350 1400 1450 1500 1550 Total
1200 (abs.) 5 46 2 1 0 0 1 1 0 56
1200 (%) 9 82 4 2 0 0 2 2 0 100
1250 7 44 4 0 0 1 0 0 0 56
13 79 7 0 0 2 0 0 0 100
1300 8 40 2 6 0 0 0 0 0 56
14 71 4 11 0 0 0 0 0 100
1350 10 34 0 1 10 0 0 0 1 56
18 61 0 2 18 0 0 0 2 100
1400 8 35 0 1 3 9 0 0 0 56
14 63 0 2 5 16 0 0 0 100
1500 9 30 0 0 0 1 12 3 1 56
16 54 0 0 0 2 21 5 2 100
Total 47 229 8 9 13 11 13 4 2 336
14 68 2 3 4 3 4 1 1 100
Notes. Light gray cells indicate understated birth weights. Dark gray cells show honest reporting of birth
weights. White cells denote overstated birth weights. The numbers in the first (second) line for each birth
weight indicate absolute frequencies (percentages). Reimbursement thresholds are marked by vertical lines.
The data set for the no-audit-no-fine treatment consists of 336 entries (n = 56 subjects).
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Table A.2.9: Frequency of reported birth weights by true birth weights: 10%-audit-no-fine
treatment
Reported weight
True weight 1150 1200 1250 1300 1350 1400 1450 1500 1550 Total
1200 (abs.) 9 29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 38
1200 (%) 24 76 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100
1250 5 31 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 38
13 82 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 100
1300 8 22 2 5 1 0 0 0 0 38
21 58 5 13 3 0 0 0 0 100
1350 7 17 0 3 10 1 0 0 0 38
18 45 0 8 26 3 0 0 0 100
1400 5 19 0 0 2 9 3 0 0 38
13 50 0 0 5 24 8 0 0 100
1500 6 15 0 0 0 0 15 2 0 38
16 39 0 0 0 0 39 5 0 100
Total 40 133 3 9 13 10 18 2 0 228
18 58 1 4 6 4 8 1 0 100
Notes. Light (Medium) gray cells indicate understated birth weight reports which are detectable (unde-
tectable) in case of an audit. Dark gray cells show honest reporting of birth weights. White cells denote
overstated birth weights. Numbers in the first (second) line for each true weight indicate absolute frequencies
(percentages). Reimbursement thresholds are marked by vertical lines. Data set for the 10% and no fine
treatment consists of 228 entries (n = 38 subjects).
Table A.2.10: Frequency of reported birth weights by true birth weights: 10%-audit-and-fine
treatment
Reported weight
True weight 1150 1200 1250 1300 1350 1400 1450 1500 1550 Total
1200 (abs.) 5 59 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 65
1200 (%) 8 91 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 100
1250 6 55 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 65
9 85 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 100
1300 7 28 5 23 2 0 0 0 0 65
11 43 8 35 3 0 0 0 0 100
1350 7 15 0 5 35 2 1 0 0 65
11 23 0 8 54 3 2 0 0 100
1400 6 16 0 0 3 37 3 0 0 65
9 25 0 0 5 57 5 0 0 100
1500 7 13 0 0 0 0 35 10 0 65
11 20 0 0 0 0 54 15 0 100
Total 38 186 9 28 40 39 39 10 1 390
10 48 2 7 10 10 10 3 0 100
Notes. Light (Medium) gray cells indicate understated birth weight reports which are detectable (unde-
tectable) in case of an audit. Dark gray cells show honest reporting of birth weights. White cells denote
overstated birth weights. The numbers in the first (second) line for each true weight indicate absolute
frequencies (percentages). Reimbursement thresholds are marked by vertical lines. The data set for the
10% and fine treatment consists of 390 entries (n = 65 subjects).
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Table A.2.11: Frequency of reported birth weights by true birth weights: 75%-audit-and-fine
treatment
Reported weight
True weight 1150 1200 1250 1300 1350 1400 1450 1500 1550 Total
1200 (abs.) 7 31 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 38
1200 (%) 18 82 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 100
1250 1 28 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 38
3 74 24 0 0 0 0 0 0 100
1300 3 2 4 28 2 0 0 0 0 38
8 5 11 74 3 0 0 0 0 100
1350 1 2 0 5 28 2 0 0 0 38
3 5 0 13 74 5 0 0 0 100
1400 2 2 0 0 3 30 1 0 0 38
5 5 0 0 8 79 3 0 0 100
1500 1 2 0 0 0 0 27 8 0 38
3 5 0 0 0 0 71 21 0 100
Total 15 67 13 33 32 32 28 8 0 228
7 29 6 14 14 14 12 4 0 100
Notes. Light (Medium) gray cells indicate understated birth weight reports which are detectable (unde-
tectable) in case of an audit. Dark gray cells show honest reporting of birth weights. White cells denote
overstated birth weights. The numbers in the first (second) line for each birth weight indicate absolute
frequencies (percentages). Reimbursement thresholds are marked by vertical lines. The data set for the
75% and fine treatment consists of 228 entries (n = 38 subjects).
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B Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Additional information about the experiment
B.1.1 Laboratory setup
Figure B.1.1: Mobile and computer laboratory
Notes. This figure shows the laboratory setup for the computer laboratory experiments at elfe at the University
of Duisburg-Essen (left panel) for our student sample and the mobile laboratory setup of elfe at the Academy for
Training and Education in Bad Nauheim for our physician sample.
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B.1.2 Sample
Table B.1.1: Sample characteristics
Sample
Full sample Medical students Non-medical students Physicians
A. All payment systems
Main characteristics
Male 40.2% 27.3% 53.5% 40.0%
Age (Mean, s.d.) 28.6 (9.8) 25.2 (7.0) 24.3 (3.4) 45.3 (6.7)
Personality traits (Mean, s.d.)
Extraversion 3.6 (0.83) 3.7 (0.84) 3.5 (0.90) 3.5 (0.56)
Neuroticism 2.8 (0.97) 2.6 (0.91) 3.0 (0.92) 2.6 (1.10)
Openness 3.6 (0.92) 3.8 (0.88) 3.3 (0.97) 3.6 (0.82)
Conscientiousness 3.6 (0.81) 3.6 (0.69) 3.2 (0.81) 4.3 (0.53)
Agreeableness 3.1 (0.71) 3.3 (0.63) 2.8 (0.73) 3.1 (0.64)
N 107 44 43 20
B. FFS
Main characteristics
Male 44.2% 40.9% 50.0% 40.0%
Age (Mean, s.d.) 28.4 (9.9) 24.3 (4.5) 24.1 (4.0) 45.9 (7.2)
Personality traits (Mean, s.d.)
Extraversion 3.7 (0.86) 3.8 (0.89) 3.7 (0.92) 3.4 (0.66)
Neuroticism 2.8 (0.92) 2.4 (0.82) 3.1 (0.85) 3.0 (0.08)
Openness 3.5 (0.93) 3.9 (0.85) 3.3 (1.00) 3.5 (0.80)
Conscientiousness 3.5 (0.79) 3.5 (0.66) 3.1 (0.82) 4.1 (0.61)
Agreeableness 3.1 (0.67) 3.3 (0.66) 2.9 (0.61) 3.2 (0.63)
N 52 22 20 10
C. CAP
Main characteristics
Male 36.4% 13.6% 56.5% 40.0%
Age (Mean, s.d.) 28.8 (9.9) 26.1 (8.8) 24.6 (2.9) 44.6 (8.2)
Personality traits (Mean, s.d.)
Extraversion 3.4 (0.79) 3.5 (0.79) 3.4 (0.88) 3.4 (0.58)
Neuroticism 2.7 (1.02) 2.8 (0.99) 2.9 (0.99) 2.3 (1.11)
Openness 3.6 (0.91) 3.7 (0.92) 3.4 (0.95) 4.0 (0.69)
Conscientiousness 3.7 (0.82) 3.8 (0.70) 3.3 (0.81) 4.5 (0.44)
Agreeableness 3.0 (0.76) 3.2 (0.61) 2.9 (0.83) 3.0 (0.90)
N 55 22 23 10
Notes. This table presents summary statistics of subjects’ characteristics for (i) the full sample of our experiment, (ii)
for medical and (iii) non-medical students in the laboratory experiment and (iv) for physicians in the artifactual field
experiment. We further differentiate between payment systems.
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B.1.3 Parameters of the experiment
Figure B.1.2: Patient health benefits by illness and severity of illness
Illness AH(q)

















0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Illness C
q
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Mild severity of illness, x Intermediate severity of illness, y High severity of illness, z
Notes. This figure illustrates patient health benefit parameters H(q) for illnesses k = A,B,C and severities of
illness l = x, y, z on the quantity interval from 0 to 10. The left panel shows patient benefits for illness A, the
middle panel for illness B, and the right panel for illness C. The black solid line indicates severity of illness x, the
grey dotted line severity of illness y, and the grey dashed line severity of illness z. For illness A and B, θ = 1 and






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table B.1.2: Parameters of main experimental conditions
Quantity (q)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Patient benefit
BAx 4 5 6 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
BAy 2 3 4 5 6 7 6 5 4 3 2
BAz 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 6 5 4
BBx 7 8 9 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3
BBy 5 6 7 8 9 10 9 8 7 6 5
BBz 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 9 8 7
BCx 8 10 12 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0
BCy 4 6 8 10 12 14 12 10 8 6 4
BCz 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 12 10 8
Costs
c 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.9 1.6 2.5 3.6 4.9 6.4 8.1 10.0
FFS
p 0.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 10.0 12.0 14.0 16.0 18.0 20.0
π 0.0 1.9 3.6 5.1 6.4 7.5 8.4 9.1 9.6 9.9 10.0
CAP
L 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0
π 10.0 9.9 9.6 9.1 8.4 7.5 6.4 5.1 3.6 1.9 0.0
FFS+P4P
p 0.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 10.0 12.0 14.0 16.0 18.0 20.0
bx 0.0 0.0 5.6 5.6 5.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
by 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.6 3.6 3.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
bz 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.4 2.4 2.4 0.0 0.0
πx 0.0 1.9 9.2 10.7 12.0 7.5 8.4 9.1 9.6 9.9 10.0
πy 0.0 1.9 3.6 5.1 10.0 11.1 12.0 9.1 9.6 9.9 10.0
πz 0.0 1.9 3.6 5.1 6.4 7.5 10.8 11.5 12.0 9.9 10.0
CAP+P4P
L 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0
bx 0.0 0.0 2.4 2.4 2.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
by 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.6 3.6 3.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
bz 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.6 5.6 5.6 0.0 0.0
πx 10.0 9.9 12.0 11.5 10.8 7.5 6.4 5.1 3.6 1.9 0.0
πy 10.0 9.9 9.6 9.1 12.0 11.1 10.0 5.1 3.6 1.9 0.0
πz 10.0 9.9 9.6 9.1 8.4 7.5 12.0 10.7 9.2 1.9 0.0
Notes. This table shows the parameters used in our experiment for all payment conditions.
p is the fee per service rendered to a patient in FFS, L is the lump-sum payment in CAP, b•l
is the bonus paid when the quality requirement is met in FFS+P4P (CAP+P4P), and π is
the physician’s profit.
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B.1.4 Instructions of the experiment
Notice that the text in squared brackets denotes [Capitation, CAP] conditions.
Welcome to the Experiment!
You are participating in an economic experiment on decision behavior. You and the other
participants will be asked to make decisions for which you can earn money. Your payoff
depends on the decisions you make. At the end of the experiment, your payoff will be
converted to Euro and paid to you in cash. During the experiment, all amounts are presented
in the experimental currency Taler. 10 Taler equal 8 Euro. The experiment will take about
90 minutes and consists of two parts. You will receive detailed instructions before each part.
Note that none of your decisions in either part have any influence on the other part of the
experiment.
Part I of the experiment
Please read the instructions carefully. We will approach you in about five minutes to answer
any questions you may have. If you have questions at any time during the experiment, please
raise your hand and we will come to you. Part I of the experiment consists of 9 rounds of
decision situations.
Decision situation
In each round, you are in the role of a physician and decide on medical treatment for a
patient. That is, you determine the quantity of medical services you wish to provide to the
patient for a given illness and a given severity of this illness. Each patient is characterized by
one of three illnesses (A,B,C), each of which can occur in three different degrees of severity
(x, y, z). In each consecutive decision round, you will face one patient who is characterized
by one of the 9 possible combinations of illnesses and degrees of severity (in random order).
Your decision is to provide each of these 9 patients with a quantity of 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9,
or 10 medical services.
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Payment
In each round, you receive a fee-for-service [capitation] remuneration for treating the patient.
Your remuneration increases with the amount of medical treatment [irrespective of the
amount of medical treatment] you provide. You also incur costs for treating the patient,
which likewise depend on the quantity of services you provide. Your profit for each decision
is calculated by subtracting these costs from the fee-for-service [capitation] remuneration.
Each quantity of medical service yields a particular benefit for the patient—contingent on
his illness and severity. Hence, in choosing the medical services you provide, you determine
not only your own profit but also the patient’s benefit.
In each round you will receive detailed information on your screen (see below) for the
respective patient, the illness, your amount of fee-for-service [capitation] remuneration—for
each possible amount of medical treatment—your costs, profit, as well as the benefit for the
patient with the corresponding illness and severity.
Payoff
At the end of the experiment, one of the 9 rounds in part I will be chosen at random. Your
profit in that round will be paid to you in cash.
For this part of the experiment, no patients are physically present in the laboratory. Yet the
patient benefit does accrue to a real patient: The amount resulting from your decision will
be transferred to the Christoffel Blindenmission Deutschland e.V., 64625 Bensheim, which
will use the money for enabling the treatment of patients with eye cataract.
The transfer of money to the Christoffel Blindenmission Deutschland e.V. will be carried out
after the experiment by the experimenter and one participant. The participant completes a
money transfer form, filling in the total patient benefit (in Euro) resulting from the decisions
made by all participants in the randomly chosen situation. This form prompts the payment
of the designated amount to the Christoffel Blindenmission Deutschland e.V. by the finance
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Fee-for-service, FFS:
Every quantity of medical service yields a particular benefit for the patient contingent on
his illness and severity. Hence, in choosing the medical services you provide, you determine
not only your own profit, but also the patients benefit.
In each round, you will receive detailed information on your screen (see below) for the
respective patient, the illness, your fee-for-service (capitation) remuneration (for each pos-
sible type of medical treatment), your costs, the profit, as well as the benefit for the patient





Every quantity of medical service yield a particular benefit for the patient contingen on
his illness and severity. Hence, in choosing the medical services you provide, you determine
not only your own profit, but also the patients benefit.
In each round, you will receive detailed information on your screen (see below) for the
respective patient, the illness, your fee-for-service (capitation) remuneration (for each pos-
sible type of medical treatment), your costs, the profit, as well as the benefit for the patient
with the corresponding illness and severity.
[FFS]
[CAP]
2department of the University of Duisburg-Essen. The form is then sealed in a stamped
envelope and deposited in the nearest mailbox by the participant and the experimenter.
After the entire experiment is completed, one participant is chosen at random to oversee the
money transfer to the Christoffel Blindenmission Deutschland e.V. The participant receives
an additional compensation of 5 Euro for this task. The participant certifies that the process
has been completed as described here by signing a statement that can be inspected by
all participants at the office of the Chair of Quantitative Economic Policy. A receipt of
the bank transfer to the Christoffel Blindenmission Deutschland e.V. may also be viewed here.
152
Comprehension questions
Prior to the decision rounds, we kindly ask you to answer a few comprehension questions.
They are intended to help you familiarize yourself with the decision situations. If you have
any questions about this, please raise your hand. Part I of the experiment will begin once
all participants have answered all comprehension questions correctly.
Part II of the experiment
Please read the instructions carefully. We will approach you in about five minutes to answer
any questions you may have. If you have questions at any time during the experiment,
please raise your hand and we will come to you. Part II of the experiment also consists of 9
rounds of decision situations.
Decision situation
As in part I of the experiment, you take on the role of a physician in each round and decide
on medical treatment for a patient. That is, you determine the quantity of medical services
you wish to provide to the patient for a given illness and a given severity of this illness.
Each patient is characterized by one of three illnesses (A,B,C), each of which can occur
in three different degrees of severity (x, y, z). In each consecutive decision round, you will
face one patient who is characterized by one of the 9 possible combinations of illnesses and
degrees of severity (in random order). Your decision is to provide each of these 9 patients
with a quantity of 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, or 10 medical services.
Payment
In each round, you are remunerated for treating the patient. In each round, you receive
a fee-for-service [capitation] remuneration for treating the patient. Your remuneration
increases with the amount of medical treatment [is irrespective of the amount of medical
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treatment] you provide. In addition to this, in each round you receive a bonus payment,
in case the quantity of medical services you provide is equal to the one that results in the
highest benefit for the patient, or deviates by one quantity from the latter. You also incur
costs for treating the patient, which likewise depend on the quantity of services you provide.
Your profit for each decision is calculated by subtracting these costs from the sum of your
fee-for-service [capitation] remuneration and bonus payment.
As in part I, every quantity of medical service yields a particular benefit for the patient
contingent on his illness and severity. Hence, in choosing the medical services you provide,
you determine not only your own profit, but also the patient’s benefit.
In each round, you will receive detailed information on your screen (see below) for the
respective patient, the illness, your amount of fee-for-service [capitation] remuneration—for
each possible amount of medical treatment, the amount of your bonus payment, your costs,
profit, as well as the benefit for the patient with the corresponding illness and severity.
Payoff
At the end of the experiment, one of the 9 rounds of part II will be chosen at random. Your
profit in this round will be paid to you in cash, in addition to your payment from the round
chosen for part I of the experiment. After the experiment is over, please remain seated until
the experimenter asks you to step forward. You will receive your payment at the front of
the laboratory before exiting the room.
As in part I, no patients are physically present in the laboratory for part II of the experiment.
Yet the patient benefit does accrue to a real patient: The amount resulting from your decision
will be transferred to the Christoffel Blindenmission Deutschland e.V., 64625 Bensheim,
which will use the money for enabling the treatment of patients with eye cataract.
The process for transferring the money to the Christoffel Blindenmission Deutschland e.V.,












Prior to the decision rounds, we kindly ask you to answer a few comprehension questions.
They are intended to help you familiarize yourself with the decision situations. If you have
any questions about this, please raise your hand. Part II of the experiment will begin once
all participants have answered all comprehension questions correctly.
Finally, we kindly ask you to not talk to anyone about the content of this session in order to
prevent influencing other participants after you. Thank you for your cooperation!
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B.1.5 Comprehension questions
Experimental condition 1: FFS and FFS+P4P
FFS: (For each of the situations 1. to 4. below, please answer the following questions.)
• What is the fee-for-service payment?
• What are the costs?
• What is the profit?

















0 0.00 0.00 0.00 15.00
1 4.00 0.20 3.80 16.00
2 8.00 0.80 7.20 17.00
3 12.00 1.80 10.20 18.00
4 16.00 3.20 12.80 19.00
5 20.00 5.00 15.00 20.00
6 24.00 7.20 16.80 19.00
7 28.00 9.80 18.20 18.00
8 32.00 12.80 19.20 17.00
9 36.00 16.20 19.80 16.00
10 40.00 20.00 20.00 15.00
1. Assume that a physician wants to provide 2 quantities of medical treatment for the
patient depicted above.



















0 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.00
1 4.00 0.20 3.80 12.00
2 8.00 0.80 7.20 14.00
3 12.00 1.80 10.20 16.00
4 16.00 3.20 12.80 18.00
5 20.00 5.00 15.00 20.00
6 24.00 7.20 16.80 22.00
7 28.00 9.80 18.20 24.00
8 32.00 12.80 19.20 22.00
9 36.00 16.20 19.80 20.00
10 40.00 20.00 20.00 18.00
3. Assume that a physician wants to provide 2 quantities of medical treatment for the
patient depicted above.
4. Assume that a physician wants to provide 9 quantities of medical treatment for the
patient depicted above.
FFS+P4P: (For each of the situations 1. to 4. below, please answer the following questions.)
• What is the fee-for-service payment?
• What is the bonus payment?
• What are the costs?
• What is the profit?





















0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 15.00
1 4.00 0.00 0.20 3.80 16.00
2 8.00 0.00 0.80 7.20 17.00
3 12.00 0.00 1.80 10.20 18.00
4 16.00 7.20 3.20 20.00 19.00
5 20.00 7.20 5.00 22.20 20.00
6 24.00 7.20 7.20 24.00 19.00
7 28.00 0.00 9.80 18.20 18.00
8 32.00 0.00 12.80 19.20 17.00
9 36.00 0.00 16.20 19.80 16.00
10 40.00 0.00 20.00 20.00 15.00
1. Assume that a physician wants to provide 1 quantity of medical treatment for the
patient depicted above.





















0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.00
1 4.00 0.00 0.20 3.80 12.00
2 8.00 0.00 0.80 7.20 14.00
3 12.00 0.00 1.80 10.20 16.00
4 16.00 0.00 3.20 12.80 18.00
5 20.00 0.00 5.00 15.00 20.00
6 24.00 4.80 7.20 21.60 22.00
7 28.00 4.80 9.80 23.00 24.00
8 32.00 4.80 12.80 24.00 22.00
9 36.00 0.00 16.20 19.80 20.00
10 40.00 0.00 20.00 20.00 18.00
3. Assume that a physician wants to provide 1 quantity of medical treatment for the
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patient depicted above.
4. Assume that a physician wants to provide 8 quantities of medical treatment for the
patient depicted above.
Experimental condition 2: CAP and CAP+P4P
CAP: (For each of the situations 1. to 4. below, please answer the following questions.)
• What is the capitation payment?
• What are the costs?
• What is the profit?
















0 20.00 0.00 20.00 15.00
1 20.00 0.20 19.80 16.00
2 20.00 0.80 19.20 17.00
3 20.00 1.80 18.20 18.00
4 20.00 3.20 16.80 19.00
5 20.00 5.00 15.00 20.00
6 20.00 7.20 12.80 19.00
7 20.00 9.80 10.20 18.00
8 20.00 12.80 7.20 17.00
9 20.00 16.20 3.80 16.00
10 20.00 20.00 0.00 15.00
1. Assume that a physician wants to provide 2 quantities of medical treatment for the
patient depicted above.


















0 20.00 0.00 20.00 10.00
1 20.00 0.20 19.80 12.00
2 20.00 0.80 19.20 14.00
3 20.00 1.80 18.20 16.00
4 20.00 3.20 16.80 18.00
5 20.00 5.00 15.00 20.00
6 20.00 7.20 12.80 22.00
7 20.00 9.80 10.20 24.00
8 20.00 12.80 7.20 22.00
9 20.00 16.20 3.80 20.00
10 20.00 20.00 0.00 18.00
3. Assume that a physician wants to provide 2 quantities of medical treatment for the
patient depicted above.
4. Assume that a physician wants to provide 9 quantities of medical treatment for the
patient depicted above.
CAP+P4P: (For each of the situations 1. to 4. below, please answer the following
questions.)
• What is the capitation payment?
• What is the bonus payment?
• What are the costs?
• What is the profit?




















0 20.00 0.00 0.00 20.00 15.00
1 20.00 0.00 0.20 19.80 16.00
2 20.00 0.00 0.80 19.20 17.00
3 20.00 0.00 1.80 18.20 18.00
4 20.00 7.20 3.20 24.00 19.00
5 20.00 7.20 5.00 22.20 20.00
6 20.00 7.20 7.20 20.00 19.00
7 20.00 0.00 9.80 10.20 18.00
8 20.00 0.00 12.80 7.20 17.00
9 20.00 0.00 16.20 3.80 16.00
10 20.00 0.00 20.00 0.00 15.00
1. Assume that a physician wants to provide 1 quantity of medical treatment for the
patient depicted above.




















0 20.00 0.00 0.00 20.00 10.00
1 20.00 0.00 0.20 19.80 12.00
2 20.00 0.00 0.80 19.20 14.00
3 20.00 0.00 1.80 18.20 16.00
4 20.00 0.00 3.20 16.80 18.00
5 20.00 0.00 5.00 15.00 20.00
6 20.00 11.20 7.20 24.00 22.00
7 20.00 11.20 9.80 21.40 24.00
8 20.00 11.20 12.80 18.40 22.00
9 20.00 0.00 16.20 3.80 20.00
10 20.00 0.00 20.00 0.00 18.00
3. Assume that a physician wants to provide 1 quantity of medical treatment for the
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patient depicted above.




Let physician i choose the quantity of medical services q in order to maximize her utility
Ui(q) = αiH(q) + (1− αi)π(q), (4.3)
with αi ∈ [0, 1). αi is a measure for physician i’s altruism. For a purely profit-maximizing
physician, for example, αi = 0. A profit-maximizing physician therefore obtains the highest
utility, in the absence of P4P in our experiment, when choosing 10 medical services in FFS
and when choosing 0 medical services in CAP.
First, we consider physician i’s behavior under the baseline payment systems, i.e., FFS
and CAP. For profits and patient benefits given in our experiment, and the given altruism
of physician i, we state the following lemma:69
Lemma 1 Physician i overprovides medical services (q > q∗) if p > q∗/5 + (αi/(1− αi)) θ,
and she underprovides medical services (q < q∗) if p < q∗/5 − (αi/(1− αi)) θ. Otherwise,
physician i chooses the patient optimal quantity (q = q∗).
Physician i’s objective function Ui(q) = αiH(q) + (1− αi)π(q) is concave. Payment R(q) =
L+ pq is linear and −c(q) is concave as c(q) is convex, thus π(q) is a concave function. As
H(q) is also a concave function (as defined in Equation 2.2) and αi ≥ 0, it follows that Ui(q)
is concave.
Note that as H(q) is not differentiable at q = q∗, with q∗ ∈ (0, 10). For q < q∗, the




+ αiθ. For q > q∗, the first-order condition











If p < q∗/5 − (αi/(1− αi)) θ, limq→q∗ U ′i(q) is positive. Also, because Ui(q) is concave,
U ′i(q) > 0 ∀ q < q∗. Therefore any q such that q ≤ q∗ cannot be optimal, i.e., physician i
chooses q > q∗.






+ αiθ. If p < q∗/5 +
(αi/(1− αi)) θ, limq→q∗ U ′i(q) is negative. Also because Ui(q) is concave, U ′i(q) < 0 ∀ q > q∗.
Therefore any q such that q ≥ q∗ cannot be optimal, i.e., physician i chooses q < q∗.
69Notice that Lemma 1 is a special case of Proposition 1 in Brosig-Koch et al. (2017a). They consider a
physician’s behavior under mixed payment systems with a weight on a FFS component and a lump-sum CAP.
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It directly follows from Lemma 1 that physician i’s provision behavior depends on the
severity of illness (i.e., the patient-optimal quantity q∗ varying with severity of illness l), the
fee for a medical service p, the marginal patient health benefit θ, and αi, the physician i’s
degree of altruism. Intuitively, the higher physician i’s altruism is towards her patient, the
lower the degree of non-optimal service provision is. Based on Lemma 1, we expect that FFS
induces overprovision of medical services, which decreases in the severity of a patient’s illness
and in patients’ marginal health benefit. On the contrary, we expect that CAP induces
underprovision of medical services, which increases in the severity of a patient’s illness, it
decreases in patients’ marginal health benefit.
We now focus on the effect of introducing P4P on physicians’ health care service provision.
Comparing physician i’s provision behavior between FFS (CAP) and FFS+P4P (CAP+P4P),
we state the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Performance pay linked to the optimal patient’s health benefit reduces physi-
cians’ overprovision of medical services in fee-for-service and underprovision in capitation.
Let qOpt. be a physician’s utility-maximizing choice for a patient j under FFS or CAP.
Depending on a physician’s quantity choice, we distinguish three cases. First, we consider
qOpt. ∈ [q∗ − 1, q∗ + 1]. As bl > 0, it follows that a physician with αi ∈ [0, 1) does not change
her behavior since bl > 0 is a constant. Second, we consider qOpt. > q∗ + 1. Here, the
physician chooses q according to max{U II(qOpt.), U(q∗ + 1) + bl}. That means a physician
either does not change her behavior or chooses q∗ + 1 when P4P has been introduced.
Analogously for qOpt. < q∗ − 1, the same logic applies.
Intuitively, whether a physician meets the quality threshold (|q − q∗| ≤ 1) depends on
physician i’s degree of altruism towards the patient, aaccording to Lemma 1, counterbalancing
the incentive effects in FFS and CAP. For a physician’s given altruism with αi ∈ [0, 1),
introducing P4P, therefore, reduces non-optimal service provision under FFS and CAP. Since
former experimental evidence shows that non-optimal service provision is highest for those
patients where the difference between for whom the incentive effects in FFS and CAP and
the patient’s optimal quantity are the most misaligned, q̂ i.e., for mild severe ill patients
under FFS and high severe ill patients under CAP, the effect sizes of P4P are also likely
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to vary between severity types. Thus, for a physician’s given altruism with αi ∈ [0, 1), we
expect a larger effect of P4P on non-optimal service provision with increasing severity of
illness under CAP and decreasing severity under FFS.
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B.3 Additional analyses
Table B.3.1: Quantities and qualities of medical service provision by patients’ health
characteristics and payment system
FFS FFS+P4P CAP CAP+P4P
Mean s.d. Mean s.d. p-value Mean s.d. Mean s.d. p-value
A. Quantity of medical services q
Aggregate 6.69 2.07 5.59 1.66 <0.001 3.32 2.13 4.40 1.71 <0.001
Mild severity 5.69 2.44 3.70 0.64 <0.001 2.23 1.22 2.55 0.83 0.0095
Intermediate severity 6.69 1.74 5.58 0.53 <0.001 3.35 1.84 4.38 0.72 <0.001
High severity 7.69 1.36 7.50 0.56 0.0759 4.38 2.55 6.27 0.81 <0.001
Low marginal health benefit 6.69 2.12 5.61 1.67 <0.001 3.23 2.18 4.37 1.69 <0.001
High marginal health benefit 6.70 1.96 5.56 1.63 <0.001 3.49 2.03 4.47 1.74 <0.001
B. Absolute deviation from patient-optimal care ρ
Aggregate 1.82 1.95 0.63 0.55 <0.001 1.77 2.01 0.65 0.75 <0.001
Mild severity 2.73 2.40 0.74 0.59 <0.001 0.90 1.12 0.59 0.73 0.0035
Intermediate severity 1.79 1.64 0.62 0.49 <0.001 1.75 1.75 0.62 0.72 <0.001
High severity 0.95 1.19 0.53 0.54 <0.001 2.66 2.51 0.75 0.78 <0.001
Low marginal health benefit 1.85 2.00 0.64 0.54 <0.001 1.84 2.08 0.67 0.74 <0.001
High marginal health benefit 1.76 1.85 0.60 0.56 <0.001 1.64 1.86 0.63 0.77 <0.001
C. Proportional health benefit Ĥ
Aggregate 0.71 0.31 0.90 0.09 <0.001 0.71 0.32 0.90 0.12 <0.001
Mild severity 0.61 0.34 0.89 0.08 <0.001 0.87 0.16 0.92 0.10 0.0039
Intermediate severity 0.64 0.33 0.88 0.1 <0.001 0.65 0.35 0.88 0.14 <0.001
High severity 0.86 0.17 0.92 0.08 <0.001 0.62 0.36 0.89 0.11 <0.001
High marginal health benefit 0.71 0.30 0.90 0.09 <0.001 0.73 0.30 0.90 0.13 <0.001
Observations 468 468 495 495
Subjects 52 52 55 55
Notes. This table shows descriptive statistics on the quantity and quality of medical service provision for each payment condition, at the aggregate level and
differentiated by patients’ characteristics (levels of severity of illness and marginal health benefit). Two-sided p-values are shown for Wilcoxon sigend rank tests for

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table B.3.3: Regression models on the effect on quantity and quality between baseline CAP
and FFS
A. Quantity of B. Absolute deviation C. Proportional
medical services q from optimal care ρ health benefit Ĥ
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CAP -3.375∗∗∗ -3.443∗∗∗ -0.053 -0.063 0.009 0.009
(0.320) (0.309) (0.300) (0.267) (0.048) (0.042)
IntermSev 1.059∗∗∗ 1.059∗∗∗ -0.019 -0.019 -0.099∗∗∗ -0.100∗∗∗
(0.100) (0.101) (0.133) (0.133) (0.023) (0.023)
HighSev 2.075∗∗∗ 2.075∗∗∗ 0.037 0.037 -0.006 -0.009
(0.167) (0.168) (0.247) (0.248) (0.035) (0.035)
HighMHB 0.139∗∗ 0.139∗∗ -0.136∗∗ -0.136∗∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.021∗∗
(0.057) (0.057) (0.056) (0.056) (0.009) (0.009)
Medical students -0.471 -0.365 0.050
(0.358) (0.346) (0.057)
Physicians -1.212∗∗ -1.442∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗∗
(0.505) (0.382) (0.057)
Male -0.468 0.340 -0.057
(0.346) (0.317) (0.052)
Extraversion 0.444 -0.077 0.010
(0.383) (0.346) (0.053)
Neuroticism 0.119 -0.126 0.018
(0.321) (0.315) (0.054)
Openness -0.097 -0.017 0.001
(0.359) (0.322) (0.050)
Conscientiousness 0.930∗∗ -0.347 0.053
(0.456) (0.409) (0.061)
Agreeableness 0.721 -0.728∗ 0.121∗
(0.450) (0.392) (0.063)
Constant 5.601∗∗∗ 5.876∗∗∗ 1.864∗∗∗ 2.284∗∗∗
(0.280) (0.380) (0.280) (0.360)
Observations 963 963 963 963 963 963
Observations 107 107 107 107 107 107
(Pseudo) R2 0.493 0.534 0.001 0.127 0.009 0.066
Notes. This table shows parameter estimates from OLS regressions (Panel A and B) and average marginal effects from
fractional probit response regressions (Panel C). Robust standard errors clustered for subjects are shown in parentheses.
CAP is dummy indicating that physicians are remunerated by CAP, and 0 otherwise (remunerated by FFS). IntermSev
and HighSev are dummy variables for intermediate and high severities of illness. HighMHB is a dummy for the marginal
health benefit being 1 if θ = 2 (high), and 0 otherwise (θ = 1, low). All models control for individual characteristics
which comprise gender, medical experience (non-medical student, medical student, physician), and personality traits.
The reference category for medical experience is non-medical students. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, and, *** p < 0.01.
Table B.3.4: Regression models on the effect on quantity and quality under FFS conditions
without individual control
A. Quantity of medical services B. Abs. deviation from optimal care C. Proportional health benefit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
P4P -1.100∗∗∗ -1.199∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗
(0.184) (0.171) (0.027)
IntermSev 1.439∗∗∗ 1.000∗∗∗ 1.439∗∗∗ -0.529∗∗∗ -0.936∗∗∗ -0.529∗∗∗ 0.004 0.020∗ 0.004
(0.086) (0.147) (0.086) (0.085) (0.148) (0.085) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010)
HighSev 2.901∗∗∗ 2.000∗∗∗ 2.901∗∗∗ -0.997∗∗∗ -1.782∗∗∗ -0.997∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗
(0.128) (0.229) (0.128) (0.141) (0.255) (0.141) (0.019) (0.026) (0.019)
HighMHB -0.016 -0.016 0.010 -0.054 -0.054 -0.074 0.008 0.008 0.007
(0.053) (0.053) (0.088) (0.051) (0.051) (0.086) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010)
P4P×MildSev -1.994∗∗∗ -1.994∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗
(0.276) (0.276) (0.024)
P4P×IntermSev -1.115∗∗∗ -1.179∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗
(0.191) (0.182) (0.023)
P4P×HighSev -0.192 -0.423∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗
(0.132) (0.111) (0.017)
P4P×LowMHB -1.083∗∗∗ -1.212∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗
(0.195) (0.179) (0.025)
P4P×HighMHB -1.135∗∗∗ -1.173∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗
(0.176) (0.171) (0.021)
Constant 5.251∗∗∗ 5.698∗∗∗ 5.243∗∗∗ 2.351∗∗∗ 2.749∗∗∗ 2.358∗∗∗
(0.279) (0.327) (0.284) (0.265) (0.319) (0.268)
Wald test (p-value)
P4P x sev.
H0: P4P×MildSev =P4P×IntermSev <0.001 <0.001 0.010
H0: P4P×MildSev= P4P×HighSev <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
H0: P4P×IntermSev=P4P×HighSev <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
P4P x MHB
H0: P4P×LowMHB=P4P×HighMHB 0.554 0.657 0.056
Observations 936 936 936 936 936 936 936 936 936
Subjects 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52
(Pseudo) R2 0.449 0.484 0.449 0.219 0.262 0.219 0.091 0.098 0.091
Notes. This table shows parameter estimates from OLS regressions (Panel A and B) and average marginal effects from fractional probit response regressions (Panel C).
Robust standard errors clustered for subjects are shown in parentheses. P4P is a dummy variable indicating the introduction of P4P. IntermSev and HighSev are dummy
variables for intermediate and high severities of illness. HighMHB is a dummy for the marginal health benefit being 1 if θ = 2 (high), and 0 otherwise (θ = 1, low). *
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, and, *** p < 0.01.
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Table B.3.5: Regression models on the effect on quantity and quality under CAP conditions
without individual controls
A. Quantity of medical services B. Abs. deviation from optimal care C. Proportional health benefit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
P4P 1.085∗∗∗ -1.117∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗
(0.188) (0.179) (0.029)
IntermSev 1.473∗∗∗ 1.115∗∗∗ 1.473∗∗∗ 0.436∗∗∗ 0.848∗∗∗ 0.436∗∗∗ -0.144∗∗∗ -0.202∗∗∗ -0.144∗∗∗
(0.100) (0.138) (0.100) (0.073) (0.137) (0.074) (0.018) (0.025) (0.018)
HighSev 2.933∗∗∗ 2.145∗∗∗ 2.933∗∗∗ 0.958∗∗∗ 1.758∗∗∗ 0.958∗∗∗ -0.149∗∗∗ -0.227∗∗∗ -0.149∗∗∗
(0.151) (0.244) (0.151) (0.133) (0.249) (0.133) (0.020) (0.030) (0.020)
HighMHB 0.179∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗ 0.261∗∗∗ -0.115∗∗ -0.115∗∗ -0.194∗∗ 0.017∗∗ 0.017∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.048) (0.069) (0.044) (0.044) (0.073) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009)
P4P×MildSev 0.321∗∗ -0.309∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗
(0.140) (0.108) (0.018)
P4P×IntermSev 1.036∗∗∗ -1.133∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗
(0.200) (0.188) (0.024)
P4P×HighSev 1.897∗∗∗ -1.909∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗
(0.295) (0.291) (0.026)
P4P×LowMHB 1.139∗∗∗ -1.170∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗
(0.195) (0.188) (0.026)
P4P×HighMHB 0.976∗∗∗ -1.012∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗
(0.192) (0.172) (0.021)
Constant 1.789∗∗∗ 2.171∗∗∗ 1.762∗∗∗ 1.345∗∗∗ 0.941∗∗∗ 1.372∗∗∗
(0.180) (0.147) (0.183) (0.173) (0.133) (0.178)
Wald test (p-value)
P4P x sev.
H0: P4P×MildSev =P4P×IntermSev <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
H0: P4P×MildSev= P4P×HighSev <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
H0: P4P×IntermSev=P4P×HighSev <0.001 <0.001 0.011
P4P x MHB
H0: P4P×LowMHB=P4P×HighMHB 0.096 0.048 0.004
Observations 990 990 990 990 990 990 990 990 990
Subjects 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55 55
(Pseudo) R2 0.432 0.457 0.432 0.180 0.221 0.180 0.082 0.090 0.082
Notes. This table shows parameter estimates from OLS regressions (Panel A and B) and average marginal effects from fractional probit response regressions (Panel C).
Robust standard errors clustered for subjects are shown in parentheses. P4P is a dummy variable indicating the introduction of P4P. IntermSev and HighSev are dummy
variables for intermediate and high severities of illness. HighMHB is a dummy for the marginal health benefit being 1 if θ = 2 (high), and 0 otherwise (θ = 1, low). *

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table B.3.8: Comparison of effects of blended performance pay systems splitted by marginal
health benefit
A. Absolute deviation B. Proportional
from patient-optimal care ρ health benefit Ĥ
Method OLS OLS Frac. Probit Frac. Probit
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
CAP -0.013 -0.018 0.001 0.001
(0.309) (0.283) (0.037) (0.034)
IntermSev -0.033 -0.033 -0.063∗∗∗ -0.063∗∗∗
(0.073) (0.073) (0.013) (0.013)
HighSev 0.008 0.008 -0.001 -0.003
(0.135) (0.136) (0.019) (0.019)
HighMHB -0.074 -0.074 0.007 0.008
(0.086) (0.086) (0.010) (0.010)
CAP×HighMHB -0.120 -0.120 0.016 0.017
(0.112) (0.113) (0.013) (0.013)
CAP+P4P×LowMHB -1.170∗∗∗ -1.170∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗
(0.187) (0.187) (0.019) (0.018)
FFS+P4P×LowMHB -1.212∗∗∗ -1.212∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗
(0.178) (0.178) (0.017) (0.016)
CAP+P4P×HighMHB -1.012∗∗∗ -1.012∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗
(0.172) (0.172) (0.016) (0.015)
FFS+P4P×HighMHB -1.173∗∗∗ -1.173∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗
(0.170) (0.171) (0.015) (0.014)


















Individual controls No Yes No Yes
Wald tests (p-value):
H0: CAP+P4P×LowMBH = FFS+P4P×LowMHB 0.507 0.508 0.425 0.404
H0: CAP+P4P×HighMHB = FFS+P4P×HighMHB 0.871 0.872 0.863 0.856
Observations 1926 1926 1926 1926
Subjects 107 107 107 107
(Pseudo) R2 0.135 0.207 0.064 0.099
Notes. For Panel A, OLS estimates are reported with robust standard errors clustered for subjects (in brackets). For Panel B, average marginal
effects based on a fractional probit response model are reported with robust standard errors clustered for subjects (in brackets). CAP = 1 if
physicians are remunerated by CAP, and = 0 otherwise (by FFS). P4P is a dummy variable indicating the introduction of P4P. IntermSev and
HighSev are dummy variables for intermediate and high severities of illness. HighMHB is a dummy for the marginal health benefit being 1 if
θ = 2 (high), and 0 otherwise (θ = 1, low). Controls for subjects’ individual characteristics comprise gender, medical experience (non-medical
student, medical student, physician), and personality traits (Big Five Inventory). The reference category for medical experience is non-medical
students. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01.
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Table B.3.9: Comparison of effects of blended performance pay systems with the full list of
covariates
A. Absolute deviation B. Proportional
from patient-optimal care ρ health benefit Ĥ
Method OLS OLS Frac. Probit Frac. Probit
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
CAP -1.828∗∗∗ -1.832∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗
(0.342) (0.310) (0.037) (0.032)
IntermSev -0.936∗∗∗ -0.936∗∗∗ 0.020∗ 0.020
(0.147) (0.148) (0.012) (0.012)
HighSev -1.782∗∗∗ -1.782∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗
(0.253) (0.254) (0.021) (0.020)
HighMHB -0.086∗∗ -0.086∗∗ 0.013∗∗ 0.013∗∗
(0.033) (0.034) (0.005) (0.005)
CAP×IntermSev 1.784∗∗∗ 1.784∗∗∗ -0.243∗∗∗ -0.241∗∗∗
(0.201) (0.201) (0.029) (0.028)
CAP×HighSev 3.540∗∗∗ 3.540∗∗∗ -0.492∗∗∗ -0.484∗∗∗
(0.354) (0.355) (0.033) (0.033)
CAP+P4P×MildSev -0.309∗∗∗ -0.309∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗
(0.107) (0.107) (0.017) (0.016)
FFS+P4P×MildSev -1.994∗∗∗ -1.994∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗
(0.274) (0.275) (0.017) (0.016)
CAP+P4P×IntermSev -1.133∗∗∗ -1.133∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗
(0.187) (0.188) (0.018) (0.017)
FFS+P4P×IntermSev -1.179∗∗∗ -1.179∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗
(0.181) (0.182) (0.017) (0.016)
CAP+P4P×HighSev -1.909∗∗∗ -1.909∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗
(0.289) (0.290) (0.018) (0.017)
FFS+P4P×HighSev -0.423∗∗∗ -0.423∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗
(0.110) (0.111) (0.015) (0.015)


















Individual controls No Yes No Yes
Wald tests (p-value):
H0: CAP+P4P×MildSev = FFS+P4P×MildSev <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
H0: CAP+P4P×IntermSev = FFS+P4P×IntermSev 0.860 0.860 0.872 0.884
H0: CAP+P4P×HighSev = FFS+P4P×HighSev <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
Observations 1926 1926 1926 1926
Subjects 107 107 107 107
(Pseudo) R2 0.240 0.312 0.094 0.129
Notes. For Panel A, OLS estimates are reported with robust standard errors clustered for subjects (in brackets). For Panel B, average marginal
effects based on a fractional probit response model are reported with robust standard errors clustered for subjects (in brackets). CAP = 1 if
physicians are remunerated by CAP, and = 0 otherwise (by FFS). P4P is a dummy variable indicating the introduction of P4P. IntermSev and
HighSev are dummy variables for intermediate and high severities of illness. HighMHB is a dummy for the marginal health benefit being 1 if θ = 2
(high), and 0 otherwise (θ = 1, low). Controls for subjects’ individual characteristics comprise gender, medical experience (non-medical student,
medical student, physician), and personality traits (Big Five Inventory). The reference category for medical experience is non-medical students.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01.
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C Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Additional information about the experiment
C.1.1 BIG Five personality inventory (BFI-10)
Table C.1.1: Item description of BFI-10 by Rammstedt et al. (2007)
Trait Item wording
Extraversion “I see myself as someone who is reserved.”(R)
“I see myself as someone who is outgoing, sociable.”
Neuroticism “I see myself as someone who is relaxed, handles stress well.” (R)
“I see myself as someone who gets nervous easily.”
Openness “I see myself as someone who has few artistic interests.” (R)
“I see myself as someone who has an active imagination.”
Conscientiousness “I see myself as someone who tends to be lazy.” (R)
“I see myself as someone who does a thorough job.”
Agreeableness “I see myself as someone who tends to find fault with others.” (R)
“I see myself as someone who is generally trusting.”
Notes. Subjects express their agreement to each statement on a five point Likert scale with 1 corresponding to
disagree strongly, 2 to disagree a little, 3 to neutral, 4 to agree a little, and 5 to agree strongly. Items marked
(R) are reverse coded. Two out of the ten statements form one trait.
C.1.2 Sample
While we investigate the effect of P4P at a within-subject level, we vary the underlying
payment system (CAP or FFS) between subjects. Note that we are mainly interested in
the effect of P4P and its interaction with personality traits considered separately for each
payment system rather than in a across-payment comparison. Hence, at a within-subject
design, we perform separate subanalyses for both payment systems instead of analyzing both
payments systems in one model. Nonetheless, it might be possible that potential variations
in the link between personality and performance across payment systems rests upon different
samples with respect to personality traits. Table C.1.2 shows statistics for each personality
measure for our subsamples. In general, we observe no significant differences in personality
measures between our sample under FFS conditions and our sample under CAP conditions,
with the exception of statistical weakly significant difference in conscientiousness based on a
Mann-Whitney U (MWU) test. Subjects under CAP appear to have slightly higher scores
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Table C.1.2: Personality traits by payment systems
Mean (s.d.) p-value
FFS CAP Difference MWU KS
Extraversion 3.683 3.436 0.247 0.114 0.609
(0.863) (0.788)
Neuroticism 2.798 2.745 0.053 0.732 0.995
(0.925) (1.018)
Openness 3.548 3.627 -0.079 0.596 0.992
(0.930) (0.909)
Conscientiousness 3.452 3.691 -0.239 0.097 0.382
(0.794) (0.825)
Agreeableness 3.115 3.000 0.115 0.495 1.000
(0.669) (0.758)
Subjects 52 55
Notes. For each personality trait we report mean responses to two statements
representing the trait. Subjects express their agreement to each statement on a five
point Likert scale with 1 corresponding to disagree strongly, 2 to disagree a little, 3
to neutral, 4 to agree a little, and 5 to agree strongly. Variable standard deviations
are reported in parentheses. P -values based on Mann-Whitney-U (MWU) tests
for differences between subsamples and based on two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov
(KS) tests are reported in the second last and in the last column, respectively.
in conscientiousness. When we, however, compare the entire distributions of both samples,
p-values of Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) tests (p ≥ 0.382) indicate that there is no statistical
evidence of a difference in any personality traits between the distributions. Taken together,
the random allocation of subjects into either a CAP or FFS payment system has resulted in
a fairly balanced samples with respect to all personality traits.
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C.2 Additional analyses
Table C.2.3: Regression models on the interaction effects of performance pay and personality
traits under CAP, trait by trait analyse
Absolute deviation from patient-optimal care
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
P4P -1.167∗∗∗ -1.097∗∗∗ -1.315∗∗∗ -1.550∗∗∗ -1.117∗∗∗ -1.716∗∗∗
(0.215) (0.179) (0.223) (0.254) (0.174) (0.220)
Extraversion -0.543 -0.430 -0.430 -0.430 -0.430 -0.743
(0.504) (0.296) (0.296) (0.296) (0.296) (0.492)
Neuroticism -0.301 -0.381 -0.301 -0.301 -0.301 -0.553
(0.226) (0.348) (0.226) (0.226) (0.226) (0.357)
Openness 0.198 0.198 -0.118 0.198 0.198 0.041
(0.252) (0.252) (0.404) (0.252) (0.252) (0.392)
Conscientiousness -0.690∗∗ -0.690∗∗ -0.690∗∗ -1.316∗∗∗ -0.690∗∗ -1.309∗∗∗
(0.305) (0.305) (0.305) (0.471) (0.305) (0.461)
Agreeableness -0.766∗∗ -0.766∗∗ -0.766∗∗ -0.766∗∗ -1.191∗∗ -1.162∗∗









P4P × Agreeableness 0.849 0.791∗
(0.549) (0.439)
InterSEV 0.436∗∗∗ 0.436∗∗∗ 0.436∗∗∗ 0.436∗∗∗ 0.436∗∗∗ 0.436∗∗∗
(0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074)
HighSEV 0.958∗∗∗ 0.958∗∗∗ 0.958∗∗∗ 0.958∗∗∗ 0.958∗∗∗ 0.958∗∗∗
(0.134) (0.134) (0.134) (0.134) (0.134) (0.134)
HighMHB -0.115∗∗ -0.115∗∗ -0.115∗∗ -0.115∗∗ -0.115∗∗ -0.115∗∗
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044)
Medical student 0.192 0.192 0.192 0.192 0.192 0.192
(0.281) (0.281) (0.281) (0.281) (0.281) (0.281)
Physician -0.438 -0.438 -0.438 -0.438 -0.438 -0.438
(0.323) (0.323) (0.323) (0.323) (0.323) (0.323)
Male 0.385 0.385 0.385 0.385 0.385 0.385
(0.263) (0.263) (0.263) (0.263) (0.263) (0.263)
Constant 1.465∗∗∗ 1.429∗∗∗ 1.539∗∗∗ 1.656∗∗∗ 1.440∗∗∗ 1.739∗∗∗
(0.259) (0.246) (0.254) (0.273) (0.244) (0.267)
Observations 990 990 990 990 990 990
Subjects 55 55 55 55 55 55
R2 0.287 0.287 0.294 0.312 0.296 0.328
Adjusted R2 0.278 0.278 0.285 0.303 0.287 0.317
Notes. This table shows estimates from separate trait by trait OLS regressions on the effects of performance pay
(P4P) and personality traits on quality of care under a capitation (CAP) baseline payment system. We perform
separate trait by trait regression analyses for robustness. All personality traits are measured on a scale from 1 to
+1. The coefficients thus reflect the effect of a one-unit change; for example, a change from the theoretical minimum
to the (neutral) midpoint or from the midpoint to the theoretical maximum. All models control for patient’s health
characteristics which comprise severity of illness and patient’s marginal health benefit. Intermediate severity of illness
= 1 if l = y, and =0 otherwise. High severity of illness =1 if l = z, and = 0 otherwise. High marginal health benefit
(MHB) is a dummy for indicating a high value of marginal health benefits (= 1 if θ = 2, for illness C, and = 0 if
θ = 1 for illness A, B). We also include further individual subjects’ controls in all models which comprise gender and
medical experience, i.e., non-medical students (=reference category), medical students and physicians. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, and ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table C.2.4: Regression models on the interaction effects of performance pay and personality
traits under FFS, trait by trait analyses
Absolute deviation from patient-optimal care
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
P4P -1.127∗∗∗ -1.220∗∗∗ -1.272∗∗∗ -1.302∗∗∗ -1.224∗∗∗ -1.290∗∗∗
(0.182) (0.173) (0.210) (0.197) (0.174) (0.292)
Extraversion 0.381 0.275 0.275 0.275 0.275 0.376
(0.457) (0.299) (0.299) (0.299) (0.299) (0.473)
Neuroticism 0.274 0.382 0.274 0.274 0.274 0.367
(0.258) (0.414) (0.258) (0.258) (0.258) (0.400)
Openness -0.021 -0.021 -0.155 -0.021 -0.021 -0.074
(0.292) (0.292) (0.467) (0.292) (0.292) (0.488)
Conscientiousness 0.428 0.428 0.428 0.200 0.428 0.231
(0.326) (0.326) (0.326) (0.485) (0.326) (0.492)
Agreeableness 0.136 0.136 0.136 0.136 -0.079 -0.067











InterSEV -0.529∗∗∗ -0.529∗∗∗ -0.529∗∗∗ -0.529∗∗∗ -0.529∗∗∗ -0.529∗∗∗
(0.086) (0.086) (0.086) (0.086) (0.086) (0.086)
HighSEV -0.997∗∗∗ -0.997∗∗∗ -0.997∗∗∗ -0.997∗∗∗ -0.997∗∗∗ -0.997∗∗∗
(0.141) (0.141) (0.141) (0.141) (0.141) (0.142)
HighMHB -0.054 -0.054 -0.054 -0.054 -0.054 -0.054
(0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051)
Medical student -0.388 -0.388 -0.388 -0.388 -0.388 -0.388
(0.299) (0.299) (0.299) (0.299) (0.299) (0.300)
Physician -1.520∗∗∗ -1.520∗∗∗ -1.520∗∗∗ -1.520∗∗∗ -1.520∗∗∗ -1.520∗∗∗
(0.267) (0.267) (0.267) (0.267) (0.267) (0.267)
Male 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050
(0.222) (0.222) (0.222) (0.222) (0.222) (0.223)
Constant 2.585∗∗∗ 2.632∗∗∗ 2.658∗∗∗ 2.673∗∗∗ 2.634∗∗∗ 2.667∗∗∗
(0.318) (0.320) (0.340) (0.331) (0.318) (0.376)
Observations 936 936 936 936 936 936
Subjects 52 52 52 52 52 52
R2 0.330 0.330 0.330 0.332 0.331 0.336
Adjusted R2 0.320 0.320 0.321 0.323 0.322 0.324
Notes. This table shows estimates from separate trait by trait OLS regressions on the effects of performance pay
(P4P) and personality traits on quality of care under a fee-for-service (FFS) baseline payment system. We perform
separate trait by trait regression analyses for robustness. All personality traits are measured on a scale from 1 to
+1. The coefficients thus reflect the effect of a one-unit change; for example, a change from the theoretical minimum
to the (neutral) midpoint or from the midpoint to the theoretical maximum. All models control for patient’s health
characteristics which comprise severity of illness and patient’s marginal health benefit. Intermediate severity of illness
= 1 if l = y, and =0 otherwise. High severity of illness =1 if l = z, and = 0 otherwise. High marginal health benefit
(MHB) is a dummy for indicating a high value of marginal health benefits (= 1 if θ = 2, for illness C, and = 0 if
θ = 1 for illness A, B). We also include further individual subjects’ controls in all models which comprise gender and
medical experience, i.e., non-medical students (=reference category), medical students and physicians. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, and ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table C.2.5: Regression models on several versions of our base model
A. CAP B. FFS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
P4P -1.117∗∗∗ -1.716∗∗∗ -1.716∗∗∗ -1.716∗∗∗ -1.716∗∗∗ -1.199∗∗∗ -1.290∗∗∗ -1.290∗∗∗ -1.290∗∗∗ -1.290∗∗∗
(0.180) (0.220) (0.220) (0.220) (0.220) (0.172) (0.291) (0.291) (0.291) (0.292)
InterSEV 0.436∗∗∗ 0.436∗∗∗ 0.436∗∗∗ -0.529∗∗∗ -0.529∗∗∗ -0.529∗∗∗
(0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.086) (0.086) (0.086)
HighSEV 0.958∗∗∗ 0.958∗∗∗ 0.958∗∗∗ -0.997∗∗∗ -0.997∗∗∗ -0.997∗∗∗
(0.134) (0.134) (0.134) (0.141) (0.141) (0.142)
HighMHB -0.115∗∗ -0.115∗∗ -0.115∗∗ -0.054 -0.054 -0.054
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051)
Medical students 0.192 0.192 0.192 -0.388 -0.388 -0.388
(0.280) (0.281) (0.281) (0.299) (0.299) (0.300)
Physician -0.438 -0.438 -0.438 -1.520∗∗∗ -1.520∗∗∗ -1.520∗∗∗
(0.322) (0.323) (0.323) (0.266) (0.267) (0.267)
Male 0.385 0.385 0.385 0.050 0.050 0.050
(0.263) (0.263) (0.263) (0.222) (0.222) (0.223)
Extraversion -0.430 -0.649 -0.649 -0.743 -0.743 0.275 0.441 0.441 0.376 0.376
(0.296) (0.522) (0.523) (0.492) (0.492) (0.298) (0.493) (0.494) (0.472) (0.473)
Neuroticism -0.301 -0.617 -0.617 -0.553 -0.553 0.274 0.313 0.313 0.367 0.367
(0.226) (0.374) (0.374) (0.356) (0.357) (0.258) (0.422) (0.423) (0.400) (0.400)
Openness 0.198 -0.009 -0.009 0.041 0.041 -0.021 0.022 0.022 -0.074 -0.074
(0.252) (0.425) (0.425) (0.391) (0.392) (0.292) (0.504) (0.504) (0.487) (0.488)
Conscientiousness -0.690∗∗ -1.573∗∗∗ -1.573∗∗∗ -1.309∗∗∗ -1.309∗∗∗ 0.428 -0.438 -0.438 0.231 0.231
(0.305) (0.446) (0.447) (0.460) (0.461) (0.325) (0.502) (0.503) (0.491) (0.492)
Agreeableness -0.766∗∗ -1.099∗∗ -1.099∗∗ -1.162∗∗ -1.162∗∗ 0.136 -0.402 -0.402 -0.067 -0.067
(0.297) (0.539) (0.540) (0.496) (0.496) (0.315) (0.668) (0.669) (0.559) (0.560)
P4P×Extraversion 0.627 0.627 0.627 0.627 -0.202 -0.202 -0.202 -0.202
(0.459) (0.460) (0.460) (0.460) (0.404) (0.405) (0.405) (0.406)
P4P×Neuroticism 0.506 0.506 0.506 0.506 -0.186 -0.186 -0.186 -0.186
(0.304) (0.304) (0.304) (0.305) (0.338) (0.338) (0.338) (0.339)
P4P×Openness 0.314 0.314 0.314 0.314 0.105 0.105 0.105 0.105
(0.341) (0.341) (0.341) (0.342) (0.428) (0.428) (0.428) (0.429)
P4P×Conscientiousness 1.238∗∗∗ 1.238∗∗∗ 1.238∗∗∗ 1.238∗∗∗ 0.394 0.394 0.394 0.394
(0.389) (0.389) (0.389) (0.390) (0.393) (0.393) (0.393) (0.394)
P4P×Agreeableness 0.791∗ 0.791∗ 0.791∗ 0.791∗ 0.406 0.406 0.406 0.406
(0.437) (0.438) (0.438) (0.439) (0.550) (0.551) (0.551) (0.552)
Constant 1.440∗∗∗ 2.381∗∗∗ 1.955∗∗∗ 2.165∗∗∗ 1.739∗∗∗ 2.621∗∗∗ 1.822∗∗∗ 2.348∗∗∗ 2.140∗∗∗ 2.667∗∗∗
(0.242) (0.251) (0.220) (0.286) (0.267) (0.315) (0.365) (0.401) (0.349) (0.376)
Observations 990 990 990 990 990 936 936 936 936 936
Subjects 55 55 55 55 55 52 52 52 52 52
R2 0.287 0.248 0.308 0.269 0.328 0.329 0.173 0.242 0.267 0.336
Notes. This table shows estimates from OLS regressions on the effects of performance pay (P4P) and personality traits on quality of care under capitation (CAP, Panel A) or fee-for-service
(FFS, Panel B) baseline payment systems. Robust standard errors clustered for subjects are shown in parentheses. The reported regression estimates stem for several versions of our base model,
see Equation (3.1). In Column (1) and (6), we study the average effect of personality traits alone. All remaining models include the interaction terms between personality traits and P4P but
vary with respect to the inclusion of control variables. Columns (2) and (7) shows the effects on the quality of care without any subject or patient level controls. In Columns (3) and (7), the
model is extended by patients’ controls which comprise a patient’s severity of illness and patient’s marginal health benefit. Intermediate severity of illness = 1 if l = y, and =0 otherwise. High
severity of illness =1 if l = z, and = 0 otherwise. High marginal health benefit (MHB) is a dummy for indicating a high value of marginal health benefits (= 1 if θ = 2, for illness C, and = 0 if
θ = 1 for illness A, B). In Columns (4) and (8), individual subjects’ controls which comprise gender and medical experience, i.e., non-medical students (=reference category), medical students
and physicians. Columns (5) and (8) show regression estimates with the full list of covariates for our main model (reported in Table 3.1). All personality traits are measured on a scale from
1 to +1. The coefficients thus reflect the effect of a one-unit change; for example, a change from the theoretical minimum to the (neutral) midpoint or from the midpoint to the theoretical
maximum. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, and ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table C.2.6: Comparisons of regression models for different regression methods
A. CAP B. FFS
Method OLS Tobit REML OLS Tobit REML
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
P4P -1.716∗∗∗ -2.030∗∗∗ -1.716∗∗∗ -1.290∗∗∗ -1.706∗∗∗ -1.290∗∗∗
(0.220) (0.232) (0.247) (0.292) (0.290) (0.286)
InterSEV 0.436∗∗∗ 0.706∗∗∗ 0.436∗∗∗ -0.529∗∗∗ -0.666∗∗∗ -0.529∗∗∗
(0.074) (0.125) (0.067) (0.086) (0.116) (0.071)
HighSEV 0.958∗∗∗ 1.454∗∗∗ 0.958∗∗∗ -0.997∗∗∗ -1.474∗∗∗ -0.997∗∗∗
(0.134) (0.191) (0.067) (0.142) (0.204) (0.071)
HighMHB -0.115∗∗ -0.169∗ -0.115∗∗ -0.054 -0.095 -0.054
(0.044) (0.093) (0.058) (0.051) (0.095) (0.061)
Medical students 0.192 0.400 0.174 -0.388 -0.498 0.114
(0.281) (0.451) (0.217) (0.300) (0.475) (0.127)
Physician -0.438 -0.867 -0.093 -1.520∗∗∗ -3.130∗∗∗ -0.441∗∗∗
(0.323) (0.617) (0.282) (0.267) (0.623) (0.156)
Male 0.385 0.543 -0.105 0.050 0.035 0.061
(0.263) (0.459) (0.208) (0.223) (0.370) (0.109)
Extraversion -0.743 -0.975 -0.707 0.376 0.416 0.415
(0.492) (0.640) (0.568) (0.473) (0.655) (0.523)
P4P×Extraversion 0.627 0.560 0.627 -0.202 0.101 -0.202
(0.460) (0.520) (0.456) (0.406) (0.446) (0.451)
Neuroticism -0.553 -0.658 -0.677 0.367 0.662 0.402
(0.357) (0.534) (0.450) (0.400) (0.573) (0.485)
P4P×Neuroticism 0.506 0.297 0.506 -0.186 -0.268 -0.186
(0.305) (0.389) (0.358) (0.339) (0.401) (0.418)
Openness 0.041 0.048 -0.017 -0.074 -0.106 -0.063
(0.392) (0.517) (0.464) (0.488) (0.671) (0.471)
P4P×Openness 0.314 0.720∗ 0.314 0.105 0.279 0.105
(0.342) (0.369) (0.373) (0.429) (0.493) (0.406)
Conscientiousness -1.309∗∗∗ -1.535∗∗ -1.589∗∗∗ 0.231 0.579 -0.223
(0.461) (0.642) (0.540) (0.492) (0.696) (0.547)
P4P×Conscientiousness 1.238∗∗∗ 1.036∗∗ 1.238∗∗∗ 0.394 0.378 0.394
(0.390) (0.447) (0.424) (0.394) (0.430) (0.469)
Agreeableness -1.162∗∗ -1.620∗∗ -1.166∗∗ -0.067 0.026 -0.389
(0.496) (0.705) (0.561) (0.560) (0.774) (0.635)
P4P×Agreeableness 0.791∗ 0.574 0.791∗ 0.406 0.463 0.406
(0.439) (0.508) (0.450) (0.552) (0.591) (0.547)
Constant 1.739∗∗∗ 1.080∗∗ 1.953∗∗∗ 2.667∗∗∗ 2.706∗∗∗ 2.350∗∗∗
(0.267) (0.454) (0.339) (0.376) (0.511) (0.346)
Observations 990 990 990 936 936 936
Subjects 55 55 55 52 52 52
(Pseudo) R2 0.328 0.102 0.336 0.124
Notes. This table shows estimates from regressions on the effects of performance pay (P4P) and personality traits on quality of
care under capitation (CAP, Panel A) or fee-for-service (FFS, Panel B) baseline payment systems. For each payment system,
we report estimates based on OLS regressions, tobit regressions, and multilevel mixed-effects REML regressions. All models
include patients’ and subjects’ level controls. Patients’ controls which comprise a patient’s severity of illness and patient’s
marginal health benefit. Intermediate severity of illness = 1 if l = y, and =0 otherwise. High severity of illness =1 if l = z, and
= 0 otherwise. High marginal health benefit (MHB) is a dummy for indicating a high value of marginal health benefits (= 1 if
θ = 2, for illness C, and = 0 if θ = 1 for illness A, B). Individual subjects’ controls comprise gender and medical experience,
i.e., non-medical students (=reference category), medical students and physicians. All personality traits are measured on a
scale from 1 to +1. The coefficients thus reflect the effect of a one-unit change; for example, a change from the theoretical
minimum to the (neutral) midpoint or from the midpoint to the theoretical maximum. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, and ∗∗∗
p < 0.01.
181
D Appendix to Chapter 4
D.1 Additional information about the experiment
D.1.1 Instructions of the experiment
Translated from German, lab version [online version]
Experimental study of the Faculty of Medicine and the Faculty of Management,
Economics and Social Sciences at the University of Cologne
Thank you for your willingness to participate in our research study in cooperation between
the Faculty of Medicine and Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences at the
University of Cologne.
In particular, you are participating in a study on decision-making behavior in the context of
experimental economic research. The aim of the study is to gain insights into the behavioral
mechanisms and determinants of individual decisions. Overall, the study—consisting of a
decision-making experiment and a subsequent questionnaire—will take about 45 minutes of
your time.
During the experiment, you and the other participants will be asked to make decisions. You
can earn money in the course of the experiment. The amount of your earnings depends on
your decisions.
You will also be asked to answer a series of questions. As compensation for answering the
questionnaire, you will receive an additional fixed amount of e 5.
After having completed the questionnaire, all your earnings from the experiment and the
questionnaire will be paid to you in cash. [After completion, all your earnings from the
experiment and from the questionnaire will be paid to you in cash.]
With your decisions in the experiment, you determine the amount of your own earnings as
well as the benefit for a patient. There are no patients present during the experiment, but
the patient benefit resulting from your decisions (expressed in Euro) will be transferred to
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the charitable organization Christoffel Blindenmission Deutschland e.V., 64625 Bensheim.
They spend the amount exclusively on the treatment of patients with cataracts (an eye
disease).
Your participation is voluntary. During the experiment and while filling in the questionnaire,
you can interrupt or withdraw from participation at any time without giving reasons and
without facing any negative consequences for your person.
During the course of your medical studies, we will ask you again to participate in our study.
The success of our research project depends on your regular participation. We would like to
include about 80% of your semester students in this study.
The data generated from the experiment and from the questionnaire are analyzed pseudony-
mously. The data cannot be matched to any specific person. Third parties have no access
to the data. The pseudonymous data will be used for scientific research and presentations.
This work will be published. Study results are not used commercially. Before starting the
experiment, we ask you to generate an individual code on your computer. No conclusions
about your person can be drawn from this code. This also applies in the case of publication
of the study results. The code serves only as a pseudonym, through which your individual
data from several participations can be compiled. The code also serves for the anonymous
payment of the earnings from the experiment. The 6-digit code consists of the first letter
of your place of birth, the second letter of your mother’s first name, the second letter of
your own first name, the first letter of your father’s first name, and your day of birth (in
two digits).
A data custodian is responsible for storing and managing the data generated from the
experiment. The data custodian is independent of the research project and is the only
person who has access to the entire data set, which—in addition to the data collected in the
experiment and questionnaire—contains your personal code and student number. The data
custodian does not perform any data analyses and ensures that the people involved in the
project receive only the data and the pseudonyms, which are collected in the experiment.
This ensures that no conclusions can be drawn from the data about individual persons. The
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data set containing the participants’ pseudonyms and student numbers will be destroyed
after completion of the project (after 6 years). You have the option (without restriction)
to revoke your consent to data processing. There is the possibility of viewing the original
data through the Ethics Commission. You have the right to information and rectification
regarding the data stored about you. It is possible to delete personal data.
Contact:
Prof. Dr. Daniel Wiesen
Department of Business Administration and Health Care Management, University of Cologne
Universitätsstraße 91, 50931 Cologne
Tel. + 49 (0) 221 470 89 171
wiesen@wiso.uni-koeln.de
The study was approved by the Ethics Commission of the Faculty of Medicine of the
University of Cologne.
[Declaration of consent] (In the lab, the consent form was handed out and signed by
participants.)
I have read and understood the information about participation in the experimental study,
including the information concerning data security. I know that my participation is voluntary
and that I can revoke my consent to participate at any time without suffering any negative
consequences for my person.
 I declare my consent for participation and want to participate
 I do not want to participate
Generation of the 6-digit code:
To link your answers from different surveys, we would like to ask you to enter the five pieces
of information indicated below, in order to generate your personal code. No conclusions
about your person can be drawn from this code. It serves solely as a pseudonym, through
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which your answers to different surveys can be linked. Furthermore, the code allows the
anonymous payment of the earnings from the experiment.
(Notes. If you have umlauts in your name, please enter them as such (e.g., ä not ae). Please
use lower case letters.)
o First letter of your place of birth
o Second letter of your mother’s first name
o Second letter of your own first name
o First letter of your father’s first name
Answer: ____
(Notes. Please do not enter more letters than the maximum of 4. Any letters exceeding this
maximum will be deleted automatically.)
Your day of birth (in two digits)
Answer: ____
Generation of the 6-digit code:
To confirm, please re-enter your personal code:
(Notes. If you have umlauts in your name, please enter them as such (e.g., ä not ae). Please
use lower case letters.)
o First letter of your place of birth
o Second letter of your mother’s first name
o Second letter of your own first name
o First letter of your father’s first name
Answer: ____
(Notes. Please do not enter more letters than the maximum of 4. Any letters exceeding this
maximum will be deleted automatically.)
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Your day of birth (in two digits)
Answer: ____
Welcome to our decision-making experiment!
Description of the experiment
You are participating in a study on decision-making behavior in the context of experimental
economic research. During the experiment, you and the other participants will be asked to
make decisions. You can earn money in the course of the experiment. The amount of your
earnings depends on your decisions. Please carefully read through the following description
of the experiment. If you have questions regarding the description or during the experiment,
you can signal this by raising your hand at any time. We will come to you and answer your
questions personally.
For the entire duration of the session, it is not allowed to communicate with other participants.
If you violate this rule, you will be excluded from the experiment and will not receive any
payment.
Please make sure that your mobile phones are switched off and that they are put in the
corridor along with your bags and jackets if applicable. From there, you can pick up your
belongings when you are finished. [While you are doing the experiment, we would like to ask
you not to use any auxiliary devices (internet, cell phone, ...) and not to communicate with
the others.]
The experiment comprises 30 rounds.
During the entire experiment you take the role of a physician. In each round, you decide on
the treatment of a patient.
For each patient, you choose between two treatment options—Treatment A or Treatment B.
With your decision, you determine your earnings in Euros and the benefit for the patient,
which is also measured in Euros.
Upon completion of the experiment one of the 30 rounds of the experiment will be randomly
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selected. The earnings from that round will be paid to you in cash after the completion of
the experiment and the questionnaire.
No There are no patients will be present in this during the experiment (or and no participants
in take the role of patients). The patient benefit in Euros, which is determined by from your
decision in the randomly selected round, will help an actual patient: the amount of money
resulting from the patient benefit you generated with your decision regarding the benefit for
a patient will be given donated to the charitable organization Christoffel Blindenmission
Deutschland e.V., 64265 Bensheim. The amount is earmarked to facilitate the treatment of
patients with cataracts (an eye disease).
 I have understood the instructions.
Payment
Information concerning place and time of the payment will be given to you after the
completion of the experiment. (Additionally, an information sheet was handed out to the
participants)
You will receive your payment in an envelope with your personal code on it. To guarantee
anonymized payment, you will confirm on a separate receipt with your signature that you
have received your payment according to your code. The code is not listed on this separate
receipt sheet. Once signed, please put the receipt sheet without the envelope in the provided
box.
After the experiment, the proper payment of the amount to the Christoffel Blindenmission
Deutschland e.V. will be confirmed by a control person. When receiving her payment, the
control person will enter the amount of money, which results from the cumulated patient
benefit generated in the randomly selected round, in a payment order form. The form will
be put in a stamped envelope addressed to the financial administration of the University of
Cologne. The control person and another person involved in the study will then together
put it into the nearest mailbox. The financial administration of the University of Cologne
will then issue the payment of this amount to Christoffel Blindenmission Deutschland e.V..
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The role of the control person will be randomly assigned to a participant upon completion
of the questionnaire [today]. The control person will receive an additional remuneration
of 5enext to the payment she receives from the experiment and the questionnaire. On a
form, the control person will confirm with her signature that she has correctly completed her
assigned tasks as described above. A copy of this form as well as a copy of the confirmation
of Christoffel Blindenmission Deutschland e.V., indicating the receipt of payment, will be
hung up in the information box of the Deanery of Studies of the Faculty of Medicine at
Cologne University (Basement, Building 42, Joseph-Stelzmann-Str. 20, 50931 Cologne).
 I have read and understood the information regarding payment.
Sample decision situation in the experiment
We would now like to explain the decision situation in the experiment using an exemplary
decision screen. Both treatment options Treatment A and Treatment B are simply depicted
in an abstract manner, without indicating actual medical services. The selection of a
treatment option (either Treatment A or Treatment B) determines the profit of the physician
as well as the benefit for the patient.
The interpretation of the screen above is as follows: Suppose a participant has chosen
Treatment A. Then the earnings of the participant amounts to 7 and the benefit for the
patient amounts to 10. If a participant decides on Treatment B, her earnings (in e ) amount
to 14 and the benefit for the patient (in e ) amounts to 2. You choose your preferred
treatment option (either Treatment A or Treatment B) by clicking on it.
 I have read and understood the information regarding payment.
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D.1.2 Summary of the survey items
Table D.1.1: Description of survey items
Variable Description Scale
Economic preferences (Falk et al., 2018, 2016)
Risk aversion Equality weighted sum of quantitative and qualitative measure and transformed such that
= 0 implies risk neutrality, > 0 risk aversion, and < 0 risk seeking.
[-0.5, 0.5]
Quantitative item Switching point in multiple price list (31 hypothetical choices between a lottery and a
safe option), rescaled to [0, 1].
Qualitative item Self-assessed risk taking on a scale from 0 (“not at all willing to take risks”) to 10 (“very
willing to take risks”), , rescaled to [0, 1].
Time discounting Equality weighted sum of quantitative and qualitative measure and transformed such that
= 0 implies patience, and > 0 impatience.
[0, 1]
Quantitative item Switching point in a list of 25 hypothetical choices between an early payment “today”
and a delayed payment “in 12 months”, rescaled to [0, 1].
Qualitative item Self-assessed patience on a scale from 0 (“not at all willing to give up something today
[in order to benefit from that in the future]” to 10 (“very willing to give up something”),
rescaled to [0, 1].
Trust Equality weighted sum of quantitative and qualitative measure. [0, 1]
Quantitative item First mover behavior in hypothetical investment game, rescaled to [0, 1].
Qualitative item Self-assessment on how much the statement ”As long as I am not convinced otherwise,
I assume that people have only the best intentions” describe subjects on a scale from 0
(“does not describe me at all”) to 10 (“describes me very well”), rescaled to [0, 1].
Altruism Equality weighted sum of quantitative and qualitative measure. [0, 1]
Quantitative item Donation to a good cause after hypothetical lottery win of 1000 Euro, rescaled to [0, 1].
Qualitative item Self-assessed altruism on a scale from 0 (“not at all willing to share [with others without
expecting anything in return when it comes to a good cause]” to 10 (“very willing to
share”), rescaled to [0, 1].
Positive reciprocity Equality weighted sum of two quantitative measures. [0, 1]
Quantitative item 1 Second mover behavior in hypothetical investment game (average of four scenarios),
rescaled to [0, 1].
Quantitative item 2 Size of thank-you gift following hypothetical scenario, rescaled to [0, 1].
Negative reciprocity Equality weighted sum of quantitative and qualitative measure. [0, 1]
Quantitative item Minimum acceptable offer in hypothetical ultimatum game, rescaled to [0, 1].
Qualitative item Self-assessed negative reciprocity on a scale from 0 (“not at all willing to punish [unfair
behavior even if it is costly]”) to 10 (“very willing to punish”), rescaled to [0, 1].
Personality traits
Self-assessed description of personality according to following items (either Big Five In-
ventory by Rammstedt and John (2007), Gosling et al. (2003) or HEXACO Personality
Inventory by Ashton and Lee (2009). For each trait, we calculated the average score of
the respective items and rescaled it to [-1, 1].
Openness(to experience) [-1, 1]
Big Five On a scale from 1[Disagree strongly] to 7[Agree strongly]: “I see myself as someone who
has few artistic interests.(reverse code)”, “I see myself as someone who has an active
imagination.”
Continued on next page
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Variable Description Scale
HEXACO On a scale from 1[Disagree strongly] to 5[Agree strongly]: “I would be quite bored by a
visit to an art gallery.(reversed code)”, “I’m interested in learning about the history and
politics of other countries.”, “I would enjoy creating a work of art, such as a novel, a song,
or a painting.”, “I think that paying attention to radical ideas is a waste of time.(reverse
code)”, “If I had the opportunity, I would like to attend a classical music concert.”, “I’ve
never really enjoyed looking through an encyclopedia.(reverse code)”, “People have often
told me that I have a good imagination.”, “I like people who have unconventional views.”,
“I don’t think of myself as the artistic or creative type. (reverse code)”, “I find it boring
to discuss philosophy.(reverse code)”.
Conscientiousness [-1, 1]
Big Five On a scale from 1[Disagree strongly] to 7[Agree strongly]: “I see myself as someone who
tends to be lazy.(reverse code)”, “I see myself as someone who does a thorough job.”.
HEXACO On a scale from 1[Disagree strongly] to 5[Agree strongly]: “I plan ahead and organize
things, to avoid scrambling at the last minute.”, “I often push myself very hard when
trying to achieve a goal.”, “When working on something, I don’t pay much attention to
small details.(reverse code)”, “I make decisions based on the feeling of the moment rather
than on careful thought.(reverse code)”, “When working, I sometimes have difficulties due
to being disorganized.(reverse code)”, “I do only the minimum amount of work needed
to get by.(reverse code)”, “I always try to be accurate in my work, even at the expense
of time.”, “I make a lot of mistakes because I don’t think before I act.(reverse code)”,
“People often call me a perfectionist.”, “I prefer to do whatever comes to mind, rather
than stick to a plan.(reverse code)”.
Agreeableness (versus Anger) [-1, 1]
Big Five On a scale from 1[Disagree strongly] to 7[Agree strongly]: “I see myself as someone
who tends to find fault with others.(reverse code)”, “I see myself as someone who is
generally trusting.”, “I see myself as someone who is considerate and kind to almost
everyone.(additional)”; rescaled to [-1, 1].
HEXACO On a scale from 1[Disagree strongly] to 5[Agree strongly]: ‘I rarely hold a grudge, even
against people who have badly wronged me.”, “People sometimes tell me that I am too crit-
ical of others.(reverse code)”, “People sometimes tell me that I’m too stubborn.(reverse
code)”, “People think of me as someone who has a quick temper.(reverse code)”, “My
attitude toward people who have treated me badly is âforgive and forgetâ.”, “I tend to be
lenient in judging other people.”, “I am usually quite flexible in my opinions when people
disagree with me.”, “Most people tend to get angry more quickly than I do.”, “Even when
people make a lot of mistakes, I rarely say anything negative.”, “When people tell me
that I’m wrong, my first reaction is to argue with them.(reverse code)”.
Extraversion [-1, 1]
Big Five On a scale from 1[Disagree strongly] to 7[Agree strongly]: “I see myself as someone who
is reserved.(reverse code)”, “I see myself as someone who is outgoing, sociable.”.
HEXACO On a scale from 1[Disagree strongly] to 5[Agree strongly]: “I feel reasonably satisfied
with myself overall.”, “I rarely express my opinions in group meetings.(reverse code)”, “I
prefer jobs that involve active social interaction to those that involve working alone.”, “On
most days, I feel cheerful and optimistic.”, “I feel that I am an unpopular person.(reverse
code)”, “In social situations, I’m usually the one who makes the first move.”, “The first
thing that I always do in a new place is to make friends.”, “Most people are more upbeat
and dynamic than I generally am.(reverse code)”, “I sometimes feel that I am a worthless
person.(reverse code)”, “When I’m in a group of people, I’m often the one who speaks on
behalf of the group.(reverse code)”.
Neuroticism/emotionality [-1, 1]
Big Five On a scale from 1[Disagree strongly] to 7[Agree strongly]: “I see myself as someone who
is relaxed, handles stress well.(reverse code)”, “I see myself as someone who gets nervous
easily.”.
Continued on next page
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Variable Description Scale
HEXACO On a scale from 1[Disagree strongly] to 5[Agree strongly]: “I would feel afraid if I had to
travel in bad weather conditions.”, "I sometimes can’t help worrying about little things.”,
“When I suffer from a painful experience, I need someone to make me feel comfortable.”,
“I feel like crying when I see other people crying.”, “When it comes to physical danger, I
am very fearful.”, “I worry a lot less than most people do.(reverse code)”, “I can handle
difficult situations without needing emotional support from anyone else.(reverse code)”,
“I feel strong emotions when someone close to me is going away for a long time.”, “Even in
an emergency I wouldn’t feel like panicking.(reverse code)”, “I remain unemotional even
in situations where most people get very sentimental.(reverse code).
Occupationally related items
Expected income Calculation based on a subject’s self-assessed likelihood (p) of having a monthly net
income given a full-time employment five years following the completion of specialty
training which falls into the following categories:
[2,500, 7,000]
i) less than EUR 3,000 net per month
ii) between EUR 3,000 and EUR 3,999 net per month
iii) between EUR 4,000 and EUR 4,999 net per month
iv) between EUR 5,000 and EUR 5,999 net per month
v) more than EUR 6,000 Euro per month
The expected value of future income per subject was calculated as follows:
EV = pi x 2,500 + pii x 3,500 + piii x 4,500 + piv x 5,500+pv x 6,500
Specialty choice Selection of the first most preferred specialty from the following list: Anesthesia, Gen-
eral medicine, Neurology/Psychiatry, Orthopedics, Radiology/Nuclear medicine, Foren-
sic medicine, Urology, Dentistry and maxillary surgery, Ophthalmology, Surgery, Der-
matology, Gynecology, Otorhinolaryngology, Internal medicine, Pediatrics, Laboratory
medicine, Other (namely)
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D.2 Illustration of Delta method








They are transformed back to their original scale thanks to the l = 3× 1 vector of monotonic














Then, for a given estimated covariance matrix of the model parameters, V̂ (η̂0), the covariance
matrix of θ0, can be estimated according to the Delta method by:
V̂ (θ̂0) = G(η̂0)V̂ (η̂0)G′(η̂0),
where G(η̂0) is the 3× 3 matrix of ∂g
i(η)
∂ηj


















We now illustrate the Delta method with dummy variables, where we take gender as an
example. Values are transformed back to their original scale with the l = 3(K+ 1)× 1 vector
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of monotonic continuously differentiable functions g. For the constant, the transformation is
θ0 = g(η0).
For the dummy variable, the transformation back to the original scale is:
θfemale = g(η0 + ηfemale)− g(η0).











ga(ηa0 + ηafemale)− ga(ηa0)
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
.
For variables other than dummy variables, such as the scores from the preference module, we
proceeded as follows, taking altruism as an example. Values are transformed back to their
original scale thanks to the l = 3(K + 1)× 1 vector of monotonic continuously differentiable
functions g. For the constant, the transformation is:
θ0 = g(η0).
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Furthermore, for altruism, the transformation back to the original scale is:
θaltruism = g(η0 + 0.1× ηaltruism)− g(η0)
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D.3 Descriptive analysis of the control group
Analogous to Section 4.5.1, we now provide descriptive statistics on patient-regarding behavior
and individuals’ characteristics of our control group of non-medical students (N=145) and
compare them to our medical student sample, see Table D.3.1.
Table D.3.1: Descriptive statistics of our control group (non-medical students) and our
medical student sample
Non-medical students Medical students M, t-test
Mean s.d. N Mean s.d. N p-value
A. Patient-regarding choices
Total sample 11.9 9.30 145 16.9 9.0 733 <0.001
1st cohort 15.2 9.0 40 19.8 8.1 259 <0.001
2nd cohort 10.6 9.6 23 16.1 8.3 235 0.001
3rd cohort 11.1 9.1 56 13.8 9.6 158 0.035
4th cohort 9.7 9.1 26 15.6 9.6 81 0.004
B. Characteristics
Economic Preferences
Altruism 0.37 0.14 144 0.38 0.17 729 0.229
Trust 0.50 0.21 144 0.57 0.24 729 <0.001
Positive reciprocity 0.42 0.16 144 0.36 0.18 729 0.017
Negative reciprocity 0.46 0.15 144 0.47 0.16 729 0.439
Risk aversion 0.09 0.15 145 0.07 0.15 731 <0.050
Time discounting 0.31 0.16 145 0.27 0.16 731 0.003
Personality traits
Extraversion 0.22 0.27 144 0.25 0.41 729 0.271
Agreeableness 0.10 0.27 144 0.09 0.37 729 0.3071
Conscientiousness 0.29 0.28 144 0.39 0.35 729 <0.001
Openness 0.21 0.31 144 0.27 0.44 729 0.055
Emotionality/Neuroticism 0.17 0.31 144 -0.08 0.43 729 <0.001
Notes. This table presents summary statistics on the number of patient-regarding choices and subject’s characteristics for
our non-medical students sample and compares it to our medical student sample. Comparisons are based on a one-sided
t-test with p-values reported in the last column. Subject’s characteristics comprise social and economic preferences by the
Preference Survey Module (Falk et al., 2016) and personality traits by the 60-item questionnaire of the HEXACO Personality
Inventory (Ashton and Lee, 2009). Altruism, trust, positive and negative reciprocity are measured on a scale of [0, 1]. Risk
aversion is transformed such that it =0 implies risk neutrality, >0 implies risk aversion and <0 risk seeking. While time
discounting = 0 implies patience and a value >0 inpatience. All personality traits are scaled between -1 and 1. Table D.1.1
in Appendix D.1.2 gives a full description of all variables.
Overall, non-medical students make, on average, 11.9 patient-regarding choices. This
corresponds to significantly lower patient-regarding behavior by about one third fewer
patient-regarding choices. The significance of less patient-regarding choices in non-medical
than medical students is prevalent for each cohort comparisons (p <0.05, t-test). Recall
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that the progress stages of non-medical students have been synchronized with the medical
studies. Students in their first term correspond to freshmen (“1st cohort”). Students in
their second to fourth terms correspond to the pre-clinical phase (“2nd cohort”), students
between their fifth to tenth term correspond to the clinical phase (“3rd cohort”), and terms
above 10 reflect the practical year (“4th cohort”). When differentiating between study
cohorts for non-medical students, students of the first cohort are the most patient-regarding
(15.2 prcs), students of the fourth cohort are the least patient-regarding (9.7 prcs). While,
overall speaking, we find patient-regarding behavior to decrease with study progress, students
of the third cohort make slightly more patient-regarding choices than students of second
cohort (11.1 compared to 10.6 prcs). However, this difference is not statistical significant.
Comparing the distributions, the Kolmogorov-Smirnoff-test only rejects the hypothesis of
identical distributions for the comparison of prc the first and fourth cohort (p < 0.05).
Figure D.3.1: Distributions of patient-regarding choices by cohorts for medical and non-
medical students
Notes. This figure shows the distributions of the relative frequencies of patient-regarding choices (prc)
differentiated by study cohorts for medical and non-medical students.
For an illustration of the distributions of prcs by study cohorts of our control group, see
Figure D.3.1. Students who made no prc (referred to as pure profit-maximizers), amount to
5.0% in the first cohort, 30.4% in the second cohort, 12.5% in the third cohort and 23.1%
in fourth cohort. Non-medical students who always made the prc make up for 5.0% in the
196
first cohort, 8.7% in the second cohort, 7.1% in the third cohort and 3.9% in fourth cohort.
While the overall share of pure patient-regarding altruists is similar in non-medical and
medical students (6.8% and 7.8%, respectively), there are percentage-wise more than twice
as much pure profit-maximizer among non-medical than medical students (15.2% compared
to 6.8%).
While non-medical students are significantly less patient-regarding than medical students,
they do not significantly differ in their general altruistic behavior elicited by the Preference
Survey Module by Falk et al. (2016, 2018); see Panel B of Table D.3.1. They also do not
differ in their preferences for negative reciprocity. Whereas, a comparisons of the other
social and economic preferences reveals that our non-medical student sample has lower social
preferences for trust and positive reciprocity, but higher preferences for time discounting and
risk aversion (p <0.05, t-test). In terms of personality traits, non-medical students appear to
be less conscientious, less open but more emotional/neurotic than medical students (p <0.10,
t-test).
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D.4 Further estimations on CES preferences
D.4.1 Aggregate estimations
Figure D.4.1 shows the distribution of observed heterogeneity implied by the different set
of covariates. Table D.4.1 shows the results of the aggregate estimations for the CES
preference functional with various sets of covariates. Standard errors are clustered at the
individual level. Table D.4.2 shows the corresponding parameter estimates when values are
transformed back to the original scale.
Figure D.4.1: Distributions of parameters a, r and noise for the aggregate model with
different sets of covariates, CES preferences
a r noise



















































Table D.4.1: Aggregate estimations, parameter estimates, CES preferences
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
a
Constant −0.669∗∗∗ −1.330∗∗∗ −0.879∗∗∗ 0.125∗ 0.885∗∗∗ 1.039∗∗∗
(0.073) (0.148) (0.168) (0.208) (0.434) (0.565)
Pre-clinical 0.830∗∗∗ 0.705∗∗∗ 0.653∗∗∗ 0.519∗∗∗ 0.576∗∗∗
(0.181) (0.189) (0.196) (0.203) (0.292)
Clinical 1.197∗∗∗ 1.083∗∗∗ 0.942∗∗∗ 0.701∗∗∗ 0.800∗∗∗
(0.190) (0.196) (0.199) (0.205) (0.275)
Practical Year 0.917∗∗∗ 0.604∗∗∗ 0.694∗∗∗ 0.394∗∗∗ 0.475∗∗∗
(0.259) (0.355) (0.310) (0.375) (0.438)
Female −0.618∗∗∗ −0.257∗∗∗ −0.192∗∗∗ −0.217∗∗∗
(0.124) (0.125) (0.120) (0.193)
General altruism −3.186∗∗∗ −2.588∗∗∗ −2.657∗∗∗
(0.420) (0.470) (0.498)
Risk aversion −0.815∗∗∗ −0.688∗∗∗
(0.560) (0.585)




Negative reciprocity 0.157 0.103
(0.501) (0.781)













Constant −0.671∗∗∗ −0.807∗∗∗ −0.401∗∗∗ −0.303∗∗∗ −0.395∗∗∗ −0.310∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.061) (0.112) (0.145) (0.285) (0.358)
Pre-clinical 0.165∗ 0.105∗ 0.103∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗
(0.108) (0.132) (0.126) (0.144) (0.192)
Clinical 0.193∗ 0.131 0.208∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗ 0.279∗∗∗
(0.142) (0.175) (0.147) (0.164) (0.187)
Practical Year 0.245∗ −0.060 0.077 −0.076 −0.010
(0.208) (0.303) (0.268) (0.343) (0.379)
Female −0.539∗∗∗ −0.309∗∗∗ −0.285∗∗∗ −0.271∗∗∗
(0.097) (0.102) (0.107) (0.146)
General altruism −0.718∗∗∗ −0.770∗∗∗ −0.744∗∗∗
(0.240) (0.307) (0.350)
Risk aversion −0.280∗∗ −0.117
(0.432) (0.454)




Negative reciprocity 0.460∗∗∗ 0.367∗∗∗
(0.372) (0.602)













Constant 0.964∗∗∗ 0.924∗∗∗ 0.838∗∗∗ 0.810∗∗∗ 0.697∗∗∗ 0.668∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.051) (0.073) (0.137) (0.243) (0.270)
Pre-clinical −0.082 −0.077 −0.090∗∗ −0.077∗ −0.152∗∗∗
(0.081) (0.099) (0.101) (0.106) (0.144)
Clinical 0.016 0.047 −0.048 −0.038 −0.084∗
(0.104) (0.128) (0.130) (0.133) (0.146)
Practical Year 0.138 0.293∗∗∗ 0.220∗∗∗ 0.388∗∗∗ 0.332∗∗∗
(0.128) (0.216) (0.212) (0.238) (0.263)
Female 0.053 −0.059 −0.033 −0.003
(0.083) (0.091) (0.090) (0.111)
General altruism 0.181∗ 0.130 0.087
(0.229) (0.268) (0.281)
Risk aversion −0.086 −0.212∗
(0.314) (0.365)




Negative reciprocity −0.157 −0.047
(0.283) (0.381)












N 733 733 733 729 729 729
Log-likelihood -13,331.09 -13,002.64 -12,884.71 -12,394.66 -12,028.09 -11997.39
Notes. ∗p<0.10; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table D.4.2: Aggregate estimations, preference parameters, noise, and marginal effects, CES
preferences
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
a
Constant 0.339∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗ 0.293∗∗∗ 0.531∗ 0.708∗∗∗ 0.776∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.028) (0.039) (0.053) (0.082) (0.115)
Pre-clinical 0.168∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.045) (0.048) (0.044) (0.056)
Clinical 0.258∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗ 0.213∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.046) (0.047) (0.046) (0.061)
Practical year 0.189∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.087) (0.068) (0.064) (0.057)
Female −0.111∗∗∗ −0.064∗∗∗ −0.041∗∗∗ −0.039∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.031) (0.027) (0.042)
General altruism −0.079∗∗∗ −0.056∗∗∗ −0.049∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.013) (0.022)
Risk aversion −0.017∗∗∗ −0.011∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.012)




Negative reciprocity 0.003 −0.001
(0.011) (0.014)













Constant −0.956∗∗∗ −1.240∗∗∗ −0.493∗∗∗ −0.354∗∗∗ −0.485∗∗∗ −0.155
(0.097) (0.160) (0.195) (0.199) (0.391) (0.490)
Pre-clinical 0.342∗ 0.149 0.132∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗
(0.240) (0.208) (0.170) (0.204) (0.218)
Clinical 0.393∗ 0.183 0.254∗∗∗ 0.276∗∗∗ 0.277∗∗∗
(0.286) (0.256) (0.189) (0.229) (0.254)
Practical year 0.486∗ −0.092 0.100 −0.118 0.246∗∗
(0.408) (0.501) (0.335) (0.532) (0.309)
Female −1.066∗∗∗ −0.490∗∗∗ −0.489∗∗∗ −0.370∗∗∗
(0.210) (0.188) (0.235) (0.272)
General altruism −0.101∗∗∗ −0.119∗∗∗ −0.084∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.061) (0.078)
Risk aversion −0.042∗∗ −0.0004
(0.058) (0.059)




Negative reciprocity 0.067∗∗∗ 0.027∗
(0.063) (0.080)













Constant 2.623∗∗∗ 2.519∗∗∗ 2.313∗∗∗ 2.247∗∗∗ 2.007∗∗∗ 1.773∗∗∗
(0.092) (0.130) (0.181) (0.308) (0.504) (0.480)
Pre-clinical −0.198 −0.171 −0.194∗∗ −0.149∗ −0.266∗∗∗
(0.197) (0.220) (0.225) (0.208) (0.225)
Clinical 0.041 0.112 −0.106 −0.075 −0.137
(0.266) (0.306) (0.287) (0.264) (0.259)
Practical year 0.373 0.787∗∗∗ 0.552∗∗∗ 0.951∗∗∗ 0.293∗
(0.362) (0.657) (0.571) (0.683) (0.569)
Female 0.127 −0.128 −0.064 0.004
(0.206) (0.200) (0.175) (0.213)
General altruism 0.041∗ 0.026 0.016
(0.048) (0.053) (0.052)
Risk aversion −0.017 −0.038∗
(0.061) (0.063)




Negative reciprocity −0.031 −0.002
(0.061) (0.072)












N 733 733 733 729 729 705
Log-likelihood -13,331.09 -13,002.64 -12,884.71 -12,394.66 -12,028.09 -11,537.7
Notes. ∗p<0.10; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
D.4.2 Finite mixture model
As stated in Section 4.5.3, our econometric model can be extended in several other directions
to account for individual heterogeneity. One potential direction to account for heterogeneity
identifies distinct preference (and noise) types with a finite mixture model without covariates.
We next describe the estimation of distinct preference types using a finite mixture model.
Here the population is composed by a finite number of preference types C. Each type
c = 1, . . . , C is present in proportion πc in the population and is characterized by a (distinct)
set of parameters θc. Each individual’s type is a priori unknown and has a probability πc to
belong to type c. The likelihood associated with a choice sequence T for decision-maker i is
now written:




Taking account theoretical restrictions on parameters (with θc = g(ζc), the likelihood of the
sequence of choices for subject i can be written:




And the (grand) log-likelihood to be maximized with respect to the set of proportions and
parameters (π1, . . . , πC−1, ζ1, . . . , ζC) is:
LL(π1, . . . , πC−1, ζ1, . . . , ζC) =
∑
i
ln(Pi(π1, . . . , πC−1, ζ1, . . . , ζC))
The log-likelihood is known to be difficult to maximize directly. We follow Bruhin et al.
(2019) and first maximize the log-likelihood with an Expectation-Maximisation procedure
and then move to a direct maximisation.
Subjects can be classified ex-post in the preference type that best characterize their behavior
based on parameters estimates (π1, . . . , πC−1, θ1, . . . , θC). For a given set of proportions and






When evaluated with proportions and parameter estimates at maximum likelihood, τic are
ex-post probabilities to belong to type c for subject i.
In order to assess the superiority of a finite mixture model over a basic aggregate model
with no heterogeneity, we compute several criteria for model selection. First, we compute
the well-known Akaike Information criterion (AIC). For a model with C types, the AIC is
defined as:
AIC(C) = −2LL(π1, . . . , πC−1, ζ1, . . . , ζC) + 2nm
where nm denotes the number of estimated parameters. The higher the number of parameters
to be estimated, the larger the penalty included in the criterion. The preferred model is
the one with the minimum AIC value. We also compute the Bayesian information criterion
(BIC):
BIC(C) = −2LL(π1, . . . , πC−1, ζ1, . . . , ζC) + nln(N)
Similarly, the preferred model is the one with the minimum BIC value.







where τic are ex-post probabilities to belong to type c for subject i. If each subject is
unambiguously classified in a given type, then the entropy is equal to 0. On the opposite,
when ex-post probabilities to belong to each type are away from 0 or 1, the entropy is large.
The third criteria, the normalized entropy criterion (NEC) is equal to entropy normalized
by the difference in log-likelihood between a model with C types and the aggregate model:
NEC(C) = E(C)
LL(π1, . . . , πC−1, ζ1, . . . , ζC)− LL(ζ)
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The preferred model is the one with the minimum NEC value.
The fourth criteria is the integrated completed likelihood criterion (ICL). This criteria
corresponds to the BIC criteria with entropy as included as additional penalty term. Like
the NEC, ICL favors C values giving rise to partitioning the data with the greatest evidence.
For C = 1, the NEC criterion is, by definition, not defined and ICL is equal to BIC.
Estimation results. We estimate a series of finite mixture model in the fashion of Bruhin
et al. (2019) to characterize the heterogeneity of preferences in the subject population. We
follow Bruhin et al. (2019) and estimate models with C = 2, 3, 4 types and then compare
these models to the aggregate model without covariates. We use the AIC, BIC, NEC and
ICL criteria to assess the best model(s) in terms of fitting.
Table D.4.3 shows the values of criteria for CES preference functional. According to the
NEC criterion a model with two types performs best. According to the other criteria, the
model with four types is the best model. The latter suggests that heterogeneity in preference
types is substantial. This justifies to investigate heterogeneity more thoughtfully with a
random coefficient model.
Table D.4.3: Model selection criteria for finite mixture model, CES preferences
C AIC BIC NEC ICL
1 26668.18 26681.97 NA 26681.97
2 20147.57 20179.75 0.007 20202.78
3 17922.62 17973.19 0.010 18018.37
4 16950.22 17019.18 0.015 17090.13
Table D.4.4 shows the characterization of CES preference types for C = 2 and C = 4. For
C = 2, two types emerge: a strongly altruistic type with a low personal share parameter
equal to 0.135 and a moderately altruistic type with a high personal share parameter equal
to 0.76. For C = 4, two additional types appear: extremely altruistic with a share parameter
close to zero and Rawlsian type with largely negative r parameter. Both for C = 2 and
C = 4 noise is significantly higher for the most selfish types.
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Table D.4.4: Finite mixture model, parameter estimates and preference parameters, CES
preferences
C=2 C=4
strongly altruistic moderately altruistic Rawls extremely altr. strongly altr. moderately altr.
π 0.609 0.391 0.295 0.207 0.333 0.164
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.016) (0.020) (0.014)
a 0.135 0.756 1 0.036 0.238 0.739
(0.011) (0.021) (0.023) (0.022) (0.011) (0.014)
r -1.522 -1.861 -272.333 -1.648 -1.309 0.145
( 0.102) ( 0.238) (1902.769) ( 0.575) ( 0.091) ( 0.107)
µ 1.662 2.012 2.043 1.062 1.114 1.002
( 0.039) ( 0.075) ( 0.070) ( 0.054) ( 0.040) ( 0.070)
Log-likelihood -10,066.786 NA NA -8,460.111 NA NA
D.4.3 Random coefficient model
We next detail another econometric specification which incorporates observed and unobserved
heterogeneity in a random coefficient model. In a random coefficient model, individual
parameters are the sum of two components. The first component ηXi corresponds to
observed heterogeneity. It is similar to the estimated parameters in the aggregate model
with covariates. The second component corresponds to unobserved heterogeneity. We denote
ψi, the 3× 1 vector representing this second component. Individual parameters are defined
as the sum of observed and unobserved heterogeneity:
θi = g(ηXi + ψi)
We assume ψi follows a multivariate normal distribution independent of the regressors








For each subject i, Pi(θi) = Pi(g(ηXi + ψi)) is the choice probability conditional on η













We use Bayesian hierarchical models to estimate this log-likelihood. Corresponding methods
are described at length in Train (2009).
Estimation results. Table D.4.5 shows the results from the random coefficient model for
the CES preference functional with various sets of covariates. The components of the Ω
matrix are given in a separate Table D.4.6. Table D.4.5 shows the results for parameter
estimates.
Table D.4.7 shows the estimation results with transformation of the estimated parameters.
The share parameter a increases with term, with a maximum attained for clinical studies.
This effect remains stable after controlling for gender, altruism, preferences and personality
measures. Women and altruist-oriented subjects have lower personal share parameter values.
Trust, positive reciprocity and conscientiousness also decrease the estimated value of the
personal share parameter. Compare to the aggregate estimations, risk aversion is no longer
significant in the random coefficient model. The same applies to agreeableness and extraver-
sion. Still, discounting increases the value of a.
Parameter r also tend to increase with term, but with no firm results among the different
estimated models. Estimations show this parameter decrease with gender (being a woman
leading to lower values of r and hence higher elasticity of substitution), altruism, discounting
and risk aversion. The impact of positive reciprocity and negative reciprocity are no longer
significant. On the other hand, trust leads to higher values of r. Noise tend to be lower
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for pre-clinical students and larger for students in practical years. Discounting is found to
increase noise.
Figure D.4.2 shows the typical indifference curves for the different terms based on
preference parameters from model (2). Figure D.4.3 shows the distribution of observed het-
erogeneity implied by the different set of covariates and Figure D.4.4 shows the corresponding
distribution of unobserved heterogeneity.
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Table D.4.5: Random coefficient model, parameter estimates, CES preferences
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
a
Constant −0.784∗∗∗ −1.359∗∗∗ −0.999∗∗∗ 0.027 0.539∗∗ 0.806∗∗
(0.073) (0.139) (0.115) (0.175) (0.213) (0.357)
Pre-clinical 0.678∗∗∗ 0.599∗∗∗ 0.513∗∗∗ 0.434∗∗∗ 0.438∗∗∗
(0.187) (0.156) (0.142) (0.098) (0.146)
Clinical 1.165∗∗∗ 1.127∗∗∗ 0.879∗∗∗ 0.743∗∗∗ 0.695∗∗∗
(0.173) (0.157) (0.143) (0.123) (0.146)
Practical year 0.912∗∗∗ 0.793∗∗∗ 0.684∗∗∗ 0.586∗∗∗ 0.539∗∗∗
(0.229) (0.209) (0.164) (0.176) (0.132)
Female −0.495∗∗∗ −0.257∗∗ −0.175∗ −0.133
(0.102) (0.115) (0.099) (0.107)
General altruism −2.788∗∗∗ −2.291∗∗∗ −2.303∗∗∗
(0.459) (0.334) (0.677)
Risk aversion −0.457 −0.379
(0.281) (0.273)




Negative reciprocity 0.228 −0.115
(0.195) (0.220)













Constant −0.604∗∗∗ −0.694∗∗∗ −0.289∗∗∗ 0.007 −0.008 −0.046
(0.057) (0.090) (0.100) (0.164) (0.219) (0.216)
Pre-clinical −0.033 −0.068 −0.118 −0.017 −0.014
(0.131) (0.131) (0.125) (0.094) (0.128)
Clinical 0.246∗ 0.252 0.152 0.268∗∗∗ 0.264∗
(0.135) (0.165) (0.140) (0.100) (0.141)
Practical year 0.385∗∗ 0.365∗∗ 0.312∗ 0.383∗∗∗ 0.414∗∗∗
(0.176) (0.186) (0.163) (0.137) (0.149)
Female −0.624∗∗∗ −0.508∗∗∗ −0.488∗∗∗ −0.466∗∗∗
(0.102) (0.092) (0.086) (0.108)
General altruism −0.844∗∗∗ −1.093∗∗∗ −1.019∗∗∗
(0.297) (0.324) (0.353)
Risk aversion −0.363∗∗ −0.278
(0.176) (0.229)




Negative reciprocity 0.246 0.331
(0.217) (0.253)













Constant −0.259∗∗∗ −0.191∗∗∗ −0.335∗∗∗ −0.505∗∗∗ −0.634∗∗∗ −0.652∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.054) (0.060) (0.114) (0.112) (0.176)
Pre-clinical −0.007 0.007 0.026 −0.012 −0.001
(0.073) (0.078) (0.080) (0.060) (0.069)
Clinical −0.239∗∗∗ −0.244∗∗∗ −0.208∗∗ −0.266∗∗∗ −0.229∗∗∗
(0.076) (0.091) (0.097) (0.078) (0.078)
Practical year −0.098 −0.091 −0.068 −0.085 −0.140
(0.101) (0.098) (0.097) (0.093) (0.112)
Female 0.221∗∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.065) (0.056) (0.070)
General altruism 0.453∗∗ 0.637∗∗∗ 0.520∗∗∗
(0.210) (0.199) (0.157)
Risk aversion 0.007 −0.098
(0.169) (0.209)




Negative reciprocity −0.088 −0.011
(0.156) (0.153)












N 733 733 733 729 729 705
Log-likelihood -5,562.34 -5,574.82 -5,555.61 -5,518.31 -5,508.63 -5,311.27
Notes. ∗p<0.10; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table D.4.6: Random coefficient model, covariance parameter estimates, CES preferences
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ω[a,a] 2.068
∗∗∗ 1.902∗∗∗ 1.808∗∗∗ 1.529∗∗∗ 1.426∗∗∗ 1.362∗∗∗
(0.205) (0.187) (0.173) (0.156) (0.134) (0.128)
Ω[r,r] 1.370
∗∗∗ 1.382∗∗∗ 1.251∗∗∗ 1.209∗∗∗ 1.119∗∗∗ 1.149∗∗∗
(0.154) (0.164) (0.141) (0.139) (0.122) (0.131)
Ω[µ,µ] 0.365
∗∗∗ 0.359∗∗∗ 0.350∗∗∗ 0.343∗∗∗ 0.324∗∗∗ 0.326∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.043) (0.039) (0.039)
Ω[a,r] 0.488
∗∗∗ 0.466∗∗∗ 0.360∗∗∗ 0.276∗∗∗ 0.301∗∗∗ 0.267∗∗∗
(0.127) (0.122) (0.114) (0.101) (0.090) (0.093)
Ω[a,µ] −0.225
∗∗∗ −0.192∗∗∗ −0.151∗∗ −0.119∗∗ −0.125∗∗ −0.135∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.062) (0.060) (0.054) (0.052) (0.052)
Ω[r,µ] −0.532
∗∗∗ −0.526∗∗∗ −0.470∗∗∗ −0.460∗∗∗ −0.413∗∗∗ −0.421∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.064) (0.060) (0.060) (0.053) (0.057)
N 733 733 733 729 729 705
Log-likelihood -5,562.34 -5,574.82 -5,555.61 -5,518.31 -5,508.63 -5,311.27
Notes. ∗p<0.10; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01























Table D.4.7: Random coefficient model, preference parameters, noise, and marginal effects,
CES preferences
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
a
Constant 0.314∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗ 0.270∗∗∗ 0.507∗∗∗ 0.630∗∗∗ 0.687∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.022) (0.023) (0.043) (0.050) (0.081)
Pre-clinical 0.131∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.035) (0.032) (0.023) (0.031)
Clinical 0.247∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.036) (0.029) (0.028) (0.036)
Pratical year 0.186∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.049) (0.033) (0.036) (0.028)
Female −0.086∗∗∗ −0.064∗∗ −0.041∗ −0.029
(0.017) (0.029) (0.024) (0.024)
General altruism −0.069∗∗∗ −0.054∗∗∗ −0.049∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.008) (0.013)
Risk aversion −0.011 −0.008
(0.007) (0.006)




Negative reciprocity 0.005 −0.002
(0.005) (0.005)













Constant −0.833∗∗∗ −1.009∗∗∗ −0.342∗∗∗ −0.007 −0.033 −0.072
(0.105) (0.182) (0.132) (0.168) (0.237) (0.233)
Pre-clinical −0.024 −0.037 −0.024 −0.002 −0.001
(0.102) (0.073) (0.026) (0.011) (0.014)
Clinical 0.191∗ 0.135 0.029 0.031∗∗ 0.027
(0.109) (0.091) (0.028) (0.014) (0.024)
Practical year 0.295∗ 0.192∗∗ 0.060∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.039
(0.152) (0.097) (0.035) (0.016) (0.025)
Female −0.363∗∗∗ −0.106∗∗∗ −0.061∗∗∗ −0.049
(0.070) (0.026) (0.018) (0.032)
General altruism −0.181∗∗ −0.144∗∗∗ −0.098∗∗∗
(0.073) (0.054) (0.027)
Risk aversion −0.046∗ −0.028
(0.026) (0.022)




Negative reciprocity 0.029 0.030
(0.026) (0.026)













Constant 0.772∗∗∗ 0.827∗∗∗ 0.717∗∗∗ 0.607∗∗∗ 0.534∗∗∗ 0.529∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.044) (0.043) (0.068) (0.061) (0.098)
Pre-clinical −0.0002 0.001 0.005 −0.004 0.001
(0.004) (0.006) (0.017) (0.022) (0.036)
Clinical −0.012∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗ −0.043∗ −0.091∗∗∗ −0.102∗∗
(0.004) (0.006) (0.022) (0.034) (0.041)
Practical year −0.005 −0.006 −0.014 −0.030 −0.060
(0.005) (0.007) (0.021) (0.034) (0.054)
Female 0.017∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗
(0.005) (0.016) (0.023) (0.047)
General altruism 0.100∗ 0.248∗∗ 0.273∗∗
(0.052) (0.099) (0.135)
Risk aversion 0.003 −0.037
(0.064) (0.091)




Negative reciprocity −0.028 −0.006
(0.051) (0.073)












N 733 733 733 729 729 705
Log-likelihood -5,562.34 -5,574.82 -5,555.61 -5,518.31 -5,508.63 -5,311.27
Notes. ∗p<0.10; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Figure D.4.3: Distributions of parameters a, r and noise based on observed heterogeneity
for the random coefficient model with different sets of covariates, CES preferences
a r noise




















































Figure D.4.4: Distributions of parameters a, r and noise based on unobserved heterogeneity
for the random coefficient model with different sets of covariates, CES preferences
a r noise






















































A last alternative to account for individual heterogeneity is to estimate the preference and
noise parameters for each individual separately. For individual estimations, the individual
log-likelihood ln(Pi(θi, µi) is maximized with respect to θi and µi for each subject i. Because
individual estimations might depends on initial values of parameters (Bruhin et al., 2019),
for each individual estimation we run a series of 33 estimations with different starting values.
The set of starting values is constructed as a grid of all combinations of a = {0.1, 0.5, 0.9},
r = {−10,−2, 0.5} and µ = {0.5, 2, 5} for the CES preferences. The individual estimates
corresponding the best fitting parameter estimates out of the 33 possible values. When
convergence is not attained, all parameter estimates at the subject level are treated as missing.
Estimation results. Table D.4.8 shows the results of the individual estimations for
the CES preferences. Table D.4.8 reports the descriptive statistics for the parameter es-
timates (Column 1) and the preference estimates transformed back to their original scale
(Column 2).
Table D.4.8: Individual results: descriptive statistics, median and interquartile range, CES
preferences
Parameter estimates Preference parameters
a -0.61 0.352
Q1-Q3 -1.473 - 0.045 0.186 - 0.511
r -0.809 -1.245
Q1-Q3 -1.656 - 0.044 -4.239 - 0.043
µ -0.462 0.63
Q1-Q3 -1.443 - 0.06 0.236 - 1.062
Log-likelihood -7.763
Q1-Q3 -11.448 - -4.225
N 610
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D.4.5 Estimation results for all subjects
We next report the estimation results for all subjects including our control group of non-
medical students for direction of our econometric model. First, we account for observed
heterogeneity in the aggregate estimation. Second, we account for both observed and unob-
served heterogeneity in a random coefficient model. In what follows, we use cohorts instead
of study progress to include non-medical students. The cohorts match study progress in
the following way: the first cohort corresponds to freshmen (reference category), the second
cohort corresponds to pre-clinical phase, the third cohort corresponds to clinical phase and
fourth cohort corresponds to practical year.
Estimation results of aggregate estimation. Table D.4.9 shows the result of the
aggregate estimations for the CES preference functional with various sets of covariates with
standard errors clustered at the individual subject level. Figure D.4.5 shows the typical
indifference curves for medical and non-medical students based on parameter estimates from
Model (2).
Figure D.4.5: Indifference curves for medical and non medical students for aggregate
estimation, CES preferences
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Table D.4.9: Aggregate estimations, parameter estimates for medical and non-medical
students, CES preferences
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
a
Constant −0.536∗∗∗ −1.397∗∗∗ −0.774∗∗∗ 0.086 0.779∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.154) (0.148) (0.188) (0.347)
2nd cohort 0.895∗∗∗ 0.582∗∗∗ 0.682∗∗∗ 0.576∗∗∗
(0.191) (0.179) (0.176) (0.175)
3rd cohort 1.232∗∗∗ 0.961∗∗∗ 0.932∗∗∗ 0.726∗∗∗
(0.199) (0.181) (0.178) (0.181)
4th cohort 1.079∗∗∗ 0.659∗∗∗ 0.792∗∗∗ 0.576∗∗∗
(0.209) (0.256) (0.234) (0.303)
Female −0.733∗∗∗ −0.330∗∗∗ −0.264∗∗∗
(0.161) (0.120) (0.123)












Non-medical students 0.894∗∗∗ 0.923∗∗∗ 0.844∗∗∗ 0.778∗∗∗
(0.227) (0.178) (0.193) (0.186)
r
Constant −0.670∗∗∗ −0.844∗∗∗ −0.318∗∗∗ −0.330∗∗∗ −0.393∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.066) (0.132) (0.138) (0.250)
2nd cohort 0.201∗∗∗ −0.010 0.131∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗
(0.133) (0.146) (0.118) (0.127)
3rd cohort 0.121 −0.111 0.136∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗
(0.224) (0.283) (0.143) (0.145)
4th cohort 0.433∗∗∗ 0.007 0.194∗∗∗ 0.051
(0.180) (0.239) (0.199) (0.303)
Female −0.620∗∗∗ −0.358∗∗∗ −0.346∗∗∗
(0.141) (0.104) (0.117)












Non-medical students −0.203∗∗ 0.046 −0.100 −0.047
(0.289) (0.237) (0.263) (0.256)
µ
Constant 1.008∗∗∗ 0.938∗∗∗ 0.788∗∗∗ 0.777∗∗∗ 0.597∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.055) (0.098) (0.125) (0.233)
2nd cohort −0.079 0.042 −0.099∗∗ −0.098∗∗
(0.103) (0.111) (0.093) (0.100)
3rd cohort 0.068 0.211∗∗∗ 0.016 −0.007
(0.149) (0.162) (0.119) (0.118)
4th cohort 0.0003 0.245∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗ 0.310∗∗∗
(0.158) (0.194) (0.183) (0.220)
Female 0.070∗ −0.055 −0.014
(0.109) (0.090) (0.088)












Non-medical students 0.179∗∗∗ 0.061 0.204∗∗∗ 0.248∗∗∗
(0.157) (0.162) (0.154) (0.153)
N 878 878 878 873 873
Log-likelihood -16,279.32 -15,661.38 -15,486.70 -14,981.08 -14,620.35
Notes. ∗p<0.10; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
214
Table D.4.10 shows the estimation results when estimated parameters are transformed back
to the original scale. The personal share parameter a increases with term, with a maximum
attained for the second term category. This effect remains stable after controling for gender,
altruism, preferences and personnality measures. Women and altruist-oriented subjects have
lower personal share parameter values while non medical student have high higher share
parameter a (for oneself). Risk aversion, trust, positive reciprocity decrease the estimated
value of the personal share parameter. On the other hand, discounting increases the value
of a.
Parameter r also tend to increase with term, but with no firm results among the different
regression. Estimations shows this parameter decreases with gender (being a woman leading
to lower values of r), altruism, discounting, positive reciprocity and risk aversion. No stable
effect is associated with non-medical students. On the other hand, trust and negative
reciprocity lead to higher values of r, i.e. to lower values of the elasticity of substitution.
Noise tends to be larger for the fourth cohort. Positive reciprocity, altruism and discounting
are found to increase noise. Non-medical students also display a higher level of noise.
Figure D.4.6 shows the distribution of observed heterogeneity implied by the different set of
covariates.
Estimation results of random coefficient model. Table D.4.11 shows the result from
the random coefficient model for the CES preference functional with various sets of covariates.
The components of the Ω matrix are given in table D.4.12. Table D.4.13 shows the estimation
results when estimated parameters are transformed back to the original scale. The personal
share parameter a increases with term, with a maximum attained for the third cohort. This
effect remains stable after controlling for gender, altruism and preferences. Women and
altruist-oriented subjects have lower personal share parameter values. Trust, risk aversion
and positive reciprocity also decrease the estimated value of the personal share parameter.
Compared to the aggregate estimation risk aversion is significant and discounting is no
longer significant. Non-medical students have higher value of the personal share parameter.
Parameter r also tend to increase with term for the third and fourth cohort. Estimations
show this parameter decreases with gender (being a woman leading to lower values of r),
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altruism, discounting and risk aversion. The impact of positive reciprocity and negative
reciprocity are no longer significant. On the other hand, trust lead to higher values of r. No
systematic impact is associated with non-medical students on r. Noise tend to be lower for
the third cohort. Discounting and gender (being a women) are found to increase noise. No
systematic impact is associated with non-medical students on noise parameter.
Figure D.4.7 shows the typical indifference curves for medical and non-medical students
based on parameter estimates for Model (2).
Figure D.4.6: Distributions of parameters a, r and noise for the aggregate model with
different sets of covariates for medical and non medical students, CES preferences
a r noise









































Table D.4.10: Aggregate estimations, preference parameters, noise, and marginal effects for
medical and non-medical students, CES preferences
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
a
Constant 0.369∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗ 0.316∗∗∗ 0.522 0.685∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.025) (0.032) (0.047) (0.075)
2nd cohort 0.179∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.041) (0.043) (0.041)
3rd cohort 0.261∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗ 0.213∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.042) (0.042) (0.043)
4th cohort 0.223∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.061) (0.053) (0.056)
Female −0.134∗∗∗ −0.082∗∗∗ −0.059∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.029) (0.029)












Non-medical students 0.179∗∗∗ 0.222∗∗∗ 0.196∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.043) (0.041) (0.039)
r
Constant −0.955∗∗∗ −1.326∗∗∗ −0.374∗∗∗ −0.391∗∗∗ −0.482∗∗∗
(0.100) (0.154) (0.181) (0.192) (0.370)
2nd cohort 0.424∗∗∗ −0.013 0.171∗∗∗ 0.245∗∗∗
(0.270) (0.202) (0.160) (0.191)
3rd cohort 0.266 −0.161 0.177∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗
(0.461) (0.427) (0.188) (0.207)
4th cohort 0.817∗∗∗ 0.009 0.245∗∗∗ 0.074
(0.297) (0.327) (0.243) (0.429)
Female −1.179∗∗∗ −0.599∗∗∗ −0.612∗∗∗
(0.253) (0.201) (0.275)












Non-medical students −0.524∗∗ 0.062 −0.146 −0.071
(0.817) (0.312) (0.401) (0.394)
µ
Constant 2.739∗∗∗ 2.554∗∗∗ 2.199∗∗∗ 2.175∗∗∗ 1.816∗∗∗
(0.094) (0.140) (0.215) (0.271) (0.424)
2nd cohort −0.195 0.094 −0.205∗∗ −0.170∗∗
(0.249) (0.249) (0.199) (0.183)
3rd cohort 0.180 0.516∗∗∗ 0.035 −0.013
(0.406) (0.430) (0.261) (0.214)
4th cohort 0.001 0.611∗∗∗ 0.308∗∗ 0.661∗∗∗
(0.403) (0.517) (0.441) (0.531)
Female 0.159∗ −0.117 −0.026
(0.244) (0.191) (0.159)












Non-medical students 0.501∗∗∗ 0.138 0.491∗∗∗ 0.511∗∗∗
(0.470) (0.376) (0.405) (0.377)
N 878 878 878 873 873
Log-likelihood -16,279.32 -15,661.38 -15,486.70 -14,981.08 -14,620.35
Notes. ∗p<0.10; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table D.4.11: Random coefficient model, parameter estimates for medical and non medical
students, CES preferences
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
a
Constant −0.673∗∗∗ −1.317∗∗∗ −1.017∗∗∗ 0.036 0.424
(0.068) (0.091) (0.162) (0.138) (0.374)
2nd cohort 0.623∗∗∗ 0.665∗∗∗ 0.572∗∗∗ 0.456∗∗∗
(0.123) (0.174) (0.135) (0.119)
3rd cohort 1.012∗∗∗ 1.112∗∗∗ 0.908∗∗∗ 0.757∗∗∗
(0.111) (0.198) (0.115) (0.097)
4th cohort 0.891∗∗∗ 0.925∗∗∗ 0.742∗∗∗ 0.614∗∗∗
(0.171) (0.251) (0.178) (0.149)
Female −0.552∗∗∗ −0.314∗∗∗ −0.310∗∗∗
(0.109) (0.115) (0.093)












Non-medical students 0.714∗∗∗ 0.711∗∗∗ 0.748∗∗∗ 0.636∗∗∗
(0.133) (0.142) (0.153) (0.117)
r
Constant −0.587∗∗∗ −0.732∗∗∗ −0.278∗∗∗ −0.020 −0.310
(0.053) (0.085) (0.102) (0.150) (0.329)
2nd cohort 0.019 −0.023 −0.062 0.036
(0.125) (0.107) (0.119) (0.114)
3rd cohort 0.281∗∗ 0.283∗∗ 0.243∗ 0.339∗∗∗
(0.116) (0.129) (0.141) (0.131)
4th cohort 0.410∗∗ 0.450∗∗∗ 0.341∗∗ 0.496∗∗∗
(0.187) (0.147) (0.171) (0.136)
Female −0.713∗∗∗ −0.544∗∗∗ −0.547∗∗∗
(0.094) (0.088) (0.101)












Non-medical students 0.178 0.175 0.247∗ 0.321∗
(0.122) (0.137) (0.149) (0.166)
µ
Constant −0.262∗∗∗ −0.177∗∗∗ −0.331∗∗∗ −0.513∗∗∗ −0.483∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.047) (0.062) (0.079) (0.173)
2nd cohort −0.020 −0.003 0.020 −0.022
(0.066) (0.071) (0.064) (0.064)
3rd cohort −0.256∗∗∗ −0.256∗∗∗ −0.238∗∗∗ −0.302∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.075) (0.076) (0.077)
4th cohort −0.116 −0.137 −0.066 −0.162∗
(0.104) (0.103) (0.096) (0.084)
Female 0.248∗∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.055) (0.052)












Non-medical students −0.007 −0.006 −0.010 −0.045
(0.075) (0.075) (0.080) (0.082)
N 878 878 878 873 873
Log-likelihood -6,615.2 -6,631.76 -6,624.59 -6,582.66 -6,578.67
Notes. ∗p<0.10; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table D.4.12: Random coefficient model, covariance parameter estimates for medical and
non medical students, CES preferences
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ω[a,a] 2.326
∗∗∗ 2.045∗∗∗ 1.977∗∗∗ 1.727∗∗∗ 1.624∗∗∗
(0.211) (0.180) (0.179) (0.152) (0.145)
Ω[r,r] 1.471
∗∗∗ 1.445∗∗∗ 1.332∗∗∗ 1.303∗∗∗ 1.245∗∗∗
(0.145) (0.148) (0.147) (0.138) (0.128)
Ω[µ,µ] 0.368
∗∗∗ 0.358∗∗∗ 0.344∗∗∗ 0.337∗∗∗ 0.316∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.038) (0.037) (0.035) (0.036)
Ω[a,r] 0.548
∗∗∗ 0.481∗∗∗ 0.373∗∗∗ 0.300∗∗∗ 0.332∗∗∗
(0.127) (0.112) (0.110) (0.095) (0.097)
Ω[a,µ] −0.228
∗∗∗ −0.187∗∗∗ −0.143∗∗∗ −0.111∗∗ −0.127∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.060) (0.055) (0.050) (0.047)
Ω[r,µ] −0.544
∗∗∗ −0.528∗∗∗ −0.474∗∗∗ −0.466∗∗∗ −0.432∗∗∗
(0.059) (0.058) (0.055) (0.055) (0.054)
N 878 878 878 873 873
Log-likelihood -6,615.2 -6,631.76 -6,624.59 -6,582.66 -6,578.67
Notes. ∗p<0.10; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Figure D.4.7: Indifference curves for medical and non medical students based on random
coefficient model, CES preferences
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Table D.4.13: Random coefficient model, preference parameters, noise, and marginal effects
for medical and non medical students, CES preferences
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
a
Constant 0.338∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗ 0.267∗∗∗ 0.509∗∗∗ 0.601∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.032) (0.034) (0.086)
2nd cohort 0.122∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.037) (0.031) (0.024)
3rd cohort 0.213∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.043) (0.027) (0.027)
4th cohort 0.184∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.057) (0.038) (0.031)
Female −0.093∗∗∗ −0.077∗∗∗ −0.074∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.028) (0.024)












Non-medical students 0.143∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.033) (0.032) (0.027)
r
Constant −0.802∗∗∗ −1.087∗∗∗ −0.328∗∗ −0.032 −0.439
(0.095) (0.177) (0.135) (0.152) (0.477)
2nd cohort 0.015 −0.011 −0.011 0.006
(0.092) (0.061) (0.023) (0.017)
3rd cohort 0.206∗∗ 0.154∗∗ 0.047 0.047∗
(0.087) (0.075) (0.028) (0.025)
4th cohort 0.297∗∗ 0.242∗∗∗ 0.064∗ 0.065∗∗
(0.140) (0.088) (0.033) (0.027)
Female −0.428∗∗∗ −0.111∗∗∗ −0.080∗∗∗
(0.080) (0.020) (0.029)












Non-medical students 0.130 0.095 0.046 0.040∗
(0.089) (0.075) (0.028) (0.021)
µ
Constant 0.770∗∗∗ 0.839∗∗∗ 0.720∗∗∗ 0.601∗∗∗ 0.627∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.040) (0.045) (0.048) (0.112)
2nd cohort −0.001 −0.00004 0.005 −0.006
(0.004) (0.005) (0.014) (0.023)
3rd cohort −0.013∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗∗ −0.048∗∗∗ −0.095∗∗
(0.003) (0.006) (0.016) (0.043)
4th cohort −0.006 −0.010 −0.013 −0.053
(0.005) (0.008) (0.020) (0.039)
Female 0.019∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.062∗
(0.006) (0.014) (0.034)












Non-medical students −0.0004 −0.0004 −0.002 −0.018
(0.004) (0.006) (0.017) (0.030)
N 878 878 878 873 873
Log-likelihood -6,615.2 -6,631.76 -6,624.59 -6,582.66 -6,578.67
Notes. ∗p<0.10; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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D.5 Alternative behavioral model: Fehr and Schmidt (1999)
D.5.1 Fehr and Schmidt parametric form for the utility function
For an alternative variant for the utility function ui, we now consider a Fehr and Schmidt
parametric form defined as:
ui(s, o, αi, βi) = s− αimax(o− s, 0)− βimax(s− o, 0)
where αi represents the penalty implied by the difference between other and self and βi
represents the penalty implied by the difference between self and other, for participant i.
αi > 0 corresponds to aversion to disadvantageneous inequality (and αi < 0 corresponds to
a taste to disadvantageneous inequality, being behindness averse), βi > 0 corresponds to
aversion to advantageneous inequality (aheadness aversion).
For the sake of notational simplicity, we denote θi = (αi, βi, µi) for the Fehr-Schmidt
preference functional. Similarly to the estimation procedure for the CES preference functional
form, the estimation procedure for the Fehr-Schmidt preference functional form accounts for
parameter constraints on noise with an exponential transformation (µi = gµ(ζµi ) = exp(ζ
µ
i ))
of the parameter value to guarantee the noise parameter is positive. Contrary to the CES
preference function, no theoretical restrictions are put on the parameters αi and βi for the
Fehr-Schmidt preference functional and transformation functions correspond to the identity
function id() on R. In vector notation, for the Fehr-Schmidt preference functional, θi = g(ζi)
with ζi = (αi, βi, ζµi ) and g() = (id(), id(), gµ()).
The regression tables report both the regression coefficients ζi and the value of the transformed
regression coefficients in noise ,i.e. when regression coefficients are transformed back to the
original scale.
D.5.2 Aggregate estimation results for Fehr and Schmidt preferences
Table D.5.1 shows the estimation results with transformation of the estimated parameters
into preference parameters, noise, and marginal effects. The base value of parameter α in
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Model (1) shows a taste for disadvantagenous inequality. Aversion to disadvantagenous
inequality increases with term, with a maximum attained for clinical studies. This effect
remains stable after controling for gender, altruism, preferences and personality measures.
Altruist-oriented subjects display a lower aversion to disadvantagenous inequality (or higher
taste for disadvantagenous inequality). The same hold for trust, positive and negative
reciprocity. On the other hand, gender and discounting are associated to higher aversion to
disadvantagenous inequality. The base Model (1) shows a high aversion to advantagenous
inequality, as measure by parameter β. Parameter β decreases with term, with a minimum
attained for clinical studies. On the opposite, gender and altruism increase aversion to
advantagenous inequality. The same applies for risk aversion, discounting and positive
reciprocity. Noise tends to be lower for pre-clinical students. Positive reciprocity and
discounting is found to increase noise.
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Table D.5.1: Aggregate estimations, preference parameters, noise, and marginal effects, Fehr
and Schmidt preferences
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
α
Constant −0.260∗∗∗ −0.346∗∗∗ −0.388∗∗∗ −0.264∗∗∗ −0.092∗∗∗ −0.105∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.024) (0.028) (0.041) (0.090) (0.093)
Pre-clinical 0.108∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.032) (0.033)
Clinical 0.164∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.039) (0.037) (0.040) (0.041)
Practical Year 0.103∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.051) (0.056) (0.071) (0.075)
Female 0.068∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030)
General altruism −0.033∗∗∗ −0.019∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
Risk aversion −0.006 −0.009∗∗
(0.010) (0.011)




Negative reciprocity −0.011∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗
(0.010) (0.010)













Constant 0.970∗∗∗ 1.105∗∗∗ 0.954∗∗∗ 0.687∗∗∗ 0.557∗∗∗ 0.493∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.042) (0.044) (0.060) (0.112) (0.137)
Pre-clinical −0.167∗∗∗ −0.142∗∗∗ −0.114∗∗∗ −0.093∗∗∗ −0.108∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.052) (0.055) (0.055) (0.064)
Clinical −0.230∗∗∗ −0.223∗∗∗ −0.184∗∗∗ −0.168∗∗∗ −0.192∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.052) (0.055) (0.057) (0.064)
Practical Year −0.196∗∗∗ −0.138∗∗∗ −0.122∗∗∗ −0.050 −0.060
(0.067) (0.075) (0.087) (0.109) (0.119)
Female 0.250∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.041) (0.040) (0.052)
General altruism 0.081∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
Risk aversion 0.020∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗
(0.015) (0.018)




Negative reciprocity −0.011∗∗ −0.008
(0.016) (0.018)













Constant 2.554∗∗∗ 2.714∗∗∗ 2.342∗∗∗ 1.846∗∗∗ 1.714∗∗∗ 1.578∗∗∗
(0.098) (0.178) (0.213) (0.292) (0.511) (0.535)
Pre-clinical −0.478∗∗∗ −0.316∗∗ −0.200∗∗ −0.149∗ −0.228∗∗∗
(0.234) (0.238) (0.224) (0.210) (0.213)
Clinical −0.282 −0.181 −0.142 −0.163∗ −0.206∗∗
(0.272) (0.272) (0.259) (0.257) (0.255)
Practical Year −0.015 0.332 0.310∗ 0.750∗∗∗ 0.624∗∗∗
(0.348) (0.465) (0.473) (0.665) (0.648)
Female 0.493∗∗∗ 0.147∗ 0.164∗∗ 0.189∗∗∗
(0.292) (0.213) (0.196) (0.225)
General altruism 0.129∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.063) (0.065)
Risk aversion −0.006 −0.027
(0.062) (0.069)




Negative reciprocity −0.044∗∗ −0.019
(0.069) (0.069)












N 733 733 733 729 729 729
Log-likelihood -13,148.31 -12,815.62 -12,685.95 -12,176.39 -1,1797.29 -11,764.14
Notes. ∗p<0.10; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
D.5.3 Random coefficient model for Fehr and Schmidt preferences
Table D.5.2: Random coefficient model, covariance parameter estimates, Fehr and Schmidt
preferences
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ω[a,a] 0.127
∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009)
Ω[r,r] 0.272
∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗ 0.234∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗ 0.204∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.027) (0.025) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Ω[µ,µ] 0.530
∗∗∗ 0.536∗∗∗ 0.516∗∗∗ 0.505∗∗∗ 0.461∗∗∗ 0.465∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.065) (0.063) (0.062) (0.057) (0.058)
Ω[a,r] −0.044
∗∗∗ −0.037∗∗∗ −0.040∗∗∗ −0.031∗∗∗ −0.028∗∗∗ −0.028∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
Ω[a,µ] 0.124
∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.016) (0.016)
Ω[r,µ] 0.113
∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.026) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.024)
N 733 733 733 729 729 705
Log-likelihood -4,755.7 -4,755.29 -4,757.09 -4,738.65 -4,743.42 -4,565.67
Notes. ∗p<0.10; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table D.5.3 shows the estimation results with transformation of the estimated parameters.
The base value of parameter α shows a taste for disadvantagenous inequality. Aversion
to disadvantagenous inequality increases with term, with a maximum attained for clinical
studies. This effect remains stable after controling for gender, altruism, but vanish when
controling for preferences and personnality measures for clinical and practical. Altruist-
oriented subjects have lower aversion to disadvantagenous inequality (or higher taste for
disadvantagenous inequality). The same hold for trust, positive reciprocity. Negative
reciprocity is no longer significant. On the other hand, gender and discounting are associated
to higher aversion to disadvantagenous inequality.
Parameter β decreases with term, with a minimum attains for clinical studies. On
the opposite, gender, altruism, risk aversion and positive reciprocity increase aversion to
advantagenous inequality. The impact of negative reciprocity is no longer significant. Noise
tends to be lower for pre-clinical students. Gender, altruism, positive reciprocity and
discounting are found to increase noise.
Figure D.5.1 shows the distribution of observed heterogeneity implied by the different
set of covariates and Figure D.5.2 shows the corresponding distribution of unobserved
heterogeneity.
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Table D.5.3: Random coefficient model, preference parameters, Fehr and Schmidt preferences
Model: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
α
Constant −0.249∗∗∗ −0.338∗∗∗ −0.363∗∗∗ −0.214∗∗∗ −0.060 −0.085∗
(0.015) (0.023) (0.026) (0.040) (0.067) (0.045)
Pre-clinical 0.134∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.031) (0.034) (0.025) (0.034)
Clinical 0.164∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗ 0.063∗
(0.036) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.037)
Practical year 0.113∗∗ 0.084∗ 0.066 0.053 0.041
(0.048) (0.047) (0.046) (0.038) (0.048)
Female 0.064∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.029) (0.028) (0.026)
General altruism −0.417∗∗∗ −0.199∗∗∗ −0.203∗∗∗
(0.083) (0.059) (0.073)
Risk aversion 0.025 0.042
(0.078) (0.072)




Negative reciprocity −0.060 −0.087
(0.072) (0.072)













Constant 1.098∗∗∗ 1.271∗∗∗ 1.127∗∗∗ 0.761∗∗∗ 0.711∗∗∗ 0.707∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.041) (0.048) (0.049) (0.090) (0.166)
Pre-clinical −0.188∗∗∗ −0.196∗∗∗ −0.154∗∗∗ −0.150∗∗∗ −0.144∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.046) (0.042) (0.048) (0.039)
Clinical −0.377∗∗∗ −0.376∗∗∗ −0.318∗∗∗ −0.313∗∗∗ −0.297∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.051) (0.045) (0.052) (0.062)
Practical year −0.280∗∗∗ −0.308∗∗∗ −0.239∗∗∗ −0.280∗∗∗ −0.259∗∗∗
(0.083) (0.078) (0.076) (0.053) (0.084)
Female 0.247∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.044) (0.047) (0.042)
General altruism 0.936∗∗∗ 0.795∗∗∗ 0.601∗∗∗
(0.128) (0.136) (0.190)
Risk aversion 0.229∗∗∗ 0.167∗
(0.080) (0.089)




Negative reciprocity −0.124 0.012
(0.076) (0.141)













Constant 0.868∗∗∗ 0.888∗∗∗ 0.804∗∗∗ 0.677∗∗∗ 0.862∗∗∗ 0.661∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.056) (0.067) (0.047) (0.115) (0.098)
Pre-clinical 0.012 0.004 0.014 −0.002 0.020
(0.013) (0.010) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014)
Clinical −0.025∗∗ −0.031∗∗ −0.028∗∗ −0.057∗∗∗ −0.036∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.018) (0.012)
Practical year −0.012 −0.024 −0.023 −0.035∗∗∗ −0.007
(0.015) (0.020) (0.018) (0.011) (0.013)
Female 0.032∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗
(0.009) (0.012) (0.014) (0.016)
General altruism 0.055∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗
(0.020) (0.040) (0.023)
Risk aversion −0.020 −0.034∗∗
(0.023) (0.017)




Negative reciprocity −0.021 −0.012
(0.018) (0.011)












N 733 733 733 729 729 705
Log-likelihood -4,755.7 -4,755.29 -4,757.09 -4,738.65 -4,743.42 -4,565.67
Notes. ∗p<0.10; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Figure D.5.1: Distributions of parameters a, r and noise based on observed heterogeneity for
the random coefficient model with different sets of covariates, Fehr and Schmidt preferences
alpha beta noise





















































Figure D.5.2: Distributions of parameters a, r and noise based on unobserved heterogeneity
for the random coefficient model with different sets of covariates, Fehr and Schmidt preferences
alpha beta noise




















































D.6 Estimation results for patient-regarding altruism, specialty choices,
and income expectations
Tables D.6.1 shows the estimation results for aggregate estimations and Table D.6.2 shows
the result from the random coefficient model including medical students’ expectations on
their future income, as reported in the main text. The components of the Ω matrix are
given in a separate Table D.6.3.
Table D.6.4 shows the most preferred stated specialty choices crossed with study cohorts.
Table D.6.5 shows the estimation results for aggregate estimations and Table D.6.6 shows
the result from the random coefficient model including the four most preferred specialities,
as reported in the main text. The components of the Ω matrix are given in a separate Table
D.6.7. Figure D.6.1 shows the typical indifference curves for the different specialty choice
based on preference parameters from Model (1).
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Table D.6.1: Aggregate estimations including income expectations, preference parameters a
and r, marginal effects, CES preferences
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
a
Constant 0.266∗∗∗ 0.336∗∗∗ 0.250∗∗∗ 0.798∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.030) (0.034) (0.112)
Expected income 0.139∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗





Practical year 0.110∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗
(0.103) (0.055)

























Constant −1.215∗∗∗ −0.512∗∗∗ −0.499∗∗∗ 0.081
(0.124) (0.142) (0.210) (0.393)
Expected income 0.485∗∗∗ 0.273∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗ 0.040





Practical year −0.348 0.183∗∗∗
(0.769) (0.245)

























Constant 2.548∗∗∗ 2.390∗∗∗ 2.088∗∗∗ 1.441∗∗∗
(0.121) (0.169) (0.216) (0.371)
Expected income 0.001 −0.035 0.055 0.201∗∗∗





Practical year 1.042∗∗∗ 0.151
(0.779) (0.372)
























N 693 693 693 693
Log-likelihood -12,467.94 -12,384.92 -12,048.49 -11,276.86
Notes. ∗p<0.10; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table D.6.2: Random coefficient model including income expectations, preference parameters
a and r, marginal effects, CES preferences
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
a
Constant 0.268∗∗∗ 0.316∗∗∗ 0.220∗∗∗ 0.618∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.033) (0.031) (0.085)
Expected income 0.018∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗





Practical year 0.205∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.045)

























Constant −1.024∗∗∗ −0.368∗∗∗ −0.597∗∗∗ −0.105
(0.166) (0.138) (0.148) (0.244)
Expected income 0.102 0.049 0.115 0.024





Practical year 0.294∗∗ 0.056∗
(0.128) (0.030)

























Constant 0.775∗∗∗ 0.668∗∗∗ 0.742∗∗∗ 0.587∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.042) (0.048) (0.116)
Expected income −0.002 −0.0001 −0.001 −0.006





Practical year −0.008 −0.051
(0.006) (0.034)
























N 693 693 693 693
Log-likelihood -5,235.95 -5,230.15 -5,227.93 -5,216.73
Notes. ∗p<0.10; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table D.6.3: Random coefficient model including income expectations, covariance parameter
estimates, CES preferences
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Ω[a,a] 1.964
∗∗∗ 1.921∗∗∗ 1.726∗∗∗ 1.360∗∗∗
(0.199) (0.191) (0.174) (0.135)
Ω[r,r] 1.397
∗∗∗ 1.255∗∗∗ 1.233∗∗∗ 1.155∗∗∗
(0.166) (0.150) (0.149) (0.138)
Ω[µ,µ] 0.373
∗∗∗ 0.358∗∗∗ 0.343∗∗∗ 0.332∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041)
Ω[a,r] 0.453
∗∗∗ 0.363∗∗∗ 0.329∗∗∗ 0.281∗∗∗
(0.136) (0.118) (0.110) (0.089)
Ω[a,µ] −0.237
∗∗∗ −0.191∗∗∗ −0.151∗∗∗ −0.133∗∗
(0.070) (0.067) (0.057) (0.056)
Ω[r,µ] −0.546
∗∗∗ −0.485∗∗∗ −0.463∗∗∗ −0.425∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.063) (0.064) (0.061)
N 693 693 693 693
Log-likelihood -5,235.95 -5,230.15 -5,227.93 -5,216.73
Notes. ∗p<0.10; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table D.6.4: Descriptive statistics on stated specialty choice
Freshman Pre-clincial Clinical Practical Year Overall
Surgery 75 (29.0%) 42 (17.9%) 15 (9.5%) 5 (6.2%) 137 (18.7%)
Internal medicine 25 (9.7%) 34 (14.5%) 30 (19.0%) 21 (25.9%) 110 (15.0%)
Pediatrics 37 (14.3%) 29 (12.3%) 22 (13.9%) 9 (11.1%) 97 (13.2%)
Neurology/psychiatry 34 (13.1%) 32 (13.6%) 13 (8.2%) 5 (6.2%) 84 (11.5%)
Anesthesia 12 (4.6%) 15 (6.4%) 15 (9.5%) 8 (9.9%) 50 (6.8%)
Others 22 (8.5%) 23 (9.8%) 9 (5.7%) 5 (6.2%) 59 (8.1%)
Orthopedics 16 (6.2%) 15 (6.4%) 17 (10.8%) 2 (2.5%) 50 (6.8%)
General medicine 11 (4.2%) 18 (7.7%) 11 (7.0%) 6 (7.4%) 46 (6.3%)
Gynecology 9 (3.5%) 7 (3.0%) 5 (3.2%) 5 (6.2%) 26 (3.5%)
Radiology/nuclear medicine 8 (3.1%) 3 (1.3%) 1 (0.6%) 6 (7.4%) 18 (2.5%)
Ophthalmology 0 (0.0%) 2 (0.9%) 7 (4.4%) 3 (3.7%) 12 (1.6%)
Dermatology 2 (0.8%) 2 (0.9%) 5 (3.2%) 3 (3.7%) 12 (1.6%)
Forensic medicine 3 (1.2%) 4 (1.7%) 2 (1.3%) 1 (1.2%) 10 (1.4%)
Otorhinolaryngology 2 (0.8%) 3 (1.3%) 3 (1.9%) 0 (0.0%) 8 (1.1%)
Urology 1 (0.4%) 3 (1.3%) 2 (1.3%) 2 (2.5%) 8 (1.1%)
Dentistry and maxillary Surgery 0 (0.0%) 2 (0.9%) 1 (0.6%) 0 (0.0%) 3 (0.4%)
Laboratory medicine 2 (0.8%) 1 (0.4%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 3 (0.4%)
N 259 (100%) 235 (100%) 158 (100%) 81 (100%) 733 (100%)
Notes. This table shows the most preferred stated specialty choices crossed with study cohorts. Specialties sorted in
descending order.
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Table D.6.5: Aggregate estimations including specialty choice, preference parameters, noise,
and marginal effects, CES preferences
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
a
Constant 0.401∗∗∗ 0.448∗∗∗ 0.323∗∗∗ 0.757∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.029) (0.062) (0.124)
Surgery −0.120∗∗∗ −0.076∗∗∗ −0.025∗∗ −0.027∗∗
(0.039) (0.054) (0.041) (0.050)
Internal Medicine −0.070∗∗∗ −0.007 −0.029∗∗ −0.010
(0.045) (0.049) (0.047) (0.031)
Pediatrics −0.138∗∗∗ −0.047∗∗∗ −0.034∗∗ −0.032∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.059) (0.061) (0.041)
Neurology/Psychiatry −0.103∗∗∗ −0.071∗∗∗ −0.031∗∗ −0.020∗





Practical year 0.121∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗
(0.122) (0.071)

























Constant −0.820∗∗∗ −0.492∗∗∗ −0.581∗∗∗ −0.462∗∗∗
(0.155) (0.178) (0.356) (0.613)
Surgery −0.311 0.131 0.195∗∗ 0.069
(0.228) (0.291) (0.220) (0.215)
Internal Medicine −0.284 0.253∗∗∗ 0.189∗ 0.201∗∗∗
(0.289) (0.268) (0.294) (0.187)
Pediatrics −0.219 0.395∗∗∗ 0.422∗∗∗ 0.298∗∗∗
(0.266) (0.272) (0.269) (0.267)
Neurology/Psychiatry −0.199 0.133 0.282∗∗∗ 0.317∗∗∗
(0.317) (0.396) (0.288) (0.272)































constant 2.588∗∗∗ 2.747∗∗∗ 2.520∗∗∗ 2.157∗∗∗
(0.155) (0.255) (0.382) (0.624)
Surgery −0.072 −0.440∗∗∗ −0.437∗∗∗ −0.254∗∗∗
(0.241) (0.332) (0.282) (0.243)
Internal Medicine −0.052 −0.637∗∗∗ −0.519∗∗∗ −0.536∗∗∗
(0.273) (0.367) (0.324) (0.234)
Pediatrics −0.282 −0.796∗∗∗ −0.638∗∗∗ −0.464∗∗∗
(0.252) (0.357) (0.315) (0.271)
Neurology/Psychiatry 0.598∗∗ 0.180 0.012 −0.182
(0.392) (0.599) (0.453) (0.312)






























N 733 733 733 729
Log-likelihood -13,218.83 -13,129.38 -12,807.65 -11,931.48
Notes. ∗p<0.10; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table D.6.6: Random coefficient model including specialty choice, preference parameters,
noise, and marginal effects, CES preferences
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
a
Constant 0.363∗∗∗ 0.426∗∗∗ 0.294∗∗∗ 0.612∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.028) (0.028) (0.055)
Surgery −0.022∗∗∗ −0.024∗∗ −0.010∗ −0.009∗
(0.007) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005)
Internal Medicine −0.012 −0.015∗ −0.012∗∗ −0.017
(0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.011)
Pediatrics −0.023∗∗∗ −0.023∗∗ −0.015∗ −0.015∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.005)
Neurology/Psychiatry −0.009 −0.008 0.001 −0.006





Practical year 0.189∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.024)

























Constant −0.786∗∗∗ −0.270∗∗ −0.405∗∗∗ −0.658∗
(0.138) (0.136) (0.150) (0.388)
Surgery −0.038 −0.027 −0.019 −0.014
(0.048) (0.044) (0.063) (0.019)
Internal Medicine −0.056 −0.036 −0.080 −0.028
(0.047) (0.046) (0.079) (0.029)
Pediatrics −0.009 0.022 0.048 0.007
(0.061) (0.047) (0.075) (0.015)
Neurology Psychiatry 0.053 0.039 0.107 0.015





Practical year 0.179∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗
(0.083) (0.019)

























Constant 0.782∗∗∗ 0.691∗∗∗ 0.741∗∗∗ 0.664∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.045) (0.049) (0.088)
Surgery 0.008 0.010 0.003 0.017
(0.010) (0.013) (0.006) (0.025)
Internal Medicine 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.004
(0.010) (0.014) (0.007) (0.029)
Pediatrics −0.007 −0.016 −0.009 −0.035
(0.012) (0.015) (0.008) (0.026)
Neurology Psychiatry −0.023∗∗ −0.031∗ −0.020∗∗ −0.066∗





Practical year −0.006 −0.024
(0.008) (0.033)
























N 733 733 733 729
Log-likelihood -5,558.94 -5,550.56 -5,556.06 -5,522.58
Notes. ∗p<0.10; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table D.6.7: Random coefficient model including specialty choice, covariance parameter
estimates, CES preferences
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Ω[a,a] 2.010
∗∗∗ 1.958∗∗∗ 1.809∗∗∗ 1.517∗∗∗
(0.193) (0.183) (0.169) (0.148)
Ω[r,r] 1.389
∗∗∗ 1.251∗∗∗ 1.255∗∗∗ 1.186∗∗∗
(0.157) (0.141) (0.149) (0.137)
Ω[µ,µ] 0.368
∗∗∗ 0.359∗∗∗ 0.348∗∗∗ 0.334∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.041) (0.039) (0.041)
Ω[a,r] 0.468
∗∗∗ 0.376∗∗∗ 0.367∗∗∗ 0.339∗∗∗
(0.123) (0.112) (0.107) (0.094)
Ω[a,µ] −0.224
∗∗∗ −0.180∗∗∗ −0.157∗∗∗ −0.150∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.063) (0.061) (0.055)
Ω[r,µ] −0.536
∗∗∗ −0.484∗∗∗ −0.471∗∗∗ −0.436∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.062) (0.063) (0.059)
N 733 733 733 729
Log-likelihood -5,558.94 -5,550.56 -5,556.06 -5,522.58
Notes. ∗p<0.10; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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